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CHAPTER I
TI'l"TRODUCTION
The geographic area known as Silicon Valley, in the southem part of the San
Francisco Bay Area, is widely recognized as a hub of high-tech business development
and innovation. Silicon Valley is the third largest high-tech manufacturing center in the
U.S., according to a 2008 survey, with 225,300 high-tech jobs and the largest high-tech
manufacturing center in the U.S. The region has the highest concentration of high-tech
workers of any metropolitan area and the highest average high-tech salary (AeA, 2008).
Silicon Valley has become the archetypical example of a regional cluster (Saxenian,
1994).
A regional cluster is simply a group of interconnected companies and institutions
doing business in a similar industry or organizational field in a particular geography
(Porter, 1998a). Regional clusters can have profound economic impacts on their regions.
Regional clusters create positive self-reinforcing feedback loops (Arthur, 1994) in the
regional and national economy, resulting in potentially large economic growth within
their geography. Additionally, the increasing economic returns that regional clusters
deliver run contrary to predictions that globalization will negate locationa1 advantages
(Guillen, 2001; Marquis & Batti1ana, 2009, forthcoming). Researchers, economic
2developers, and politicians are thus extremely interested in understanding how and why
regional clusters emerge.
Why do regional clusters develop? So far researchers know little about the
natural seeding and growth of clusters (Noted exception: Chiles, Meyer & Hench, 2004).
Trying to explain cluster emergence, Pouder and St. John (1996: 1198) state, "In some
ways, clusters of firms are analogous to forests of trees. Although one cannot anticipate
exactly when or where the first seed will land within a field, once the seed is implanted, it
is highly likely more trees will follow." However, this view is overly deterministic. If it
were true, regional clusters would be more common. We would expect to see software
development clusters populating regions around Phoenix and Fargo, in addition to the
well-established clusters in Seattle and the Bay Area.
Research shows that, in general, regional clusters exist because the locational
advantages of a particular area are greater than the benefits of locating in a more
dispersed pattern. These locational advantages include both access to natural resources
and positive externalities, such as labor market pooling or the knowledge spillover that
result from business clustering. However, the influence of natural resources on location
choice is not as great as might be expected. In a recent study, natural resources explained
only 20 percent of location selection (Ellison & Glaeser, 1999). Researchers studying the
influence of externalities on regional clustering have considered firm benefits resulting
from enhanced access to geographically bound factor markets, knowledge, and
innovation (see Lawson, 1999; Newlands, 2003; Tallman, Jenkins, Henry & Pinch, 2004
for reviews). Surprisingly little research explores the advantages of geographically bound
institutional contexts.
3The enduring locational advantages to finns in regional clusters are rooted in
resources and capabilities that are difficult or expensive to transfer (Barney, 1991;
Wernerfelt, 1984). While globalization (the rapid growth of international trade and
investment) makes factor markets and codified knowledge highly transferable, research
has shown that regional clusters maintain their inimitability (Guillen, 2001). Although
many resources and capabilities are transferable, geographical, institutional, and inter-
organizational contexts are not. A complete explanation of the emergence and
perfonnance of regional clusters requires an understanding of the role played by such
inimitable and non-transferable resources. I contribute to our understanding of the
emergence and perfonnance of regional clusters by exploring the role of one such
resource: the institutional context. The research question--How institutions, specifically,
varying levels ofa congruous institutional logic, affect regional cluster emergence-
guides this study. In order to clarify my research question, I next define institutions,
congruous institutional logics, and regional clusters.
Defining Institutions
Institutions are "multifaceted, durable social structures, made up of symbolic
elements, social activities, and material resources" (Scott, 2001: 49). Institutions limit
and define individuals' choice sets and as such influence social and economic activity.
Many disciplines address the impact of institutions-forces within society, culture, and
markets- that pressure organizations to behave and adopt fonns that conform to these
forces. The various disciplines create slightly different flavors of institutional theory
(i.e.Meyer & Rowan, 1977; North, 1990), which Scott (2001) reviews and compares.
4Scott (2001) integrated the various streams of institutional research into three
pillars, or types, of institutional forces-regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive.
Regulative institutions are formalized rules in society or an organizational field that
derive their force from legal systems. Normative institutions are based on value systems
that derive their force from moral legitimacy. Cultural-cognitive institutions are agreed-
upon definitions and beliefs that derive their force from cultural legitimacy.
These three types of institutions can operate at many different levels, ranging
from an organizational subsystem to a world system (Scott, 2001). However, the most
important level of analysis for researchers investigating institutional processes within
institutional theory is the organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001).
An organizational field is a group of organizations, which have a cognitive and social
cohesiveness such that they "constitute a recognized area of organizational life"
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For example, U.S. museums (DiMaggio, 1991) or U.S.
banks (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007) can be considered organizational fields. Institutional
fields differ from regional clusters because regional clusters are necessarily
geographically bound and contain many organizations and inter-institutional systems.
Thus, organizations focusing on a particular technological arena such as wind or solar
power generation comprise an organizational field regardless of their geographic
location. A regional cluster of solar energy manufacturers would be a subset of the
organizational field, confined to a particular location. How the three pillars of
institutional theory influence activities within an organizational field can be measured by
institutional logics.
..----------- - _._----
Institutional Logics
According to Thornton and Ocasio, institutional logics are:
the socially constructed, historical pattems of material practices,
assumptions, values, beliefs, and lUles by which individuals produce and
reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide
meaning to their social reality. (Thorton & Ocasio, 1999: 804)
Friedland and Alford (1991) were the first theorists to introduce the concept of
institutional logics to represent institutional belief systems that guide actions of
organizations and actors. It is important to clarify that institutional logics have meaning
and actions associated with them (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). By including actions,
institutional logics overcome the difficulty in measuring institutional influences on
organizational activities. I define institutional logics that fit an individual or
organizational belief system to be congruous institutional logics. ConglUous means
"being in agreement, harmony, or correspondence; conforming to the circumstances or
requirements of a situation" (Merriam-Webster, 2009). As such, a congruous
institutional logic can be thought of as being harmonious with a firm's activities.
For example, a common belief in the institutional logic of wealth protection in
mutual fund management in Boston existed at the same time as an institutional logic of
wealth growth in mutual fund management in New York City. These different
5
institutional logics, which were congruous in each city, then in tum influenced what were
deemed appropriate management behaviors in each city (Lounsbury, 2007). Lounsbury
assumed the appropriate institutional logic was represented in each city, but did not
measure how much ofthat congruous logic was represented in the city and how that level
of a congruous logic influenced the amount of each type of money management firm.
-----------------------_._--_ ....._.. _.
This study measures the prevalence of a congruous institutional logic across many cities.
And although Lounsbury was not studying regional clusters, his study reinforced how
institutional logics can be associated with geographic regions, which are themselves
associated with variance in institutions and institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio,
2008). And yet geographic regions are not the same as regional clusters. Next, I clarify
the definition of regional clusters used in this study.
Defining Regional Clusters
Researchers examine regional clusters from several schools of thought, including
theories of agglomeration, knowledge, untraded interdependencies, and evolutionary
economics. (A review ofthe theories employed is in Appendix A.) There is overlap
between the definitions of many of the terms used by these schools of thought to identify
regional clusters. They include the tenns agglomeration economies, industrial districts,
industrial regions, competency regions, and communities. Despite the definitional
variances, together their propositions build toward a more complete model of regional
clusters from which to begin this study than anyone school alone. A theme common to
all of these tenns is the notion of interrelated industries bound by a geographic region.
For this study, I use Porter's recent and encompassing definition:
A cluster is a geographically proximate group of interconnected
companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by
commonalities and complementarities. (1998a, p.: 199)
This study examines the phenomenon of regional clusters. Population ecology
and network studies address similar phenomena. However, as I explain below, the
definition I adopt for regional clusters leads me to exclude most research based on the
6
7theory of population ecology, but I do include the body of work inclusive of
geographically bound network research.
Population ecology measures organizational performance in relation to foundings,
density, and demise of homogenous organizations (Carroll & Hannan, 2000). A
population of organizations can be in a geographically bound regional cluster, but a
population of one organizational form or industry is not sufficient to comprise a cluster
on its own. For example, population ecology has studied the performance implications of
hotels based on hotel size and density (Baum & Ingram, 1998), and yet this does not
represent a tourism cluster. Additionally, population ecology treats all organizations
within a population as equal, resulting in contradictory implications (Freeman, Audia,
Cook & Massey, 2006). Regional clusters are comprised of multiple homogenous
industries or heterogeneous organizational populations within geographic boundaries.
Clearly, a true representation of a regional cluster in a study cannot track a population of
one organizational form. Since this study focuses on regional clusters, it does notdraw
from population ecology research.
Regional cluster research overlaps with network research. Explanations of the
emergence and performance of regional clusters must consider the implications of
geographically bound networks, such as biotechnology firms in Boston (Owen-Smith &
Powell,2004). However, regional clusters and networks are not synonymous. Regional
clusters are geographically bound interrelated industries, which are not the same as
networks considering, "network research investigates relational processes and structures
at many different levels of analysis" (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003, p.: 4). Network research
focuses on the structure of relational ties between nodes, without geographic or level of
8analysis assumptions. Although networks need not be bound by a geographic region,
they are often more cohesive with propinquity. Physically proximate networks are more
effective at transmitting information. For example, researchers have shown venture
capital funds prefer to invest in biotechnology ventures that are geographically nearby
(Powell, Koput, Bowie & Smith-Doerr, 2002).
However, although networks are an important structural component of clusters,
network effects are distinguishably different from those of clusters. Geoffrey Bell (2005)
modeled the effects of management networks, firm networks, and cluster membership on
innovation, finding that although both manager networks and cluster membership
positively and significantly affected innovation, cluster membership had a much greater
effect than manager networks. This study draws from only that network research that is
relevant to geographically proximate interrelated organizations and associated
institutions.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In the following
chapter, Chapter 2, I systematically review previous work related to the institutional and
geographic contexts of cluster emergence, drawing on Scitovsky's (1957) two concepts
of external economies. As noted above, cluster research emphasizes benefits derived
from positive externalities. Using Scitovsky's two external economies, I organize
previous research according to the type of beneficial externalities it explains. I begin by
explaining Scitovsky's concepts of pecuniary and technological external economies, and
then examine previous empirical research through this lens, highlighting findings that
show how institutions interact with these externalities. I then review institutional logics
9in order to show how it can be used to bridge the gaps in the reviewed regional cluster
research.
In Chapter 3, I use the institutional logics framework to develop a model and
hypotheses. The institutional logics perspective is appropriate because it instantiates
institutions through meaning and action (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) to explain how
institutions influence actions of people and organizations (Friedland & Alford, 1991). I
develop three hypotheses to test the influence of congruous institutional logics across
geographic areas to see if the relative prevalence of a congruous institutional logic results
in more firms and greater levels of clustering.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I describe the methods I employed to test the hypotheses and
the results of the analysis, respectively. For the empirical setting, I consider the passage
of the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) a catalyst for business
cluster emergence in the renewable energy sector and examine the emergence of wind
and solar energy clusters after the passage of this act. I use fixed effects estimation on
the panel data set to test several hypotheses regarding positive direct and moderating
effects of institutional alignment on cluster emergence and growth. I tind that conglUous
institutional logics have a positive direct influence on clustering, and as technological
uncertainty increases, this positive direct influence is enhanced. I find only partial
support for the moderating influence of congmous institutional logics on the positive
direct effect of positive externalities on clustering.
Chapter 6 provides conclusions and implications ofthis study. By examining the
theoretical, public policy, and managerial implications of the results, this study
contributes to our understanding of the emergence and performance of regional clusters.
10
The findings of this study show institutional contexts do influence clustering behavior of
finns. As such, this study contributes to a more thorough understanding of the
emergence of regional clusters.
11
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
IExisting empirical research on clusters has shown benefits resulting from
positive externalities generated in regional clusters. While researchers have conjectured
about the importance of institutional contexts, to date, we know little empirically about
how it influences cluster emergence. To streamline and elucidate prior research, I
organize this review of the empirical literature through the lens ofScitovsky's (1957) two
external economies. Following the review of the empirical research on clusters, I present
a review of institutional logics as a theoretical bridge to fill the gap in cluster research on
institutional influences.
Scitovsky's Two External Economies
Externalities are third-party benefits or detriments resulting from market
transactions between buyers and sellers (Mikesell, 2003). They are considered third-
party benefits or detriments because they do not accrue to the decision maker. A
common example of externalities, such as a neighboring factory polluting the air, tends to
I Varying disciplines and intellectual genealogies shape researchers' approaches
to studying regional clusters. Because of these differing origins, researchers tend to come
from at least four different schools of thought regarding the sources of advantages to
businesses in clusters. A review of the differing schools ofthought applied to regional
clusters is located in Appendix A.
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emphasize the negative outcomes from externalities. However, in the case of regional
clusters, externalities are often positive.
Regional clusters create a positive feedback loop (Arthur, 1994) where the
concentration of interrelated firms creates benefits, which encourages more firms to form
or locate in the region, which creates more benefits, and so forth. Of course, the impact
of more firms clustering may reach an inflection point where congestion results in a
detriment (Folta, Cooper & Baik, 2006). However, benefits outweigh detriments during
the process of cluster growth and emergence. In other words, the externalities are
summatively positive. Most of the empirical research on clusters highlights the positive
nature of externalities.
Tibor Scitovsky (1957) delineated two types of external economies (a.k.a.
externalities), in order to improve the application of the concept of externalities to
economic theory: pecuniary and technological. The first external economy is pecuniary.
Pecuniary externalities exist where,
the profits of the firm depend not only on its own output and factor inputs
but also on the output and factor inputs of other firms" (Scitovsky, 1954:
146, emphasis in original).
The second external economy is technological. Technological externalities exist
whenever,
the output of a firm depends not only on the factors of production utilized by this
finn but also on the output and factor utilization of another firm or group of firms.
(Scitovsky, 1957:145, italics added).
Scitovsky conceives of pecuniary extemalities as broader and more encompassing
than technological extemalities, because in addition to non-market interdependence
between producers, pecuniary externalities include market-based interdependence
13
between producers. Scitovsky gives an example of a pecuniary externality as the
situation when "investment in industry A will cheapen its product; and if this is used as a
factor in industry B, the latter's profits will rise." (Scitovsky, 1957: 146) He
distinguishes pecuniary externalities from the creation of a proper consumers' surplus,
since it is benefiting finns rather than consumers. In order to clarify the meaning of
pecuniary externalities, it helps to remember the definition of pecuniary as relating to or
measured by money. Therefore, pecuniary externalities are third-party benefits
improving a finn's profits. Pecuniary externalities emphasize increased profits because
of market benefits such as reduced costs of inputs or increased demand for outputs. An
example of a positive pecuniary externality in clusters is a lower wage for skilled labor,
because workers know there is employment for their particular skills in the cluster's
geographic region.
Technological externalities are more specific in definition than pecuniary
externalities because the technological externality does not include market-based
interdependence between producers. For example, a well-known story of a positive
technological externality comes from the symbiotic relationship between bees and
flowers. Orchard owners' benefit from pollination oftheir fruit trees while beekeepers
are producing honey for their own profit. Orchard owners and beekeepers mutually
benefit even though there may not be direct contracts or market mechanisms. Although
this is similar to an economy of scope, where a by-product of production may result in
cost-savings in another location or product, economies of scope usually occur within the
same finn whereas technological externalities do not.
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Scitovsky felt this type of positive externality was rather rare. However, in 1957,
the implications of a knowledge-versus-industrial economy had not been explored. In a
knowledge-based economy, learning and knowledge spillover are very important
examples of technological externalities. In order to clarify the meaning of technological
externalities, it is helpful to consider the definition of technological as improving the
completion of a task (Scitovsky, 1957). Technological externalities thus are third-party
benefits that improve a firm's production capabilities or an individual's utility.
Knowledge spillover is the most common type of technological externality in
business clusters (Fujita & Thisse, 1996). Scitovsky did not foresee the supplanting of an
industrial economy with a knowledge economy, and thus did not realize the potential
prevalence and importance of technological externalities. Technological externalities
became more prevalent and studied as the knowledge revolution supplanted the industrial
revolution as a driving force in economic growth (Rifkin, 2000). Researchers began
focusing on advantages of clustered organizations in knowledge creation, innovation, and
dissemination. Researchers such as Pouder and St. John and Powell and colleagues
(Pouder & St. John, 1996; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996) highlighted the
importance of clustered organizations' interactions and embeddedness in generating
knowledge.
Focusing on positive externalities to understand positive feed back loops (Arthur,
1994) fueling cluster emergence provides a systematic framework for examining
institutional influences on cluster emergence. Doeringer and Terkla (1995) emphasize
the need to understand positive externalities to understand the clustering process. Despite
the seemingly obvious interaction between positive externalities and institutional contexts
15
on regional clusters, the interaction is under-studied. Table 1 summarizes the two types
of externalities.
Table 1. Two External Economies in Regional Cluster Research
Externali!Y Mechanism Benefit
Pecuniary Non-market and market based Improved profits
I Technological Non-market based Improved production function or
individual utility (also leading to
improved profits)
Beneficial pecuniary and technological externalities drive positive feedback loops
fueling regional cluster emergence, thus providing a salient lens for analyzing previous
research. Scitovsky's lens aids in assimilating findings and gaps, indicating valuable
areas for future research. This literature review assimilates findings, institutional
influences, and methodology employed in prior research for each type of externality.
first discuss positive externalities, then discuss negative externalities of each type, and
then how previous research has examined institutional influences.
Pecuniary Externalities and Clusters
Researchers focusing on pecuniary extemalities in regional clusters have found
many benefits for clustered finns, including enhanced access to existing resources and
reduced costs of inputs, increased legitimacy, and access to specialized inputs. These
benefits derive from location near necessary resources or markets, increased access to
inputs, shared services, or increased competition. Negative externalities include
16
increased competition for resources and derive from congestion. Institutional influences
are reviewed with respect to each of the three institutional pillars-regulatory, normative,
and cultural-cognitive (Scott, 2001). Researchers use a variety of methods to study
institutional influences, such as event history analysis and qualitative research. This
section concludes with a summary of the research on clusters and pecuniary externalities.
First I review previous findings on pecuniary externalities for clustered firms.
Findings from Prior Research on Pecuniary Externalities
Enhanced access to existing resources. Empirical research on clustering
demonstrates that access to existing resources (Audretsch & Feldman, 2004; Decarolis &
Deeds, 1999; Karagozoglu & Lindell, 1998) increases with increasing concentration of
finns (Bresnahan, Gambardella & Saxenian, 2001) and reduces costs of inputs. For
example, Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999) found network stability and economic and
social interactions reduced transaction costs in the packaging manufacturing industry. A
review of the last 10 years of economic geography research (Rosenthal & Strange, 2007)
found that clustered firms have better access to labor market pooling, industrial inputs,
natural advantages, and increased consumption, and that they gain home market
advantages, and improved rent seeking.
Legitimacy. Normative and cognitive legitimacy (Scott, 2001) enhances survival
because organizations need resources, and legitimacy helps attract resources. Clusters, or
other geographically bounded regions, enhance the ability to acquire resources and
legitimacy because both are easier to acquire with propinquity. For example,
McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll, and Khessina (2003) found that legitimacy through identity
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formation of disk array producers was enhanced by geographical agglomeration.
Studying entrepreneurship in alternative energy foundings in New York and California,
Sine, Haveman, and Tolbert (2005) showed that legitimacy reduced the perceived risk of
using new technology, thus increasing new business foundings.
Access to specialized inputs. Other advantages to regional clusters found in the
management literature include resources with indivisibilities, such as when a regional
cluster has critical mass to support specialized law or investment firms. Saxenian (1990),
in her study of Route 128 and Silicon Valley, found that clustered firms benefited from
specialized business functions present within regional clusters. Saxenian (1990)
emphasizes the importance of Stanford University, trade associations, and other for-profit
organizations that provide services that firms cannot afford individually. A study of two
European ceramic tile clusters by Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos (2007) supports
this finding. Additionally, Stuart and Sorenson (2003) illustrated the importance of
public research universities and the availability of venture funding, in granting
entrepreneurs access to resources, in order to found new firms.
Negative externalities. Not all externalities are beneficial or equally distributed.
Detriments of clustering tend to come from problems with congestion. In their study on
internationalization of information technology firms, Fernhaber and colleagues (2007)
found that access to resources promoting internationalization were positive until cluster
size reached an inflection point, after which access to resources decreased. Similarly, as
clusters grow, firms benefit from improved access to alliance partners and private equity
partners until cluster size reaches an inflection point where benefits begin to decline
(Bresnahan et al., 2001). Besides negative externalities, distribution of positive
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externalities can be heterogeneous within a cluster. For example, in cellular handset
manufacturing clusters, collocating is more beneficial to less capable firms (Alcacer,
2006). Locating in a cluster is not always optimal, and consideration should be given to
firm capabilities and cluster characteristics. Despite these negative externalities, positive
pecuniary externalities dominate cluster research. Next, I examine research at the nexus
of pecuniary externalities, institutions, and clusters.
Institutions and Pecuniary Externalities
In this section, I show how previous research has found that each of the three
types of institutions influence pecuniary externalities. Regulatory institutions provide
opportunities to increase prices paid for outputs or improved access to necessary inputs
such as skilled labor. Nonnative institutions have less research than the other two, but
can encourage support for philanthropy that could help develop sources for inputs or
increase demand for outputs. Cultural-cognitive institutions can increase clustering
through institutional grooming of organizations or reduced transaction costs.
Regulatory institutions. Regulatory institutions influence pecuniary externalities
by influencing the cost of inputs or market demand. Specific to pecuniary externalities,
regulatory institutions benefit clustered firms through mechanisms such as reducing the
cost of inputs or increasing the demand for outputs. By improving the business climate
for firms, regulatory institutions can thus increase clustering of firms. Fromhold-Eisbeth
and Fromhold (2005) point out that although researchers have identified institutions as
important assets to clusters, there has been insufficient study and we lack a complete
understanding of how institutions affect cluster formation.
---_ .. - ._-----
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Local interpretations of existing regulations or flexibility in creating regulations
influences cluster development. Political decentralization, where local governments have
more flexibility in developing regulations, creates opportunities to encourage the
development of clusters (Benton, 1992; Ganne, 1995; Trigilia, 1992). Zeitlin (1995)
argues that the absence of flexibility for local governments with regulatory controls
stultifies regional cluster development, because local governments are prevented from
investing in infrastructure, training, or other business incentives.
Similarly, although not specifically studying clusters, literature on regulatory
influences on other geographically constrained entities has implications for
geographically constrained clusters. States and state regulations are examples of formal
institutions affecting pecuniary externalities. Ingram and Simons (2000) found a
stabilizing effect from state formation that resulted in an increase in new firm foundings.
In studies of alternative energy foundings, when regulations (under PURPA) lowered
economic entry barriers, foundings increased for those using new technology (Russo,
200,1,2003; Sine, Haveman & Tolbert, 2005). Russo (2001) found that the nature of the
regulatory environment and institutions affected alternative energy and cogeneration
facility foundings, such that clear statement of avoided cost calculations by state
regulators and the existence of trade associations increased foundings. Just as Russo
(2001) found that utilities sought to have PURPA interpreted to their benefit, Wade,
Swaminathan, and Saxon (1998) found that powerful organizations, such as the Women's
Christian Temperance Union during prohibition, will seek to shape institutional change to
their benefit, drastically affecting the viability of the climate for firm foundings and
potential for clustering.
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In additional research on U.S. state-level regulatory institutions, Lee & Sine
(2005) studied social movements in California and New Jersey. Their findings show that
social movements, indicated by increasing Sierra Club membership, resulted in changes
to the regulatory environment, which in tum resulted in increasing avoided cost rates. In
a follow-up study, (Sine & Lee, 2009) the authors found popular support for
environmental issues, as measured by Sierra Club membership, leads to more state
regulatory policies for renewable energy, and the number of state regulatory policies
leads to entrepreneUlial opportunity recognition for wind energy projects. In a very
interesting result, they found, contrary to the predictions of population ecology, that
organizational density did not affect entrepreneurial activity once natural resources and
environmental groups were in the model. Their findings suggest researchers should
consider "how pre-existing regional differences in non-economic sectors can shape
economic outcomes." (Lee & Sine, 2005: 114) My study seeks to test how institutions,
as a non-economic sector, can influence cluster emergence.
Normative institutions. Normative institutions have not been a focus of cluster
research because they are more about obligations and expected behaviors that influence
human behaviors more than firm performance. Normative institutions bring the
"prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension into social life" (Scott, 2001: 54).
However, research based on communities by Marquis and colleagues (Marquis, 2003;
Marquis & Battilana, 2009, forthcoming; Marquis, Glynn & Davis, 2007), considers
normative behaviors. Although they are researching unique norms that develop in
communities~not clusters~their research can help understand potential normative
influences on pecuniary externalities. For example, the norm that developed for
____________________'0__ - •• _
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corporate giving to the arts in Minneapolis, Minnesota, (Marquis et aL, 2007) could
generate access to specialized inputs. Researching the differences between corporate
philanthropy in Columbus and Cleveland, Ohio, (Marquis et aI., 2007), they found
corporate philanthropy in Columbus focused on non-profits that benefit children, while
corporate philanthropy in Cleveland focused on affordable housing. A nonn supporting
corporate philanthropy to support affordable housing could eventually lead to greater
access to a labor pool. This type of research has not been tied to clusters, most likely
because it is very difficult to link nonn-driven behavior to reduced cost of inputs.
Cultural-cognitive institutions. Cultural cognitive institutions are agreed-upon
definitions and beliefs that derive their force from cultural legitimacy. This drives what
is considered to be appropriate behavior by individuals or organizations in support of
identity (Scott, 2001). As stated by Fromhold-Eisbith and Eisbith (2005), there has been
too little research on how associated infotmal institutions, such as nonns and cultures of
interaction, influence cluster fonnation.
In a fascinating study about the emergence of a musical theater cluster, Chiles and
colleagues (2004) found that the important stabilizing and grooming nature of the local
culture and institutions created 'wholesome' theater offerings that built upon previous
successes leading to a positive feedback loop. Institutions such as local government,
chambers of commerce, and the local culture encouraged more 'wholesome' theater
offerings, which increased demand. The importance of understanding institutions for
cluster survival is reinforced by Tan's (2006) study of the state-fostered Beijing science
park that is experiencing premature ossification. Tan conjectures that the premature
ossification is due to a mismatch between the institutional environment and the finns.
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Ingram and Simons (2000), while not studying a regional cluster, are two of the
few researchers to look at the interaction of the ideologies of organizations. They studied
the implications of mutualism in ideologies on firm foundings of worker cooperatives in
Israel. Interestingly, they found that increases in the population of credit cooperatives,
which share ideology with worker cooperatives, increased worker cooperative foundings.
They conjecture that the increase in firm foundings results from reduced transaction costs
from benefits such as credible commitments and collective action. Since Ingram and
Simons conceive that the alignment of ideologies reduces transaction costs, as a market-
based transaction, this is an example of a pecuniary externality.
Can"oll and Swaminathan (2000) found that authentic connection to the local
regional identity increased new firm founding rates. In addition, when microbreweries
and brewpubs aligned in their form-based identities they enhanced each other's
legitimacy. By aligning with the local identity and with the form-based identity,
microbreweries confonned to the agreed-upon definitions and beliefs for cultural
legitimacy. This finding is supported by Freeman and Audia (2006) who state,
"Similarities in resources have competitive effects on organizations, whereas similarities
in cultural and ideological symbols appear to have mutualistic effects." (: 152).
Surprisingly, no one has studied mutualistic effects in regional clusters.
Although not specifically applied to regional clusters, demographic shifts affect
regional institutions. Haveman and Rao (1997), studying the early California thrift
industry, saw that the co-evolution of organizations and institutions changes as result of
demographic shifts and the spread of Progressivism. The battle between the different
types of thrifts represented the struggle between differing concepts of institutional logics.
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The authors define institutional logics as the nonns, rules, and ways of thinking, which
comprise moral sentiments. Institutional logics provide an opportunity to study
institutional influences on clusters. I review institutional logics after reviewing
technological externalities research.
Methodology for Pecuniary Externalities Research
The type of analysis used in these studies is usually logit or event history analysis
with the exception of Bresnahan and colleagues (2001) and Chiles and colleagues (2004),
who qualitatively studied emerging clusters. Measures of firnl-level success were
founding, age, size of initial public offering, and alliances in biotechnology. Three
studies examined cluster level perfornlance as well, looking at number and size of firms,
growth in sales, and return on assets (Bresnahan et aI., 2001; Hervas-Oliver & Albors-
Garrigos, 2007; Tan, 2006). Research settings varied considerably, with U.S.
biotechnology and infonnation technology being popular, but with other subjects
represented as well, such as European manufacturers of cellular handsets, packaging
equipment, and ceramic tiles.
One limitation common to some of these studies is how the researchers identify
clusters. For example, one study identified a cluster ifmore than one division that
produced cellular handset phones was located within 100 miles of another (Alcacer,
2006). In some studies, researchers identified clusters by generally accepted consensus in
public or industry perception. Most of the studies are careful to not sample on a
dependent variable of already being in a cluster (Exception: Bresnahan et aI., 2001;
Chiles et aI., 2004). There are two notable exceptions: Fernhaber and colleagues (2007)
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calculated clusters based on finn density after accounting for all new information
technology ventures across the U.S, and Russo (2003) calculated density of project filings
for each county in California.
The empirical research in economic geography tends to focus on only one
industry, rather than the generally accepted definition of clusters as being comprised of
interrelated industries. For example, economic geography research rarely includes the
presence of public research organizations in their studies. It is di fficult to conclude that
economic geography has adequately measured clusters in previous research.
In order to bling in relevant research on institutions, some of the literature
reviewed did not study clusters (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Haveman & Rao, 1997;
Lee & Sine, 2005; Russo, 2001; Sine et aI., 2005). However, since more than one
organizational fonn or industry is necessary for regional clusters, these studies sample
from more than one organizational fonn or industry. For example, Lee and Sine (2005)
modeled how changing Sierra Club membership and regulations avoided costs for wind
energy projects. They showed how cultural-cognitive institutions lead to regulatory
institutions, which lead to more qualifying facility projects at the state level.
Summarizing Pecuniary Externality Research
Clearly, pecuniary externalities provide benefits to clustered finns. Some
researchers found points of diminishing returns to cluster size, however all of those
researchers studied only one type of organizational form or industry. Although negative
externalities are expected from competition and congestion, without incorporating
institutional environments or other organizations it is difficult to understand the
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systematic influence on cluster size. Overall, it appears that institutional environments
are neglected in understanding transactional efficiencies from pecuniary externalities in
clusters. Only one study (Stuart & Sorenson, 2003a) explained collocation in
biotechnology resulting from proximity to venture capital necessary for entrepreneurial
resource acquisition. Although not studying clusters, Ingram and Simons (2000)
theorized institutional factors reduce transaction costs. They did not use organizations in
the workers cooperatives' supply chain as would be expected, instead using financial
institutions with similar ideology. This method could be applied to understand the
influence of cultural-cognitive institutions on regional clusters.
Next, the literature review assimilates the previous research on technological
externalities. Research focusing on knowledge spillover, learning, and innovation
assumes much of the benefits from pecuniary externalities while highlighting benefits
from technological externalities.
Technological Externalities and Clusters
Researchers focusing on technological externalities have found many benefits for
clustered firms, including knowledge spillover, and innovation, and knowledge created
within networks and from social resources such as experience. These benefits derive
from location near sources of the underlying knowledge and interaction with other firms.
Negative externalities include unintended knowledge spillover derived from interactions
with other firms. Institutional influences are reviewed with respect to each ofthe three
institutional pillars-regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive (Scott, 2001).
Researchers use a variety ofmethods including event history analysis and qualitative
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research. This section concludes with a summary ofthe research on clusters and
technological externalities. First, I review previous findings on technological
externalities for clustered firms.
Findings from Prior Research on Technological Externalities
Knowledge spillover. Knowledge spillover increases production function, and
thus is a technological externality. Research in this area emerged in the early 1990s, led
by Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson's (1993) influential article. They found that the
spread of ideas is greatly influenced by geographic proximity. Using forward citation
patterns, they detennined that patents are five to 10 times more likely to come from the
same Metropolitan Statistical Area. Almeida and Kogut (1999) reinforced this by
proving that knowledge spillovers are geographically limited.
Empirical research on technological externalities has shown that knowledge
spillover increases with location and proximity (Rosenthal & Strange, 2007). One of the
reasons is due to the geographically bound nature of the labor force. Almeida and Kogut
(1999) tracked highly cited patents and the mobility of semiconductor engineers between
firms, and found that knowledge flow is regionally constrained, and also that flow is
partially due to the mobility of engineers. Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1986) found that
the emergence of the U.S. biotechnology industry was due to the basic scientific findings
of uni versi ty research scientists whose knowledge spilled over into their region. There is
a feedback effect: when one biotechnology firm has already started operating in a ZIP
code near a public research organization, then more are likely to form (Stuart &
Sorenson, 2003a).
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Another reason for knowledge spillover is local networks. Owen-Smith and
Powell (2004) posit that formal linkages result from informal social interactions in the
Boston biotech community. The differences between bottom-up cluster formation and
top-down cluster fostering highlights the importance of embeddedness to cluster
emergence. Although public policy makers try to encourage knowledge spillovers,
publicly fostered clusters are less interconnected and create less innovation than
organically developed clusters (Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005). The investment to
foster clusters is wasted if the economic players are already networked (Newlands, 2003)
or the area lacks an intellectual pole (Lawson & Lorenz, 1999) for developing the
underlying science.
However, benefits come not only from network connections but also from value
of the knowledge inherent in the network itself (Kogut, 2000r In their study of
production networks, Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999) found that clustering enhanced
development of specialized knowledge internal and between firms.
Innovation. Studying innovation in Silicon Valley, Saxenian (1990) found the
greater number of smaller businesses, in addition to mingling from shared business
services and residential communities, results in more innovation and new business
creation than in Boston's Route 128 area. Moody and White's (2003) findings that
network cohesiveness results in more net benefit than network centrality supports this
idea. Testing Saxenian's conception of Silicon Valley's culture, two economic
geography articles measure the impact of adding employment to smaller firms, which
they theorized as being more open to knowledge spillover than larger firms. Increases in
employment to smaller firms in clusters (Henderson, 2003) resulted in more new business
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foundings, and in more productivity (Rosenthal & Strange, 2003). Owen-Smith and
Powell (2004) showed how the influence of public research organizations in capturing
value in a biotechnology cluster changed over time. Early in Boston's biotechnology
cluster public research organizations were dominant, positively enhancing patents for
firms in the region at the same time network centrality was negatively correlated to
patents. Later when commercial organizations dominated the cluster, network centrality
was positively con"elated with increased patents.
Evolving routines. Other technological externalities for clustered firms result
from evolving routines, which, as explained by evolutionary economics, provide a
mechanism to understand cluster growth. Klepper (2007) showed how the U.S. auto
industry cluster in Detroit emerged as new firms spun off from successful firms. He
argued that the cluster could be explained through spin-off'> alone and was not due to
agglomeration economies. His evidence is strong enough to support the statement that
spin-offs locate near parent firms as a mechanism of cluster growth, but is not as strong
in his attempt at invalidating agglomeration economy benefits. Klepper's findings were
moderated by Boschma and Wenting's (2007) study of the British auto industry, which
showed agglomeration economies resulting from related industries. Operationalized as
labor pool data, these related industries were necessary for starting a cluster. Once the
cluster was initiated, their findings agreed that spin-offs were the main driver for cluster
growth.
Social learning. Other advantages such as trust, understandings, and experience
come from social resources developed from embeddedness. Uzzi (1997) found in his
study of garment manufacturing that embeddedness resulted in trust which resulted in
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economies of time. Trust developed from a heuristic method of extra effort given
between exchange partners acting in each other's interest. Saxenian (1994) found that a
network of professional and social ties enhanced diffusion of knowledge, capabilities,
and understandings, in a comparative case study of Silicon Valley and Route 128.
Silicon Valley was the more successful location because of the understandings developed
through social networks, collective learning, and collaborative relationships. Klepper
(2005) found that television manufacturers were more successful when they developed
experience in radio manufacturing. Boschma and Wenting (2007) found that clusters
fonn where there are industries that are related, so that entrepreneurs gain experience
prior to starting new ventures. Automobile manufacturing entrepreneurs were more
successful than other auto manufacturers if they first gained experience in bicycle
manufacturing.
Negative externalities. Not all effects from clustering are equally beneficial.
Clustering can lead to unintended knowledge spillover. Yoffie (1993) found that
semiconductor finns concerned about sharing technology avoided collocating with
competitors. For the same reason, Chung and Alcacer (2002) found that foreign firn1s
locating in the U.S. who were technologically advanced chose to avoid existing industry
clusters. Studying the uneven distribution of externalities in clusters, Boschma and Ter
wal (2007) found unequal innovation perfonnance in clustered finns, such that more
innovative finns had more out-of-cluster relationships. However, the direction of the
causation in that finding is unclear. More innovative finns may attract more extra-local
relationships. In an example of uneven distribution of externalities, Becchitti and Rossi
(2000) found that smaller finns benefited more from shared knowledge about exporting.
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And Audretsch and Feldman (1984) found that clustered firms performed better at the
beginning of a cluster's life cycle and worse than non-clustered firms at the end of a
cluster's life cycle. Despite these negative externalities, positive externalities dominate
cluster research. However, a researcher must consider finn and cluster age when
modeling externalities if it is a well-established industry or cluster. Next, I examine
research at the nexus of technological externalities, institutions, and clusters.
Institutions and Technological Externalities
In this section I describe how previous research has found the influence of each of
the three types of institutions on technological externalities. Regulatory institutions can
create environments that facilitate knowledge spillover by not enforcing non-compete
clauses. Normative institutions have less research than the other two, but can encourage
support for businesses connected through family networks. Cultural-cognitive
institutions can increase knowledge spillover through accepted behaviors that encourage
knowledge sharing or entrepreneurial endeavors.
Regulatory institutions. Theoretically, Pouder and St. John (1996) argue that
'hot spots' have institutional forces, which increase innovation. However, as the
institutions ossify, they suppress innovation. In support of this idea, Maskell (2001)
argued for the imp011ance of the fit between institutions and industry in their ability to
develop knowledge. In both articles, the authors do not differentiate between types of
institutional fit.
Although it is clearly apparent that regulatory institutions such as laws, industry
subsidies, and tax breaks should greatly influence technological externalities, I found a
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surprisingly small amount of recent empirical research with two exceptions. Russo
(2003) modeled technological externalities in his study of wind energy filings in
California. Although he considered the pecuniary externalities of efficient access to
social capital and natural land resources where wind is abundant, he also considered the
externality of access to knowledge embedded in counties with previous wind projects.
More foundings and subsequent knowledge spillover resulted in conjunction with natural
resources, social capital, and economic viability brought about by regulatory changes.
Although not studying clusters, Stuart and Sorenson (2003b) found that spin-offs were
more likely in California, where the institutional nonn is to not enforce non-compete
clauses. Where compete clauses are enforced, knowledge spillover is reduced.
Normative institutions. Nonnative institutions have not been studied much in
cluster research. With the exception of the extended familial network in Italy (Piore &
Sabel, 1984) where familial obligations to support each others' businesses facilitated the
growth of clusters. These familial connections lead to knowledge spillover and increased
innovation. Cultural-cognitive institutions have stronger support in previous research for
enhancing technological externalities.
Cultural-cognitive institutions. Seminal research by Saxenian (1994) in her
comparison of Route 128 and Silicon Valley detennined that culture and institutions
matter in firm performance. Silicon Valley was the more successful location because it
had more mixing of work and residential venues and more shared institutions, which
resulted in more opportunities for entrepreneurs. Romanelli and Khessina (2005) argue
for a regional industrial identity, where people, both residents and external audiences,
start businesses that match a strong regional industrial identity. In building their
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argument, they assume that Metropolitan Statistical Areas have one industry or
organizational fOlill, creating a strong signal for an existing cluster. This assumption
does not align with the definition of cluster as interrelated industries and organizations.
However, the idea ofa regional identity attracting firms does support mechanisms of
cluster growth.
In their study of the emergence of a cluster of musical theaters in Branson,
Missouri, Chiles and colleagues (2004) found that cultural cognitive institutions
reinforcing 'wholesomeness' provided stability throughout the evolution of the collective,
as entrepreneurs creatively recombined resources that led to a positive feedback loop. In
a rare study to look at initial foundings within populations, Audia and colleagues (2006)
showed the importance of incorporating other industries in models. Initial foundings of
instrument manufacturers are more likely with higher densities of competitive and
synergistic firms. They argue that this is fueled by knowledge, not agglomeration
economies, because instrument manufactuting has minimal shipping costs. However,
they neglected to explain how initial foundings may be related to institutions in these
areas.
Methodology for Technological Externalities Research
For the reviewed studies, the type of analysis is usually logit or event history
analysis. The dependent variable is most often firm founding, or a derivative such as age
or death. The dependent variable has higher levels of detail for biotechnology, including
information on alliances, funding, patents, and co-authors. The approach to sampling
usually includes the entire U.S. There is concern about how some studies detennine
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clusters, although in this grouping of empirical research there are excellent examples for
determining clusters. For example, Becchetti and Rossi (2000) used not one, but two
methods to calculate clusters: the Del Cole distance to calculated poles; and the Sforzi
index, a ratio of employment in small and medium sized enterprises to national
employment average in all size firms. In another example, Audia, Freeman, and
Reynolds (2006) measured clustering within Labor Market Areas. This approach fails in
rural areas because it covers geographic areas until a minimum population of 100,000 is
reached. For rural areas, the geographic space required to accumulate 100,000 people
can be quite large. The study included places like Kalispell, Montana, where the entire
state has a population of 800,000 people. Sorenson and Audia (2000) used density of
clumping by state. Almeida and Kogut (1999) did not sample on the dependent variable
of being in a pre-identified cluster, but rather used data on the entire industry and
identified clusters by closely located firms. However, they made Oregon and
Washington one region, which is a geographically huge area with dubious informative
value for clusters.
The unit of analysis for most of these articles was foundings and exits. Most
researchers aggregated data to the state level with the exceptions of Russo (2003), who
aggregated to the county level; Klepper (2007), who aggregated to the metropolitan
statistical area level; and Owen-Smith and Powell (2004), who analyzed at the firm and
network level in Boston. The greatest limitation in the methodology is that institutions
have rarely been modeled with respect to regional clusters.
Another limitation in the empirical research was sampling only one organizational
form within clusters. For example, Sorenson and Audia (2000) sampled only shoe
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manufacturers, and many studies on biotechnology sampled only biotechnology firms
and their initial public offerings (Noted exceptions: Powell et aI., 2002; Stuali &
Sorenson,2003a). Counter to this trend, Boschma and Wenting (2007) looked at
automobile manufacturing foundings related to labor market for coach and cycle making
as well. In another notable study, Audia and colleagues (2006) looked at synergistic and
competitive firms and firm founding. Audia, Freeman, and Reynolds (2006) used data
from the US Department of Commerce's Benchmark Input-Output Account from 1977
and 1987 to determine purchasing from and selling to behaviors with other sectors. From
those ratios, they calculated indexes for community supplier and purchaser synergy, and
community competitiveness, for similar transactions as instrument manufacturers. The
thoroughness of their calculations is impressive, however they too did not incorporate
institutions in their models.
Summarizing Technological Externalities Research
Clearly, technological externalities benefit clustered firms. However, there has
not been enough research to understand the influence of institutions on regional cluster
formation. The researchers who studied the evolution of regional clusters neglected
institutions (Boschma & Tel' Wal, 2007; Klepper, 2005, 2007), or they study institutions
and neglect regional clusters (Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; Sine et aI., 2005). To
improve our understanding about regional cluster development, researchers need to
integrate models of institutions and regional clusters as interrelated industries.
Institutional logics provide a framework for filling that gap. The next section explains
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how institutional logics are suited to understanding institutional influences on cluster
emergence.
Insti tutional Logics
As highlighted in the cluster literature review, the influence of institutions on
regional clusters have been suggested but not tested (Russo, 2003 is a notable exception).
And yet, researchers have suggested that the institutional environment is critical to the
structure and flow of knowledge spillover and innovation (Malmberg & Maskell, 2006;
Saxenian, 1994). Institutional logics provide a useful framing to represent and
understand those institutional influences on cluster emergence.
Institutional theorists have developed the concept of institutional logics to
represent belief systems that guide actions of organizations and actors (Friedland &
Alford, 1991). Institutional logics represent:
the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices,
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and
reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide
meaning to their social reality. (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: 804)
Institutional logics can influence action at many levels, and have been shown to exist at
the level of geographic communities (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). By influencing action
at a geographic level, they provide a tool to predict institutional influences on cluster
emergence.
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Prior Research on Institutional Logics
Researchers have found direct and moderating influences of institutional logics on
organizations. First, I review prior research showing direct effects, and then review the
research in higher education publishing showing moderating effects (Thornton & Ocasio,
1999).
Direct effects. Logics focus attention on what individuals and organizations will
find meaningful and what types of solutions they will perceive (Thornton & Ocasio,
1999). Lounsbury describes institutional logics as "broader cultural beliefs and rules that
structure cognition and guide decision making in the field" (Lounsbury, 2007:289).
Because organizational decision makers have limited resources for search processes,
when they need to find a solution, they search within the vicinity of current solutions and
knowledge (March, 1994). For example, consider an organizational decision maker
looking for a waste solution. If the person has a pro-environmental logic guiding their
thinking, then recycling is more likely to be perceived as a possible solution. Likewise, if
this same person with a pro-environmental logic is interested in generating electricity, the
person is more likely to see renewable energy technology as a possible solution, thus
directly influencing organizational behavior.
Researchers have shown how replacement ofdominant logics influences how
fields change and mature (DiMaggio, 1991; Hoffman, 1999; Rao & Haveman, 1997;
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). DiMaggio (1991) showed how the conflicts between two
differing logics lead to the eventual management model for art museums. Haveman and
Rao (1997) showed how changes in demographics preceded the spread of Progressivism
in banking. Moral sentiments, such as Progressivism, are supported by nonns, rules, and
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ways of thinking encompassed by an institutional logic. Lounsbury (2002) tracked
foundings of professional finance associations to show that a regulatory logic was
replaced by market logic in the financial industry. Hoffman (1999) showed how the
ideology of environmentalism went from fringe to core as chemical manufacturers
developed a self-regulatory body. Additionally, many studies have shown how
professionally based logics have been replaced by managerial logics (Meyer &
Hammerschmid, 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Thornton, 2002). Business
activities in organizational fields change as a result of the replacement of dominant
institutional logics.
Contrary to earlier assumptions of inevitable isomorphic pressures, researchers
have shown that organizational fields can contain multiple logics that compete or exist in
a fragmented state (Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Scott, 2001). Scott
and colleagues (Scott, Ruef, Mendel & Caronna, 2000) studied the fragmentation of a
dominant institutional logic in the U.S. medical field. They tracked the decline of the
dominant association, the American Medical Association, and the rise of fragmented
specialist associations. Lounsbury (2007) and Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) show that
competing logics can coexist in the same organizational field. The existence of
contradictory logics, such as community banking versus national banking, in
heterogeneous geographical resource environments resulted in heterogeneous
organizational fields with large national banks and smaller local community-based banks.
Studying market management firms, Lounsbury (2007) found that geographically tied
efficiency and performance institutional logics fragmented the institutional environment
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and resulted in heterogeneous firm practices. These phenomena run counter to the
predictions of isomorphism.
Moderating effects. In addition to direct effects, institutional logics have been
shown to have a moderating effect between economic and social motivations in business
activities (Thomton, 2004). In her research on the higher-education publishing field,
Thomton (2004) found that the moderating relationship of logics varied depending on the
type of logic in use. She found that the editorial-logic had a greater moderating effect on
executive succession than the market-logic. Thornton generalizes this finding to
conclude that specific logics moderate business activities more than universal logics.
Thus, for example, we may expect a specific logic focused on environmental
sustainability to have a greater moderating influence on an entrepreneur's choice for
electricity generation than a universal logic focused on profit margins.
Geographically Bound Institutional Logics
We know institutions can vary geographically. As Scott (2001) states, "variation
in institutional pressures also comes from differences over space and time in the strength
of cognitive beliefs or normative controls" (: 162). Strangely, most of the institutional
logic research has not considered geography. A few studies exist that have considered
how geography and institutional logics are bound together. First, I review institutional
logics research incorporating geography and then combine it 'with its potential for
clusters.
Geography and institutional logics. Institutional theory researchers have
considered how institutional heterogeneity results from imprinting and unique regional
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transformational processes. Marquis and colleagues show how imprinting effects
influence firm activities in board composition (Marquis, 2003) and corporate social
action (Marquis et aI., 2007). Discussing the competing logics in the mutual fund
industry, Lounsbury (2007) found that "practice variation was importantly connected to
geographic heterogeneity, an often underappreciated dimension of organizational
difference" (: 290). He found that these geographically bound logics in Boston versus
New York City moderated economic pressures on contracting choices. Hall (2003)
studied the persistent heterogeneity oflocal community institutions at the Baltimore port
during an historic period of national pressures to convert to standardized containerization
processes. He found that diversity in regions persist because regions undergo unique
processes of regional institutional transformation in response to isomorphic pressures.
Clusters and institutional logics. Institutional logics can be and have been
shown to be geographically tied to communities just as regional clusters are necessarily
bound in a geographic region. Therefore, institutional logics ought to influence regional
clusters and their emergence as well. Studying the emergence of the Branson, Missouri,
musical theater cluster, Chiles and colleagues (2004) found that the unique, wholesome
institutional environment was clearly imprinted in that particular geographic location.
Romanelli and Khessina (2005) propose that clusters with stronger regional industrial
identities will receive more resources such as investment and entrepreneurial location
choices. In their model, regional industrial identity is the result of residents 'and external
audiences' perceptions of the region, heavily influenced by distinctive regional
characteristics. Although they do not specifically discuss institutional logics, a strong
40
perception of regional industrial identity could be akin to an institutional logic in its
cultural-cognitive influence on business activities within a geographically bound region.
The influence of institutional logics on clusters depends on fit between a logic's
guiding values and a regional cluster's business focus. Industries that are congruous with
a specific institutional logic have a focus that fits with the institutional logic's guiding
values. For example, Haveman and Rao (1997) showed that firm foundings in the early
California thrift industry changed as demographic shifts in the region replaced the
dominant institutional logic with Progressivism. Studying county level formation of wind
energy projects in California, Russo (2003) found that the influence of regulatory
institutions changed with the passage of PURPA, encouraging increasing clustering of
qualifying facilities in conjunction with natural resources and social capital. Lee and
Sine (2005) found that increases in state level Sierra Club memberships preceded state-
level regulations and entrepreneurial filings of wind energy projects.
Influences of congruous logics occur between firms as well as between human
populations and firms. Ingram and Simons (2000) found that in Israel other firm
populations could influence focal firms' foundings and survival rates if they had similar
ideologies. Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) found that specialist breweries increased
their survival by highlighting their authentic alignment with the local regional identity.
Chiles, Meyer, and Hench (2004) showed the importance of aligning with the
institutional 'wholesome' values in Branson, Missouri, to the survival of new theaters.
Although Lounsbury (2007) did not study clustering of money market funds in
Boston and New York specifically, the identification by city indicates a consensus on
clustering of type of firm and institutional logic. Lounsbury (2007) argues for the need
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for more research on the shaping of organizations and industries by geographic
heterogeneity and its corresponding logics. No one has studied how these geographically
heterogeneous institutional logics influence clustering. Firm activities and foundings,
which are necessary for regional cluster emergence, display a non-random pattern in
conjunction with the institutional environment. Clearly institutions matter, yet how
institutional logics influence regional cluster emergence has been under-studied.
Summary of Cluster Research
Regional clusters are growing in importance as globalization makes geographical
uniqueness more important in maintaining valuable, rare, inimitable, and nontransferable
resources. Regional clusters, an overlooked level of analysis (Tallman et aI., 2004),
create an opportunity to study the interaction of organizations and their environments that
create this geographical uniqueness. Researchers have examined the emergence of
industries, but few have studied emergence of naturally occurring regional clusters
(Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005). The empirical literature review highlights several
opportunities to contribute to research on regional clusters. The contributions of this
study are:
•
•
Improving sampling across all firms rather than just firms within retrospectively
identified clusters
Modeling regional clusters as interrelated firms rather than one organizational
form
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• Modeling both regulatory and cultural-cognitive institutional influences on
clusters
• Selecting a theoretical framework that incorporates institutions to use in the
analysis of clusters
In order to increase understanding about clustered firms, they must be compared
to non-clustered firms. For obvious tractability reasons, Chiles and colleagues (2004)
studied only musical theater foundings within the Branson, Missouri, musical theater
cluster. Left censoring on cluster samples is another sampling concern. Increasingly,
researchers are beginning to encompass entire history of industries in their research or
they identify discrete events to tether the sampling timeline.
The review of the literature highlights the need for improvement in sampling
more than one organizational form (Audia et al., 2006; Freeman et al., 2006).
Understanding more than one organizational form is definitionally important to regional
cluster research and the applicability of the research. Public policymakers consider
clusters as interrelated industries and institutions; as such, they cannot easily use the
findings of population ecology researchers. Modeling the density of only one
organizational form limits the understanding of how other organizations, institutions, and
history affect regional cluster development. Some researchers used contextual
knowledge of the setting to decide on salient organizations and institutions (Powell et al.,
2002; Russo, 2001; Sine et al., 2005). Another way to determine interrelated industries is
through industry input and output data (Audia et al., 2006). The thoroughness of their
calculations is impressive, however they did not incorporate institutions in their models.
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The research in regional clusters lack understanding about the interaction of
organizations and institutions. Only a few studies modeled institutional influences on
firm performance, particularly when looking at clusters. Those notable exceptions are
Saxenian (1994), Russo (2003), and Chiles and colleagues (2004). All of the articles of
Wes Sine and co-authors (2005, 2007, 2009) model institutions, but they do so at the state
level, which is far too large a geographic unit to represent a cluster. Nor do they seek to
identify clusters in their data, rather looking at project filing density aggregated at a state
level.
Chiles and colleagues' (2004) study is one of the few to look at the institutional
activities and mechanisms involved in cluster emergence. The rarity of these studies may
be due to difficulty in capturing all relevant historical data. For example, Chiles and
colleagues studied 100 years of local history. However, by waiting until a region has a
clearly identified cluster, a researcher gives up access to much potential data and is
reliant on retrospection and archival data sets.
Reviewing the literature in regional clusters is difficult because of the many
diverse streams arising from different research disciplines. Given the numerous levels of
analysis possible in regional clusters, no singular theory or discipline is the best fit for all
levels of analysis. However, to maximize the insight the different disciplines have to
offer researchers should select a theoretical framework that brings in externalities and
institutions in order to allow for endogenous change and increasing returns (Arthur,
1994) in regional clusters.
This notable gap in understanding points to the need to study how geographically
varying institutions influence regional clusters. Institutional logics present a means to
identify and measure institutional influences on clusters. The next chapter builds the
theoretical connection between institutional logics and levels of clustering and presents
hypotheses to test the influence of institutions on the emergence and growth of regional
clusters.
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
As reviewed in the previous chapter, research and observation indicate a tendency
for finns to cluster in geographic regions. Researchers from the diverse intellectual
traditions of industrial organizations, economic geography, management, and sociology
have explored cluster emergence and sought to explain it. Much of this research builds
from an underlying assumption that clusters fonn because they provide benefits, and has
centered on identifying the benefits that accrue to clustered finns and industries.
However, while we know access to resources, competitive effects, and knowledge
spillover are some of the benefits to established clusters, much remains unexplained
about institutional influences on cluster emergence and growth. Although prior literature
alludes to the importance of institutions (Malmberg & Maskell, 2006; Saxenian, 1994),
beyond influences of specific regulatory changes (Russo, 2003), we know little about
how institutions influence clusters. This study seeks to fill that gap by asking the research
question: How do institutions, specifically varying levels ofa congruous institutional
logic. affect regional cluster emergence?
Institutional logics, belief systems that guide actions of organizations and actors
(Friedland & Alford, 1991), are a tractable way to conceptualize institutional influence on
organizational activity in a region. For example, an institutional logic supporting
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community banking over national banking results in more locally owned banks (Marquis
& Lounsbury, 2007). Institutional logics bring institutions down to a manageable level of
analysis because they define "the meaning and content of institutions" (Thornton &
Ocasio, 2008: 100). Institutional logics are useful for studying regional clusters because
they develop and exist at many different levels, including geographic communities
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Thus, they can be applied to this study's definition of
regional clusters as "geographically proximate group[s] of interconnected companies and
associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and
complementarities" (Porter, 1998: 199).
In the next section, I use the theoretical framework of institutional logics to build
hypotheses to answer the research question. The hypotheses contribute to the theoretical
literature on institutional logics by positing the influence of varying levels of a congruous
institutional logic on regional clusters. Additionally, because uncertainty magnifies the
institutional pressures on business activities, I explore the role of technological
uncertainty on regional cluster emergence.
Institutional Logics
According to Thornton and Ocasio, institutional logics represent:
the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices,
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and
reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide
meaning to their social reality. (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: 804)
Thus, institutional logics are culturally constructed models that influence how actors
interpret and resolve institutional pressures (Friedland, 2002). These institutional logics
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represent collective systems of meaning that influence practice. For example, Thornton
(2004) showed how a shift from an editorial logic to a market logic in higher-education
publishing changed which executives were promoted. As market logic began to
dominate, executives who increased profits were promoted over those who increased the
prestige of a finn. In another example, Lounsbury (2002) tracked foundings of
professional finance associations to show that a regulatory logic was replaced by a
market logic in the financial industry.
Logics focus attention on what individuals and organizations will find meaningful
and what types of solutions they will perceive (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Because
organizational decision makers have limited resources for search processes, when they
need to find a solution, they search within the vicinity of current solutions and knowledge
(March, 1994). However, institutional logics do not result from organizational fields,
"they are locally instantiated and enacted in organizational fields as in other places such
as markets, industries, and organizations" (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008: 119). For example,
within the organizational field of U.S. banks, Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) found
community banking logics at different levels in different communities. The presence of
community banking logics influenced the types of banks in those communities.
As highlighted in the literature review, a growing area of research is how
institutions at the community level influence organizational behavior (Marquis, 2003;
Marquis et aL, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). The juxtaposition of institutional
logics and communities provides a solid, and yet new, opportunity to study the influence
of institutions on regional clusters.
------_.._-- . __.__ .-
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Although institutional theory has not been used to analyze regional clusters, it has
been applied to the context of communities. Communities influence organizations
through their differing institutional environments (Marquis & Battilana, 2009,
forthcoming). As a level of analysis communities are:
corresponding to the populations, organizations, and markets located in a
geographic territory and sharing, as a result of their common location,
elements of local culture, norms, identity, and laws" (Marquis & Battilana,
2009, forthcoming: 10-11).
These local environments provide heterogeneous institutional environments. As
Scott states, "Variation in institutional pressures also comes from differences over space
and time in the strength of cognitive beliefs or normative controls" (Scott, 2001: 162).
Communities are the same level of analysis used in regional cluster research. As such, it
is an appropriate concept for regional cluster analysis. Marquis and Battilana (2009,
forthcoming) argue for more research at the community level to allow for understanding
of local influences on organizations.
In order to apply institutional logics to clusters, I develop three hypotheses. First,
I develop the theory on how institutional logics directly influence clustering. Second, I
develop the theory on how institutional logics moderate pecuniary and technological
externalities. Third, I develop the theory on how technological uncertainty moderates
institutional logics direct influence on clustering.
Direct Influence of Congruous Institutional Logics on Clusters
The influence of institutional logics on clusters depends on alignment between an
institutional logic's guiding values and a regional cluster's business focus. An
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institutional logic is congruent with an industry, if the industry aligns with the same
beliefs. For example, Haveman and Rao (1997) showed that firm foundings in the early
California thrift industry changed as demographic shifts in the region shifted the
dominant institutional logic toward Progressivism. Carroll and Swaminathan (2000)
found that specialist breweries increased their survival by highlighting their authentic
alignment with the local regional identity. Lee and Sine (2005) found that increases in
state level Sierra Club memberships preceded state-level regulations and entrepreneurial
filings of wind energy projects. The supportive influences of a congruous institutional
logic occur at the national as well as state level. Ingram and Simons (2000) found that in
Israel other firm populations could influence focal firms' foundings and survival rates if
they have similar ideologies.
Studying the competing logics in the mutual fund industry, Lounsbury (2007)
found "practice variation was importantly connected to geographic heterogeneity, an
often underappreciated dimension of organizational difference" (: 290). He found that
these geographically bound logics in Boston versus New York City influenced
contracting choices such that firms contracted with firms that fit their specific
institutional logic. Lounsbury (2007) argues for the need for more research on the
shaping of organizations and industries by geographic heterogeneity and its
corresponding logics. Institutional logics can and have been shown to be geographically .
tied to communities just as regional clusters are necessarily bound in a geographic region.
Studying the emergence of the Branson, Missouri, musical theater cluster, Chiles and
colleagues (2004) found that the unique, wholesome institutional environment was
clearly imprinted in that particular geographic location.
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Finn activities and foundings, which are necessary for regional cluster emergence,
display a non-random pattern in conjunction with the institutional environment. Given
representation of a congruous institutional logic, a positive influence should lead to
higher levels of clustering by finns who align with that particular institutional logic.
Figure 1. Congruous Institutional Logic Model, Direct Effect
Pecuniary
EKtemality
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Congluous Hyp 1: + ClusteringInstitutional "-
'" LevelLogic
Technological
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This direct influence of a congruous institutional logic on levels of clustering
leads to the first hypothesis. Institutional logics are heterogeneous across communities
leading to different outcomes in film activities and levels of clustering in communities. It
can be expected that congruous institutional logics will directly influence the level of
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clustering of industries that are congruent with the belief system of a specific institutional
logic.
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between congruous institutional logics and
clustering is positive: Higher levels of congruous institutional logics will be
associated with higher levels of clustering.
Moderating Influence of Congruous Institutional Logics on Clusters
In addition to a direct effect, institutional logics have shown a moderating effect
(Thornton,2004). As highlighted in the literature review, positive pecuniary and
technological externalities are a key mechanism explaining cluster growth. Since
institutional logics guide how people think and make decisions (Lounsbury, 2007), they
are likely to influence how pecuniary and technological externalities are used by firms.
For example, a pecuniary externality in a cluster could be from labor pooling, resulting in
reduced costs for labor inputs. If the institutional logic resonates with individuals with
the necessary labor skills, then it will enhance the benefits from that pecuniary externality
on clustered firms. In another example, a technological externality of knowledge
spillover from public research organizations could be enhanced if the institutional logic
resonates between the source of the knowledge spillover and the clustered firms. It
reasons that if researchers and managers share an institutional logic, there will be more
interaction and more exchange of knowledge. Saxenian (1994) found that collaborative
funding was institutionalized at Stanford in Silicon Valley, and hierarchical funding was
institutionalized at MIT in Boston. When combined with the more collaborative and
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open business atmosphere in Silicon Valley, it resulted in greater knowledge spillover
and entrepreneurial activity in Silicon Valley.
In her extensive study of publishing in higher education, Thornton (2004), found
that institutional logics had a moderating relationship between economic and social
motivations in business activities. She found that the moderating relationship of logics
varied depending on the type of logic in use. She found that the editorial-logic had a
greater moderating effect on executive succession than the market-logic. Thornton
generalizes this finding to conclude that specific logics moderate business activities more
than universal logics. Thus, for example, we may expect a specific logic focused on
environmental sustainability to have a greater moderating influence than a universal logic
focused on profit margins on an organizational decision-maker's selection of geographic
location. For this reason, it can be expected that specific institutional logics will have a
moderating influence in addition to a direct influence on levels of clustering.
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Figure 2. Congruous Institutional Logic Model, Direct and Moderating Effect
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This moderating influence of a congruous institutional logic on the direct
influence of externalities on levels of clustering leads to the next two hypotheses.
Institutional logics and pecuniary and technological externalities are heterogeneous
across communities leading to different outcomes in finn activities and levels of
clustering in regions. It can be expected that congruous institutional logics will increase
the positive relationship between increasing pecuniary or technological externalities and
cluster growth.
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Hypothesis 2a: The moderating relationship of congruous institutional logics
on the influence of pecuniary externalities on clustering is positive: Higher levels of
congruous institutional logics will strengthen the positive relationship between
positive pecuniary externalities and clustering.
Hypothesis 2b: The moderating relationship of congruous institutional logics
on the influence of technological externalities on clustering is positive: Higher levels
of congruous institutional logics will strengthen the positive relationship between
positive technological externalities and clustering.
This study tests the direct and moderating influences of congruous institutional
logics on clustering. However, the type of industry cluster may interact with this
relationship. A key dimension to understanding institutional influences on industry
relates to its level of uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Technological Uncertainty
When using an institutional framework to examine the influence of institutional
logics on business clustering, it is important to consider the impact of uncertainty. When
facing uncertainty, decision-makers look to institutional sources for information to guide
them in making decisions. These decisions directly affect firm activities and
subsequently clustering of firms. Institutional influences are stronger under greater levels
of uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Marquis and colleagues (2007) show how
community isomorphism leads to differing organizational practices. When a business
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practice has higher levels of uncertainty, such as corporate social action, firms are more
likely to look to norms within their local geographic communities for legitimacy. Davis
and Greve (1997) found geographically proximate firm activities were more influential
when the value of a business practice was uncertain. Studying cooperative technical
organizations, Rosenkopf and Tushman (1998) found that as technological uncertainty
increases, the importance of social construction processes on the development and
implementation of technology increased.
Uncertainty amplifies the influence of institutions on firm activities. Technology
represents one important type of uncertainty (March & Olsen, 1976) affecting the
influence of institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Technological uncertainty results
from a lack of knowledge about the technology's risks (Wejnert, 2002). Since clusters
form around an industry or technology, technological uncertainty is essential to
understanding how institutional logics will influence levels of clustering. In order to
understand how institutions influence clustering, we need to explore the role of
technological uncertainty.
The process oftechnology adoption and diffusion is influenced by social as well
as economic factors (for reviews see Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997; Wejnert,
2002). The technology adoption process has three stages (Rogers, 1995). Rogers's
(1995) diffusion of innovation model represents a decision-based process of cognition-
evaluation-connotation. Cognition involves awareness of a technology, evaluation
involves determining if the innovation is better than alternatives, and connotation
involves implementing a technology.
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Several characteristics influence adoption, including relative advantage,
compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability. Social structures and processes,
including institutional logics, infuse meaning into the messages received about a
technology concerning its relative advantage compared to other technology.
Additionally, compatibility is socially influenced by the decider's experiences and values.
Technology adoption is therefore a process of acceptance and use, led by awareness
which is more socially determined, and followed by implementation which is constrained
by economic resources and environment. The growth of business clusters focused on
wind or solar power generation is essentially affected by rate of adoption of those
technologies by entrepreneurs and existing and potential customers.
Whether and how a technology is used is greatly influenced by institutional
pressures (Martinez & Dacin, 1999). Wejnert (2002), in her review of diffusion of
innovations, shows the importance of environmental conditions, including beliefs and
values, on innovation adoption and diffusion. Very relevant to cluster emergence, she
argues that externalities allow for the adoption of technologies. The greater the
ambiguity around the costs, the more need to guess and place value judgments on using a
technology. For example, the Baltimore Port Authority, with its community specific
institutions, resisted the standard adoption of containerization equipment and facilities,
resulting in the port adopting differing approaches to the technology (Hall, 2003). How
local cultural beliefs, akin to institutional logics, have influenced the adoption of
technologies has been studied in agricultural economics in the adoption of sustainable
practices. The belief systems of Amish communities are congruous with sustainable
practices leading to greater levels of adoption (Sommers & Napier, 1993). Particular
57
Montana communities with a culture of support for sustainable practices led to greater
adoption by farmers of sustainable practices in those communities (Saltiel, Bauder &
Palakovich, 1994).
Researchers have demonstrated positive relationships between institutional
legitimacy and foundings based on new, uncertain technology in renewable energy.
Research by Russo (2001; 2003) and Sine and colleagues (Lee & Sine, 2005; Sine et al.,
2005) show the importance of social, in addition to economic factors in founding of
renewable energy projects. Russo (2003) found increases in project density as a measure
of cognitive legitimacy lead to more wind energy project foundings. Sine and colleagues
(2005) found that greater levels of legitimacy for small power generation using both
traditional and novel technology increased firm foundings, but in particular, normative
legitimacy with state associations increased traditional, less risky, technological
foundings. Comparing established brown technology foundings to novel green
technology foundings supports the importance of cognitive legitimacy to adoption of
uncertain technology. "Because brown technologies were better-understood technically,
had lower development costs, and were more culturally established than green
technologies, they were generally less risky bases for new ventures than green
technologies." (Sine et al. 2003: 215) Lee and Sine (2005) argue that the social
awareness of Sierra Club members regarding wind energy preceded regulatory and
economic incentives that encouraged wind energy foundings.
Awareness and value of technology can be concentrated in a community through
the presence of populations with particular institutional logics or technologically enabling
resources. In a study of adoption of home solar systems in Sri Lanka, villages with more
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minorities, representing an attitude of greater self-reliance, were more likely to adopt the
new technology (Mceachern & Hanson, 2008). In communities possessing necessary
resources such as individuals with professional banking experience, community banks
were more often founded in resistance to national institutional pressures during a time
when there was pressures toward consolidation (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). Sorenson
and Audia (2000) found that shoe manufacturers clustered where entrepreneurs were able
to recognize opportunities because of prior experience in shoe manufacturing. Because
institutional logics funnel individual's recognition of problems and possible solutions, it
follows that logics will influence what entrepreneurial opportunities are recognized and
thus where clustering may follow.
Researchers have conflicting accounts of how technology spreads geographically.
Brown (1981) characterizes geographic diffusion of technology as originating from a
point and spreading outward over spatial distance. This suggests that adoptions will
spread from population centers where more information about the technology is available
(Brown, 1989) or from where the technology is manufactured. Researchers argue that
this type of positive feedback greatly influences the emergence of business clusters
(Porter, 1998b). Ideology, a different mechanism than postulated by Brown for
geographically centered diffusion, may also facilitate diffusion to communities with
similar ideology. The importance of similar ideologies explained the spread of
decolonization among colonies more than geographic proximity (Strang & Tuma, 1993).
Both mechanisms may act concurrently in diffusion of technology. Geography is
important not only to outward diffusion, but heterogeneous communities may have
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unique intensity of institutional logics that also are important to the diffusion of
technology even when not geographically proximate.
Although not intentionally studying competing logics, or cluster emergence, Sine
and colleagues (2005) found in their study of overall levels of organizational diversity in
small power foundings in California and New York, that the likelihood of using brown
technologies was significantly negative in California. This finding could be the result of
an environmentally sustainable logic in California that was absent in New York. At the
beginning of the small power generating industry in the U.S., increasing regulative and
cognitive legitimacy increased founding for novel technologies more than it did for
traditional technologies. However, we do not know how geographically linked
institutional logics may affect clustering of firms or customers for these green
technologies. There are hints that institutional logics can influence technology adoption
in Sine and colleagues' (2007) research: "Green-technology entrepreneurs who advocated
wind power showed that they rarely built gas cogenerators if the price of natural gas
declined. Instead, they waited until they were able to mobilize the necessary resources to
use their preferred technology" (Sine et aI, 2005: 227). In communities where these
environmentally sustainable institutional logics are prevalent, adoption of uncertain green
technologies is more likely.
My study uses two different renewable energy technologies around which
regional clusters may emerge. Both technologies align with an environmentally
sustainable logic, which allows for the influence of technological uncertainty in
combination with institutional logics to be examined more clearly.
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Given that logics are place bound (Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury,
2007) and that specific logics, such as environmentalism, have more influence than
universal logics such as profit maximization (Thornton, 2004), we can expect that
alignment with particular logics in the institutional environment will be more important
when a technology's commercial viability is more uncertain. The importance of
institutional pressures on given teclmological uncertainty will affect clustering for firms
that align with a particular congruous logic.
Figure 3. Congruous Institutional Logic Model, Uncertainty Moderating Effect
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It can be expected that technological uncertainty will increase the positive
relationship between a congruous institutional logic and cluster growth.
Hypothesis 3: The moderating relationship of technological uncertainty on
the influence of a congruous institutional logic on clustering is positive: Higher
levels of technological uncertainty will strengthen the positive relationship between
congruous institutional logics and clustering.
In the next chapter, I explain the empirical setting, sampling, and analytical
techniques I use to test the hypotheses. Following that, the fifth chapter presents the
empirical results and the sixth chapter follows with conclusions and implications.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Despite interest in regional cluster emergence and more than a century of
research, the phenomenon contains subtleties that researchers have failed to explain. As
highlighted in the literature review, there is a gap in understanding how institutions
influence regional cluster emergence. This leads to the guiding research question: How
do institutions, spec~fically varying levels ola congruous institutional logic, a.fl'ect
regional cluster emergence?
In order to address this gap, this chapter reviews the empirical setting, sample,
data collection, operationalization of variables, and analysis plan for testing the
hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. Determining how institutional logics
influence cluster emergence requires that institutional logics be identified and measured.
This study uses the congruous relationship between firms whose activities are perceived
to be pro-environmental with the prevalence of the pro-environmental institutional logic
of a human population. By capitalizing on previous research in this context by Russo
(2001,2003) and Sine and colleagues (2005,2005,2007), and introducing a variable to
represent pro-environmental institutional logic, the present study increases understanding
of regional cluster emergence.
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This chapter begins with an explanation of the research method employed. Then I
discuss the empirical setting, which greatly influences the sample design and sampling
frame. This is followed by an explanation of data sources and operationalization of the
variables. Finally, I explain the estimation methods used for the analysis presented in the
next chapter.
Description of Research Method
This study hypothesizes a causal relationship between congruous institutional
logics and levels of firm clustering that align with a particular logic. Testing institutional
influences on regional cluster emergence necessitates a longitudinal study (Thornton &
Ocasio, 2008). Previous research about institutional influences on regional cluster
emergence have used either quantitative panel data (Audia et aL, 2006; Russo, 2003) or
qualitative data (Chiles et al., 2004; Saxenian, 1994). The perspective afforded by the use
of panel data does have disadvantages compared to qualitative data. Qualitative data
affords the ability to understand the finer nuances of institutional influences within a
particular context. However, panel data allows this study to maximize the variation in the
variables of interest by sampling across many regions and many years. As such, this
study employs panel data methods in conjunction with interviews to provide contextual
understanding.
Using panel data across many regions allows me to avoid sample selection errors
resulting from sampling on the dependent variable of a previously recognized cluster. I
build the panel data set using archival data sources. Advantages of archival data are the
ability to cover long periods of time, and track large populations of finns (Hoyle, Harris
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& Judd, 2002). Care needs to be taken wherever archival data measures are used, in
order to avoid distorting their representation of the focal constructs in the analysis. To
overcome these potential misspecification errors, the research is grounded by interviews
to contextualize the construct variables. Next, I explain the empirical setting for this
study and how it allows for representation of an institutional logic of environmental
sustainability.
Empirical Setting
The research setting is the renewable energy manufacturing industry. Renewable
energy is "power generated by the natural processes of wind, sun, water, plant growth,
and heat from the earth being converted into power, steam and heat" (Repp-Crest, 2008).
The intent of developing renewable energy is that it should be nearly inexhaustible but
limited in the amount of energy generated per unit time in comparison with petroleum,
natural gas, coal, or other extractive energy sources (Repp-Crest, 2008). The Department
of Energy considers biomass, hydropower, geothermal, solar, wind, ocean thermal, wave
action, and tidal action to be renewable energy sources (EIA, 2004). Another benefit of
renewable energy is its comparatively small impact on the environment as an alternative
to burning conventional fuels. Pro-environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club,
Friends of the Earth, and the National Audubon Society, started paying attention to its
potential around 1970 (Mitchell, Mertig & Dunlap, 1992). In the late 1970s, pro-
environmental organizations began promoting renewable energy as an important
mechanism to protect the environment (Mitchell et al., 1992). Traditional power
generation became known for degrading the environment, while renewable energy
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generation became known as better for the environment (Sine & Lee, 2009). A pro-
environmental institutional logic fits, or in other words, is congruous with, the renewable
energy industry. Regions with higher levels of a pro-enviromnental institutional logic
thus are congruous with clusters of renewable energy manufacturing.
The timeframe begins with the modem emergence of the renewable energy
industry in the United States, with the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA) of 1978 (Russo, 2001). Provisions in PURPA required electric utilities to
purchase generated energy at an avoided cost rate from qualifying facilities, where
qualifying facilities are non-utility electricity generators that meet certain ownership,
operating and efficiency criteria established by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) (Administration, 1996). Although the variation in how states and utilities
interpreted and accounted for avoided cost rates greatly influenced the filing for
renewable energy projects (Russo, 2001), as such the passage of PURPA also supported
the development of the renewable energy industry.
The sample goes through 1995, which was a watershed year for the wind energy
industry for several reasons. First, the provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 were
affecting the utility market such that energy wholesalers, such as Enron, could become
non-utility energy producers. Second, in 1995 a court case against the California Public
Utility Commission supported the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC)
enforcement of capping contracts to qualifying facilities at the avoided cost rate and no
higher (Doe-EIA, 2008). This resulted in avoided cost rates lower than the interpretation
by several states, including California (EIA, 2005). Third, specific to California, where
nearly all non-renewable capacity was located until the early 1990s, prices paid to
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renewable energy producers dropped drastically in the mid-1990s (ErA, 2005). Ten-year
Standard Offer projected avoided cost rates based on the high oil prices in the early
1980s. California's avoided cost rate, set by California's Public Utilities Commission in
1982, was based on forecasted oil and natural gas prices, after 10 years the contracts
reverted to actual avoided cost rates. Most of California's wind capacity was installed
under these Interim Standard Offer 4 contracts starting in late 1983. Contracts initiated in
1984 and 1985 began to expire, and the new avoided cost rates were about half as much;
they dropped from 6.9 cents per kilowatt-hour to about 3 cents per kilowatt-hour. This
"II-year cliff' (EIA, 2005) referred to the dramatic price decrease received by QFs at the
expiration of the 1O-year contracts. The "II-year cliff' reduced commercial viability of
renewable energy producers in California (Chapman & Wiese, 1998), and as such was a
pivotal time in the renewable energy industry.
The creation of a commercial domain for non-utility generated electricity
established new markets for the renewable energy industry. This study uses the
renewable energy industry to understand institutional influences on clusters. The only
researcher to study clusters of alternative energy projects was Russo (2003), performed at
the county level in California. However, he was studying the clustering of wind energy
generating facilities-one organization form. As this study uses the same setting but
studies the clustering of supply-chain clusters for alternative energy manufacturers, and
represents these alternative energy qualifying facilities as informed customers and
operationalizing clusters as inter-related firms, the present study adds to the
understanding presented by Russo's (2003) analysis. Additionally, this study examines
the varying influence of congruous institutional logics on two distinct renewable energy
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technologies: wind and solar. By using different technologies with drastically different
commercial viability, the nuanced influence of institutional logics can be teased apart.
Wind and solar energy technologies had very different levels of uncertainty
associated with them from 1978 to 1995. One representation of uncertainty is the cost of
energy (COE) produced. COE incorporates capital, fuel, and operation and maintenance
costs. As you can see in Figure 4, the projected COE was drastically different between
the two technologies (Mcveigh, Burtraw, Dannstadter & Palmer, 1999). Although
projected COE for solar steadily decreased over time, it did not come close to the COE
for wind energy generation.
Figure 4. Projected Cost of Energy Produced for Wind and Solar from 1980 - 1995
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During the time period for this study, 1978-1995, wind energy technology had
settled on its dominant fonn while solar energy technology had not settled, and is in fact
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still under contention in 2009. Wind energy technologies are dominated by vertical and
hOlizontal axis wind turbines (Gipe, 1995). Despite large federal support of research and
development of both types of turbines, the vertical turbines experienced technological
and commercial dead ends in the 1970s and 1980s (Gipe, 1995). By 1982, it was clear
that the U.S. wind fann market would be dominated by horizontal three-blade upwind
designs (Dodge, 2001). For example, in 1995,94% of Califomia's generating capacity
used the horizontal three-blade designs, while the remaining 6% used the vertical axis
designs (Gipe, 1995). Solar energy technologies include photovoltaic and concentrating
solar power. Neither technology, nor even the dominant technology standard between
thin~film or crystallized silicon photovoltaic cells, has been resolved to date (Terlaak &
Gong, 2009).
Another representation of uncertainty is implementation of technology. When
energy generation facilities are installed, the demonstration of a technology's viability
decreases its uncertainty. Generation facilities for wind increased since the 1970s but
solar and photovoltaic energy generation was only in niche markets and remote
applications (Mcveigh et aI., 1999). Figure 5 shows cumulative installed capacity in the
U.S. for wind energy and solar energy. Infonnation on installed wind capacity was
available starting in 1980 (Dom, 2008). Infonnation for solar capacity was only
available starting in 2000 (Bradford & Maycock, 2007). However, you can see as early
as 2000 that only 17 Megawatts of solar capacity were installed, compared to 2,578
Megawatts for wind capacity. When uncertainty is greater, entrepreneurs are less likely
to use a technology. The graph below show the greater installation of wind energy is an
indication of its greater certainty over solar energy technology.
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Figure 5. Cumulative Installed Generation Capacity for Wind and Solar from 1980-2007
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The difference in uncertainty between the two technologies is used in testing
hypotheses 3: that increasing uncertainty increases the influence of congruous
institutional logics on cluster emergence. The estimation methods employed are
explained at the end of this chapter in the section on statistical estimation. In the next
section, I explain the sample design for this empirical setting.
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Sample Design
As with any research project, delineating the scope of the study is essential for
tractability. Although setting boundaries on the breadth of the study limits its
generalizability, it greatly enhances its manageability. Since this study has a
universalistic research goal, such that it is testing theoretically driven hypotheses, internal
validity is more important than external validity (Hoyle et aI., 2002). Internal validity is
concerned with showing causal effects (Hoyle et aI., 2002). To test for causality it is
necessary to have longitudinal data. For this study, I gather annual data for each region
from 1978 to 1995. In order to minimize censoring observations, the study begins at a
significant point in the emergence of the industry and ends at a point of significant
change: 1995. In the statistical estimation section at the end ofthis chapter I explain the
Granger causality (Granger, 1969; Wooldridge, 2003) method used to determine whether
the relationships between variables is spurious or causal, and if so, the direction of
causality.
This study does not randomly sample among regions, rather it uses data on the
population of regions in the U.S. This limits its external validity-the ability to
generalize from the sample to the population and setting (Hoyle et aI., 2002). However,
since this study has a universalistic research goal, increasing the size ofthe sample to
encompass the entire population increases the study's internal validity. Sample selection
correction methods (Heckman, 1979) are used to adjust the estimation method for regions
which are not represented because of missing data.
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Sample Frame
Sample frame is the population from which a sample is drawn (Hoyle et aI.,
2002). This study uses panel data of annual information from regions across the U.S.
from 1978 through 1995. In this section, I explain the unit of analysis selected to
represent geographical regions.
Geography is an essential dimension for studying regional clusters. Many
researchers have identified clusters based on commonly held understandings that a
particular city is a cluster, for example, an association is made between automobiles and
Detroit (Klepper, 2007), or Boston and biotechnology (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004).
They then study the performance of firms based on locating in a cluster. For this study,
focusing on one city or region is inadequate because the study aims to test the influence
of varying levels of a congruous institutional logic across different regions. As such, an a
priori identification of cluster locations would be selecting on the dependent variable.
Previous research examined clusters at three different geographic levels: 1) the
state-county level (Henderson, 2003; Russo, 2003), 2) the Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA) (Jaffe et aI., 1993; Romanelli & Khessina, 2005), and 3) the Labor Market Area
(LMA) (Audia et aI., 2006). An advantage to using counties as geographic regions is that
federal data are often aggregated at this level. A disadvantage is that regional clusters
may span county borders. Comparatively, an advantage to using MSAs as a geographic
region is that most manufacturing clusters occur within urban areas, while a disadvantage
is that a cluster may occur in a rural area, possibly outside a MSA boundary.
Additionally, there is a strong precedent for using MSAs to represent community based
research (Marquis & Battilana, 2009, forthcoming). Comparatively, an advantage to
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using LMAs as a geographic region is that LMAs cover gaps between MSAs in areas
with low population density and represent areas where people live and work. The
disadvantage is that LMAs, particularly in sparsely populated areas, can be quite large
geographically, creating a potentially implausible analytic frame. For example, Audia,
Freeman, and Davidson Reynolds (2006), used LMAs to determine geographic regions in
their analysis of instrument manufacturing communities. This unit of analysis results in
an LMA that encompassed a quarter of the state of Montana. Considering the advantages
and disadvantages of the three geographic regions as units of analysis, MSAs are best for
this study because clustering is a predominantly urban phenomenon.
Since the US Census Bureau periodically updates the listing ofMSAs, it is
important that I clarify the unit of analysis for this study as 1999 United States MSAs.
Where MSA is defined as:
a core area containing a substantial population nucleus, together with
adjacent communities having a high degree of economic and social
integration with that core (US Census Bureau, 2008b).
The 1999 MSAs are based on the 1990 standards for defining metropolitan areas.
According to the 1990 standards, a MSA must have a population of at least 50,000
people. If a metro area has greater than one million people, and distinct and yet
contiguous MSAs are identified within it, the greater area is designated as a Combined
Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) and the component MSAs are called Primary
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSA) (US Census Bureau, 2008a). For example, New
York City is a CMSA with 13 PMSAs such as Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Newark,
New Jersey. This study analyzes all variables at the level of MSA and CMSA.
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There are 276 MSAs in the 1999 U. S. Census Bureau listing. Twenty-four of the
MSAs did not have population data in the Global Insight dataset. Six of the missing
MSAs were not identified until the 1999 listing, six were not identified as MSAs until the
1995 listing, and three more were not official MSAs until the 1990 U.S. Census Bureau
listing. The remaining ten missing MSAs were identified as MSAs at the start of the time
frame in 1978, however, the data available on their annual populations in the Statistical
Abstracts of the United States was incomplete for the time span of this study.
The time unit is annual. Since most variables are lagged, the time span is from
1979 to 1995. Due to a fixed effects transformation of the model, another year's data are
absorbed. The justification for the fixed effects model is in the statistical estimation
section at the end of the chapter. Eliminating MSAs in Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands, and due to missing data on some MSAs that were not tracked in the 1970s, the
data set contains 252 MSAs across 16 years results in 4032 observations. Three
observations are lost because Spokane, Washington, had only one Congressional
Representative until 1993. When Tom Foley was the Speaker ofthe House in the lOlst to
the l03rd congress and did not vote, there were no other Congressional Representatives
to average into that particular MSA's score (missing scores are from the years spanning
1989-1991). Due to this, the number of observations used in analysis drops to 4029. I
use a Heckit method to correct for selection bias (Heckman, 1979) resulting from 24 of
the 276 MSAs that are not represented in the dataset because of missing population data.
The Heckit method is explained at the end of this chapter, in the section on estimation
methods.
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Data Collection
Data collection began with interviews of Public Service Commissioners and
alternative energy professionals to understand the emergence of clusters within the
context of solar and wind energy manufacturing. The intent of the interviews was to
improve the construct validity of the cluster measure. Construct validity ensures the
variables represent the constructs they are intended to represent (Hoyle et. al., 2002). For
example, Porter (1998) identifies tourism as an important component in California's wine
cluster. Although not all clusters have an industrially-unrelated component such as
California's wine cluster does, simply examining inputs and outputs of viticulture would
miss the tourism component.
Interviews focused on components of wind energy manufacturing or solar energy
manufacturing clusters that went beyond inputs and outputs. Between July and October
2008, I interviewed five public service commissioners from Colorado, Massachusetts,
Montana, and Maine, two renewable energy consultants, and three renewable energy
professionals. Interviews indicated two things: 1) no clearly identified alternative energy
clusters exist, and 2) other than input requirements, there are no other essential industries
necessary for renewable energy manufacturing cluster.
For the most part, all of the people interviewed thought only about renewable
energy generation, not the manufacturing of the systems and components. They did not
think of one particular region where they sourced for new generations facilities. For
example, Frank Burkharstmeyer, a renewable energy professional whose career has
spanned Pacific Power, Scottish Power, and Iberdrola Renewables, when asked about
potential renewable energy manufacturing clusters stated:
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No, not really, there are clusters of wind projects. But I don't know of any
clusters of manufacturers. I know we try to get the towers as close as
possible because hauling them is difficult (Burkhartsmeyer, 2008).
The interviews improved my contextual understanding about the industry but did not
identify any unusual industries that might be involved with a renewable energy
manufacturing cluster. I used industry reports to identify essential inputs to renewable
energy manufacturing. Essential inputs are skilled labor, component manufacturing, and
material suppliers. The list of components for wind and solar energy systems used for
identifying component manufacturers is in Appendix B.
Data Sources and Operationalization of Variables
In this section, I describe each variable selected for testing the hypotheses.
improve this study's discriminant validity by using the nominological net of how
previous research represented these concepts (Hoyle et aI., 2002). Previous research
measuring a regions' pro-environmental proclivities has used League of Conservation
Voter Environmental Scorecard scores (Delmas, Russo & Montes-Sana, 2007;
Groseclose, Levitt & Snyder, 1999), I use this same metric to operationalize this study's
explanatory variable. I followed previous research in this particular empirical setting by
Russo (2001, 2003) and Sine and colleagues (2005, 2005, 2007) for selection of the
control variables. Before describing each variable in detail, table 2 provides an overview
of the variables to aid the reader.
Variable
Table 2. Summary of Operational Definitions for Variables
Opera tionaliza tion Data Type
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Dependent Variables
Level of clustering
Explanatory Variables
Institutional Logic
Pro-environmental Population
Externalities
Pecuniary Externalities
Technological Externalities
Technological Externalities
Control Variables
Demand Conditions
Wind and Solar Energy
Generators (QFs)
Factor Conditions
Quantity 0 f lncentives
Population
Change in State GDP
Average Price of Electricity
Wind and Solar Potential
National Market Conditions
Federal Incentive
Supreme Court Ruling
Change in National GDP
Interest rate
Instrumental Variables
Davidson-MacKinnon Exogeneity Test
State Electricity Imports
Heckit Correction
All Non-farm Labor
Interrelated Location Quotient (ILQ)
Congressional Representative League of
Conservation Voters Scores
Skilled Labor Pool as Proportion of
Manufacturing Labor
University Research Spending
National Laboratory
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
State Incentives, Solar Law Reporter
US Census Bureau, Global Insight
US Bureau of Economic Analysis
Energy Information Administration
National Renewable Energy Laboratories
Federal Register
Solar Law Reporter
US Bureau of Economic Analysis
Federal Reserve Economic Data
Energy Information Administration
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Ratio
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Indicator
Count
Count
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Indicator
Indicator
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
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Dependent Variable
Although clusters are defined as interrelated finns (Porter, 1998a), prior research
rarely measured clusters of interrelated finns. Instead, prior research tended to measure
density of one organizational fonn. This study improves on previous research by
identifying inten-elated finns and measuring their clustering. The dependent variable
representing clustering is the Interrelated Location Quotient (lLQ). The justification and
calculation for ILQ is explained in this section.
Detennining interconnected films for wind and solar energy projects can be
accomplished through qualitative analysis, such as interviews, and/or quantitative
analysis. The difficulty with seeking expeli opinions on which finns are interrelated is
the endogenous problem of pre-detennining the clusters to be found based on those
experts' experiences. One risk, therefore, is of quantitatively finding cluster emergence
in the very place where such experts' work. An alternative approach to discovering the
degree of finn inten-elatedness is through use of a pre-existing metric for quantitative
analysis and inference. The difficulty with using a quantitative analysis such as input-
output ratios (Audia et al., 2006) lies in the researcher's capacity to capture those
interrelated finns that do not use the same inputs or outputs. For example, the wine
country cluster in California consists of wine producers and tourism (Porter, 1980), which
use drastically different inputs.
As discussed in the literature review, most researchers dodge this difficulty by
focusing on densities of only one industry or finn. O'Donoghue and Gleave (2004)
reviewed commonly used agglomeration measures, unfortunately most focus on
employment densities of one industry. This nan-owly tailored sampling technique
misspecifies the essential meaning of a regional cluster. As Audia, Freeman, and
Reynolds stated (2006):
confining the analysis to the demography of single populations, or to the
study of a small set of similar forms, may severely constrain our ability to
explain the trajectories of organizational populations. (:384)
Thus to understand clusters of organizations, a researcher ought to use intelTelated firms
rather than one organizational form.
Identifying interrelated industries. To identify intelTelated films in wind and
solar energy I triangulate using three types of information. First, for contextual
understanding I interviewed public service commissioners and professionals in renewable
energy. Second, I used industry reports explaining essential inputs for wind and solar
energy industries (Awea, 2002; U.S. Photovoltaic Industry Roadmap Steering
Committee, 2003). Third, I identified all components for wind and solar energy systems
using Renewable Energy Policy Project reports on Wind and PV manufacturing
requirements (Sterzinger & Svrcek, 2004, 2005). Then, using counts of component and
system manufacturers and a modification of the commonly used Location Quotient
(McCann, 2001), I calculate an intelTelated agglomeration quotient to represent
clustering.
Identifying interrelated agglomeration concentrations. The measure for
intelTelated agglomeration concentrations is an extension of the Location Quotient (LQ),
the most frequently used measure of agglomeration (O'Donoghue & Gleave, 2004). LQ
is a ratio of a percentage of people employed in the industry for an identified region over
the percentage employment in the industry for a nation. It can be represented by
LQ
Where:
i = industry
ej = regional employment
Ei = national employment
The next three paragraphs explain how I modify the LQ to better suit this study's
representation of clusters as interrelated firms.
(4.0)
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In application to this study, LQ suffers from two limitations. First, it does not
account for possible skewing from a few large firms versus many small firms since it
only measures employment, and second, it does not account for agglomeration of
interrelated firms. To overcome the first limitation, this study measures the number of
firms in a region rather than percentage employment. A commonly used measure to treat
for industry concentration is the Herfindahl index. However, a Herfindahl index uses a
sum of squares of each finn's market share to represent industry structures that range
from perfect competition (values near zero) to perfect monopoly (value of 10,000). Other
information such as employment share can be used. Unfortunately, market share,
employment share, or other similar type information is not available for wind and solar
manufacturers.
An additional difficulty in using employment level datum is a potential selection
problem, since skilled labor pools are an essential factor condition for clusters. Firm
count is a better metric for three reasons: 1) as stated before, large employers could
misrepresent clustering, 2) many researchers hypothesize the greater concentrations of
smaller firms leads to more positive externalities (McCann, 2001; Rosenthal & Strange,
2007; Saxenian, 1994), and 3) data on wind and solar system and component
manufactures is limited to counts.
Using finn counts rather than employment, changes the Location Quotient,
equation 4.0, to a Finn Location Quotient (FLQ) for a designated geographic region. It
can be represented by equation 4.1.
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FLQ = ,f;
r F
I
Where:
i = industry
f j = number of finns in region
F; = number of finns in nation
To overcome the second limitation of measuring concentrations ofjust one
(4.1 )
industry in a geographic region, geographic concentrations of interrelated finns are
summed as well. The summation of finn count ratios for each identified interrelated
industry creates an Interrelated Location Quotient (ILQ) for each identified geographic
region. ILQ is the dependent variable for this study. It can be represented by equation
4.2.
I
ILQ" =2:: F;
Where:
m = geographic region
i = industry
I = all identified interrelated industries
fi = number of finns in region
F j = number of finns in nation
(4.2)
Solar and wind manufacturing clusters are comprised of very different finns and
component suppliers. The ILQ for solar energy manufacturing clusters is different than
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the ILQ for wind energy manufacturing clusters. Each MSA has an ILQ for solar
manufacturing clustering and a different ILQ for wind manufacturing clustering.
Data sources for dependent variable. The data source for firm counts is the
marketing journal Thomas J Register ofAmerican Manufacturers. Published annually
since 1905, the Thomas Register is a well-known and commonly used source for
information on American manufacturers. For example, Klepper and Simons (2000) used
the Thomas Register for their study of the evolution of the radio and television receiver
industry. For the ILQ, type of manufacturer, location of manufacturer, and annual counts
by type and location come from listings in the Thomas Register.
I examined Thomas Register indexes for Volumes 1978 -1995 to identify all
possible product categories representing components and systems for wind and solarlPV
energy systems. A listing of Thomas Register product categories tracked is located in
Appendix C. Not included in the solar counts were sales firms, firms that only install
energy systems, or those focusing on solar water or house heating. The focus for solar
and PV energy is production of electricity, not passive heating. Not included in the wind
counts were firms that distributed and sold windmills, or installed and repaired windmills,
unless, of course, they were part of the manufacturing firm. The windmill category in the
Thomas Register listed two manufacturers of ornamental windmills (Aero Manufacturing
of Geneva, Nebraska, and Air Electric Machine of Lohrville, Iowa) that were eliminated
from the data set. Some firms manufactured entire systems and components, or
manufactured more than one type of component. In order to avoid double counting these
firms, binary categories tracked categories of components and system. Firms that provide
raw materials such as silicon were not counted because it was impossible to distinguish
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those finns that provide inputs for these industries specifically versus those who do not.
The listings in the Thomas Register were verified against multiple listings of
manufacturers published over the time span of the study. They include: 1977 Solar
Industry Index produced by Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA), 1983 American
Wind Energy Association Directory of Manufacturers, 1988 SEIA PV guide, 1993
Interstate Renewable Energy Council Guide to Renewable Systems, 1984 Department of
Energy PV Guide, and lists of respondent finns for the Department of Energy's Annual
Solar Thennal collector and Photovoltaic Module Manufacturers Survey. When there
were discrepancies, such as if a manufacturer was listed in one of the guides used for
cross-reference but did not show up in the Thomas Register, it was eliminated from the
count.
Next I explain the data sources and operationalization of the explanatory variables
and the control variables. All explanatory variables are centered and lagged. All control
variables are lagged except for incentives, which influence the years they are in effect.
Explanatory Variables
Congruous institutional logics. Institutional logics that are congruous for wind
and solar energy manufacturing clusters can occur in regions where human populations
have a pro-environmental ideology (Mitchell et aI., 1992; Sine & Lee, 2009). This study
represents the pro-environmental institutional logic of a population with a pattern of
congressional representatives voting in a pro-environmental manner. These data are
available from the National Environmental Scorecard published annually by the League
of Conservation Voters (LCV). The Environmental Scorecard reports the votes of US
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Congress members on about 15 bills that are selected for having pro-environmental and
anti-environmental positions. An absence counts as an incorrect vote. The LCV provides
a score for each Representative and Senator as a percentage of pro-environmental votes,
such that scores run from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating a more instances of pro-
environmental voting behavior.
This analysis uses House of Representative voting patterns rather than Senate
voting patterns for two reasons. First, LeV scores differ between the two chambers of
Congress for any given year because of different roll-call votes (Groseclose et a1., 1999).
To maintain consistency, this analysis uses only votes from Representatives rather than
Senators. Second, Representative are more 'representative' of their populace in a
particular region, because the number of Representatives in Congress increases with a
state's population. Each state has two Senators, regardless of its population; as such they
represent the state's interests overall and not those of particular MSAs. Several
researchers have used LCV scoring of Representatives to capture the characteristics of
voters and their support for environmental issues (Levitt, 1996; Nelson, 2002). Since a
state may have multiple MSAs, using averaged Senate votes creates a pro-environmental
measure for the state, rather than a particular MSA. By using Representative votes, a
finer measure for MSA pro-environmental institutional logic is possible.
In order to represent the core of a MSA, the Representative districts that comprise
an MSA are used to create an average LCV score. For example, since St. Louis is in
Missouri and Illinois, all identified Representative's districts were used, regardless of
which state they were in. All district identifications came out of Congressional
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Quarterly's publications: Districts in the 1970s, Congressional Districts in the 1980s, and
Congressional Districts in the 1990s.
Pecuniary externalities. Pecuniary externalities result from benefits achieved
through usual market interactions, where a positive extemality results in reduced prices
for an input (Scitovsky, 1957). Economic geographers often study this type of extemality
in their research. For this model, pecuniary externalities are represented by the presence
of a skilled labor pool essential to wind and solar energy projects (Audia et aI., 2006;
Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Boschma & Wenting, 2007; Sine & Lee, 2009). Sine and
Lee (2005) constructed a measure for human capital for wind energy projects for the
number of people in each state employed in technical fields relevant to wind energy.
They used the SIC and NAICS codes to compile the employment in the industry groups
of Engine and Turbines, Electric Transmission and Distribution Equipment, Electronic
Components and Accessories, Miscellaneous Electrical Machinery, and Aircraft Parts.
The Renewable Energy Policy Project (Sterzinger & Svrcek, 2004), identified the
relevant skills for wind manufacturing as SIC codes: 335103-Engines And Turbines,
336103-Electric Distribution Equipment, 336703-Electronic Components And
Accessories, 336903-Miscellaneous Electrical Equipment & Supplies, and 337203-
Aircraft And Parts. For solar and photovoltaic manufacturing (Sterzinger & Svrcek,
2005; US Photovoltaic Industry Roadmap Steering Committee, 2003), the relevant skills
are SIC codes: 3361 03-Electric Distribution Equipment, 336703-Electronic Components
And Accessories, 336903-Miscelaneous Electrical Equipment & Supplies, 336709-0ther
Electronic Components & Accessories, 336744-Semiconductors And Related Devices,
338203-Measuring And Controlling Devices, and 3321 03-Flat Glass. This data came
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fI-om the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Covered Employment and Wages Program.
Although SICs contain six digits, data for MSAs was available for the first three digits of
SICs. To scale this data, skilled labor is a ratio of employment in designated areas
divided by total manufacturing employment in a MSA.
A pecuniary externalities and institutional logic interaction term is necessary since
hypothesis 2a predicts a moderating relationship between a congruous institutional logic
and pecuniary externalities on levels of clustering. The institutional logic variable, LCV
scores, and the pecuniary externalities variable, skilled labor ratio, are lagged and
centered. The presence of these variables twice in the model creates multicollinearity
problems. By centering the explanatory variables, the collinearity resulting from
interaction variables is reduced (Aiken & West, 1991).
Technological externalities. Technological externalities impact the production
function, but the benefits result from nonrnarket interactions (Scitovsky, 1957). This type
of externality is often captured in organizational theory research as knowledge spillover.
Research in the biotechnology industry identifies knowledge spillover as an essential
mechanism for finn clustering (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004). For this model,
technological externalities are represented by the potential knowledge spillover from the
underlying science that is developed in related university departments (Owen-Smith &
Powell, 2004; Stuart & Sorenson, 2003a). Several researchers have shown that the
geographic limits of knowledge spillover is approximately a 100-mile radius (e.g. Jaffe et
a!., 1993). As such, only universities located in MSAs or consolidated metropolitan
statistical areas (CMSA) are considered to be a source of knowledge spillover in the
urban area.
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The explanatory variable for knowledge spillover is measured by the total annual
research spending by all universities in each MSA in the relevant engineering disciplines
for wind and solar energy. This data comes from the National Science Foundation as part
of its WebCASPAR Integrated Science and Engineering Resource Data System.
Relevant engineering disciplines for wind energy are aerospace, electrical, and
mechanical; for solar, they are chemical, electrical, and mechanical (Fasulo & Walker,
2007). The total number of universities and colleges with any reported spending in the
relevant disciplines between 1978 and 1995 is 330.
A technological externalities and institutional logic interaction term is necessary
since hypothesis 2b predicts a moderating relationship between a congruous institutional
logic and technological externalities on levels of clustering. The institutional logic
variable, LCV scores, and the technological externalities variable (university research
spending), are lagged and centered.
Another important source of knowledge spillover for renewable energy
manufacturing are the three national laboratories. They are: 1) National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (NREL), started in 1977 in Boulder, Colorado, (NREL, 2009), 2)
Sandia National Laboratories, started in 1949 in Albuquerque, New Mexico, (Sandia
National Laboratories, 2009), and 3) Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, started in
1931 in Berkeley, California (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2009). They are
represented with an indicator variable in the data set for these three MSAs.
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Control Variables
Demand conditions. Demand conditions are synonymous with infonned and
discerning consumers, they are represented by alternative energy generation projects.
Previous researchers (Russo, 2001; Sine et aI., 2005) have studied wind energy projects.
This study builds on their research by including solar energy projects as well as wind
energy projects in the sample and uses them as infonned customers, modeled by Porter as
demand conditions. The data set includes wind and solar qualifying facilities but not
hydroelectric dams, landfill gas collection, or geothennal heat sources. Similar to the
measure used as a dependent variable by Russo (2001; 2003) and Sine and colleagues
(Lee & Sine, 2005; Sine et al., 2005), I use Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) filings to track wind and solar qualifying facilities. Filings for 1978-1995 come
from FERC's Qualifying Facilities Report (US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
1995).
Factor conditions. Factor conditions represent a cluster's economic
environment. All factor condition variables have been used by previous researchers with
similar contexts (Lee & Sine, 2005; Russo, 2001, 2003; Sine & Lee, 2009), which
improves this study's construct validity (Hoyle et al., 2002). The study controls for
interest rates, per capita gross state product, and gross domestic product. These data are
available from the Federal Reserve and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. State
values for average electricity prices came from the Department of Energy's Energy
Infonnation Administration. If a MSA crossed state lines, the prices for the states were
averaged. Additionally, MSA population, from Global Insight, is used to control for
MSA size. All control variables are lagged with the exception of incentives.
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Regulatory incentives are represented by counts of incentives for wind and solar
applicable to each MSA. This is similar to a measure used by Lee and Sine (2005) and
Sine and Lee (2009). Although avoided cost (the price paid by each utility to generators)
would be a more exact measure (Russo, 2001, 2003), all states do not have complete
records on avoided costs paid to qualifying facilities. An indicator vmiable is used for
years in which the federal incentives were enacted (Russo, 2001, 2003). State incentives
were identified through listings in the Solar Law Reporter, and then cross-referenced
with 1982 Summary of State Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy produced by the
National Conference of State Legislatures, 1985 Solar Rating & Certification State Solar
Directory, and 1997 Interstate Renewable Energy Council's Survey of Renewable Energy
Incentives.
Natural resource potential for wind and solar energy are represented in the model
by multiplying the solar or wind rating times the area in kilometers squared. Following
Russo's (2003) delimitations between high wind potential at classes 6 and 7, and lesser
wind potential at classes 1 through 5, this study uses a similar High Wind Energy
Potential variable except I set the high wind energy potential threshold at Class 4 and
above (Department of Energy, 2000). Wind Class 4 is still more conservative than a
previous study by Pacific Northwest Laboratories which set the threshold at Class 3
(1991). A similar variable for high solar energy potential is created for comparative
analysis using a high solar energy potential annual threshold of 5,000 Whltn2/day and
above. The data was downloaded through a geographic information system (GIS) that
provides a 40-km resolution level of data at http://www.nrel.govigis/. The National
Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL) energy potential information was matched with
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the ESRI GIS software sample data provided by ArcMap to calculate energy potential
times kilometers2 per state. If a MSA crossed state lines such as in St. Louis, its potential
was an average of that for the states in which it is located, in this case, Illinois and
Missouri.
Up to this point in the chapter I have discussed the empirical setting, sample
frame, sample design, and operationalization of the variables. In the next section I
explain the specification of fixed effects for the panel data and how it is used to test the
hypotheses from Chapter 3.
Statistical Estimation
The statistical estimation method for this study was determined by the
nature of the dataset. In order to test causal relationships, the data needed to be
longitudinal. In order to test how varying levels of a congruous institutional logic
influenced clustering, the data needed to be cross-sectional for many MSAs. The result is
a panel data set. Advantages to using panel data are controlling for MSA heterogeneity,
more reliable estimates and less collinearity given greater amounts of informative data
and the ability to understand adjustments across time (Baglati, 2008).
This particular panel dataset is considered a micro panel because it has a large N
of 252, and a relatively short period T (time), since it does not exceed 20 years. Cross-
section dependence and non-stationarity is not a concern over this shorter time period
(Baglati, 2008). To confirm this I used a Nyblom-Harvey test (Nyblom & Harvey, 2000).
The null hypothesis assumes no common trends among the variables. As such it is also a
test for cointegration. Failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates stationarity. For both
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dependent variables, Wind ILQ (p value = 0.87) and Solar ILQ (p value = 0.87) the test
failed to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity when a time trend is included in the
model. A trend variable is included in the analysis to capture general growth in the
dependent variables2. As such, time-series analysis was not employed, since it is more
appropriate for non-stationarity in the data when a trend variable is included. Figure 6
shows the total annual counts for wind and solar system and component manufacturers
listed in the Thomas Register.
Figure 6. Annual Counts of Wind and Solar Component and System Manufacturers in
Thomas Register
Firm Counts for System and Component Manufacturers
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2 A shift variable was employed for the years the Federal Incentive lapsed, 1986
to 1992, however it was not significant, nor changed any of the estimated coefficients.
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A fundamental distinction of panel data models using continuous variables is
between fixed effects and random effects (Cameron & Trivedi, 2008). Random effects
assumes exogeneity of the regressors on the MSA individual effects, while fixed effects
allows for endogeneity ofthe regressors with the MSA individual effects (Baglati, 2008)
The decision between fixed and random effects should be about model selection and not
just a Hausman test, in which rejection means using a fixed effects model and non-
rejection means using a random effects model (Baglati, 2008). A disadvantage of fixed
effects is that time invariant regressors are eliminated from the model.
This dataset is best represented with a fixed effects model, since there are many
unobserved characteristics ofthe metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). Using a fixed
effects model allows for endogeneity of the regressors for the individual effects of each
MSA (Baglati, 2008). A Hausman test supports the fixed effects specification, indicating
that the random effects estimate was significantly different from the unbiased fixed
effects estimate (for Wind model X2(23) =175.36; for Solar model X2 (23) =3601.92).
Fixed effects estimation begins with a model where i represents each MSA for all
t from 1979 to 1995:
(4.3)
The time invariant explanatory variables are represented with a i " For each i, in this case
MSA, the equation is averaged resulting in:
(4.4)
The data are time-demeaned by subtracting the mean model, equation 4.4, from the
original model, equation 4.3, such that:
«« -
Yt=yu-y; (4.5)
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Since the unobserved effects for each MSA are in both equations, the unobserved effect,
ai' is removed:
(4.6)
The estimation is calculated using pooled ordinary least squares (Wooldridge, 2003).
Given the possible recursive nature of variables influencing incentives for wind
and solar technologies and the pro-environmental proclivities of a human population,
there is a concern about endogeneity in this dataset. This endogeneity can be treated with
instrumental variable estimation. An instrumental variable is another independent
variable that should be correlated with the variable for which the instrumental variable is
now an alternative estimator and not correlated with the error term for the model
(Kennedy, 2003). For this dataset, the variables for which I am concerned about
contemporaneous correlation are counts of state wind and solar incentives. The
instrument, in other words, the alternative estimator, is the amount of electricity a state
imports. Electricity imports is a good instrument because it should be related to a state's
policy choices for incentivizing alternative energy generation and energy conservation,
but not to the error term for the model. Electricity import infonnation comes from the
Energy Information Administration. The Davidson-MacKinnon test for exogeneity using
average electricity imports as an instrumental variable for state incentives, indicates the
instrumental variable estimation is not necessary (for Wind model F( I, 3752)=0.0041, P
value=0.9487; for Solar model F(l, 3752)=0.6812, P value =0.4092) to correct for
endogeneity.
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Another concem is non-random sample selection leading to biased coefficient
estimators (Wooldridge, 2003). The sampling frame identified all MSAs in the U.S. in
199G--because of missing population data, 24 of those MSAs were excluded from the
sample. Using a Heckit method (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Heckman, 1979) this
incidental truncation is accounted for by generating a variable, the inverse mills ratio
(IMR), from an explicit selection equation (Wooldridge, 2003). Ifsignificant, the IMR is
then included into the estimation to account for this selection bias. To generate the IMR,
a variable not included in the model, must be used in the explicit selection equation. This
variable must be related to being excluded from the sample, but not highly correlated to
the dependent variable. I use total non-farm labor for this variable, since it is highly
related to MSA population and one of the main reasons for exclusion was the cities had
not yet reached the MSA population minimum, and not highly correlated to the overall
model. Ifthe IMR variable in the overall model is statistically significant, it is a sample
selection problem, and the IMR variable should be included in further estimations. Its
influence on the interpretation of the estimations must be taken into account in the
analysis.
My original model included a measure for wind and solar potential and an
indicator variable for national laboratories, since all were fonned prior to the timeframe
of the dataset. However, since they are time invariant, they drop out of a fixed effects
model. Even though fixed effects models eliminate time invariant regressors, a
Hausman-Taylor estimator (Hausman & Taylor, 1981) allows for overcoming the
absorption of the time invariant regressors. into the fixed effects transformation. A
Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable estimator allows for the inclusion of time-
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invariant regressors into a fixed effects specification (Cameron & Trivedi, 2008). The
Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable estimator can be calculated using only the
inforn1ation already present in the model by distinguishing variables that are time
invariant and not correlated with the error term in the model (Greene, 2003). The
variable I identify as uncorrelated with the fixed-effects assigned to MSAs is the 1983
Supreme Court ruling upholding PURPA and avoided cost rates. This is a reasonable
assumption since the Supreme Court ruling in support ofPURPA is random to specific
MSA characteristics. By using a Hausman-Taylor estimator, I am able to assign an
estimator to wind and solar potential and the presence of a national laboratory in an
MSA.
To test hypotheses 1 and 2, the estimation of the models is sequential, adding in
explanatory variables to determine if inclusion of the explanatory regressors supports the
hypotheses. The first model includes control variables, the following models build
sequentially by adding the institutional alignment variable, then the interaction term for
the institutional alignment variable with each pecuniary and technological externality
variables.
In order to test hypotheses 3 for a significant difference in influence of
institutional logics when technological uncertainty is greater, a Hest between the wind
energy clusters model and solar energy clusters model is used. During the time frame of
the study, 1979-1995, wind energy had greater commercial viability than solar energy
(Gipe, 1995). As discussed in the section on empirical setting, the technological
uncertainty was much greater for solar than for wind technology. Given the distinct
difference in technological uncertainty between the two technologies, there is an
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opportunity to test for a significant difference between the explanatory variables when
using wind energy manufacturing versus solar energy manufacturing clustering data.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the value of the LeV regression coefficient for wind will be
less than for solar because solar has greater technological uncertainty.
The null hypothesis for the t-test sets the coefficient multiplied with the average
value of the dependent variable for each model equal to each other.
Ho'y- *fJ . =y- *fJ
• wind LCVwllld solar LCVsolar
The t-test uses the each coefficient estimate, standard error, and sample size for the two
mean test assuming unequal variance.
In order to determine if the relationship between the explanatory variables and the
dependent variable are causal or spurious, I use a Granger causality estimation (Granger,
1969). This examines the influence of the explanatory variable, lagged by one year, on
the dependent variable, and then reverses the regression. First, the explanatory variable,
lagged one year, is regressed on the dependent variable (the traditional regression
estimation) and then the dependent variable, lagged one year, is regressed on the
explanatory variable. To further examine a causal relationship, this study focuses on
MSAs that had zero clustering at the start of the timeframe, and later did exhibit
clustering. Focusing on such MSAs allows me to examine whether the hypotheses hold
when a reverse causal relationship is not possible since the level of clustering is zero. In
the next chapter, I apply these estimation methods, interpret the results, and detennine
results for hypotheses testing.
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CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL TESTING AND RESULTS
This study seeks to answer the research question: How do institutions, specifically
valying levels ofa congruous institutional logic, affect regional cluster emergence? The
previous chapter explained the empirical setting, sampling frame, variables, and
estimation methods. This chapter tests the hypothesized relationships between congruous
institutional logics, technological uncertainty, and cluster growth. The first section of
this chapter presents descriptive statistics, followed by the application of a Heckit method
(Heckman, 1979) to correct for sample selection. Then I test the first two hypotheses
using a fixed effects estimation. As explained in the previous chapter, fixed effects
estimation is preferred in this empirical setting due to the many unobserved
characteristics of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Then the third hypothesis is
tested with a t-test. Following that, the causal relationship between the variables of
interest is examined. Since time-invariant regressors may be important to the model, a
Hausman-Taylor estimation is examined. This chapter concludes with a review of the
results and a discussion of this study's limitations.
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Data Characteristics
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, control
variables, and explanatory variables. All explanatory and control variables are lagged
one year, with the exception of the Federal Incentive indicator and the count of state
Wind and Solar Incentives, because incentives only impact the years in which they are in
effect. Several variables are logged to improve their linear relationship with the
dependent variables of Wind Interrelated Location Quotient (ILQ) and Solar Interrelated
Location Quotient (ILQ. They are: Population, Wind Generating Facilities, Solar
Generating Facilities, Wind and Solar Skilled Labor, and All Non-farm Labor.
The three explanatory variables of 1) League of Conservation Voter Scores (LCV), 2)
LCV interacted with Skilled Labor (LCV X Labor), and 3) LCV interacted with Research
and Development (LCV X R&D), exhibit high levels of multicollinearity. To treat the
collinearity, each variable that shows up in the model twice is centered (Aiken & West,
1991).
Since the dataset contains cross-sectional data spanning many years, variables
were centered by subtracting the mean value for time period ti, from each observed value
for the same time period. Centered variables are: Wind Skilled Labor, Solar Skilled
Labor, Wind University R&D, Solar University R&D, LCV, LCV X Wind Labor, Lev
x Solar Labor, LCV X Wind R&D, and LCV X Solar R&D. With centering, the highest
variance inflation factor (VIF) is 2.47 for the variable Percent Change in US GDP. Prior
to centering the highest VIF was 8.86 for the interaction variable LCV X Wind Labor.
After centering, the mean VIF was 1.49, compared to before centering, where the mean
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VIF was 2.69. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for variables employed in this
study.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Mean S.D. Min Max
Wind CLQ (%) 0.67 2.16 0.00 23.46
SoiarlPV CLQ (%) 0.69 3.34 0.00 49.72
Population (thousands) a. b 5.73 1.07 4.05 9.73
Change State Gross Prod (%) a 0.07 0.04 -0.39 0.30
Change US GDP (%) a 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.11
Avg Price ofElec ($/MBtu) a 16.84 4.74 3.08 35.55
Commercial Interest Rate a 10.47 3.31 6.00 18.87
Federal Incentive Indicator 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Sup Court Ruling Indicator 0.76 0.42 0.00 1.00
No. Wind Incentives 1.33 1.30 0.00 6.00
No. Solar Incentives 1.84 1.46 0.00 6.00
Trend 10.00 4.90 2.00 18.00
Wind Generating Facilities a. b 0.13 0.52 0.00 5.28
Solar Generating Facilities a. b 0.03 0.22 0.00 3.00
Wind Labor (thousands) a. b, C 0.03 1.80 -4.06 2.80
Solar Labor (thousands) a. b, C 0.02 1.52 -3.56 2.81
Wind R&D ($ Millions) a. b. c 0.01 3.81 -3.49 8.83
Solar R&D ($ Millions) a. b. c 0.01 3.89 -3.61 8.67
Wind Potential (km2) b 7.44 4.45 0.00 12.35
Solar Potential (km2) b 6.52 5.74 0.00 13.20
National Laboratory Indicator 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00
LCV (/1 00) a. c 0.00 0.25 -0.51 0.66
LCV X Wind Labor a b. c
-0.02 0.44 -2.48 1.97
LCV X Solar Labor a, b. c
-0.01 0.38 -2.17 1.76
LCV X Wind R&D a. b. c 0.16 0.95 -3.61 4.35
LCV X Solar R&D a. b. c 0.16 0.97 -3.30 4.35
a lagged; b logged; c centered
Table 4 provides correlations for variables used in the wind energy manufacturing
cluster model, and Table 5 provides correlations for the variables used in the solar energy
manufacturing cluster model. In these tables, superscripts indicate which variables are
lagged (3), logged (b), and centered C). Correlations greater than 0.8 indicate high
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collinearity between the variables (Kennedy, 2003). After centering, none of the
variables have correlations higher than 0.8, thus reducing concems about collinearity
A few correlations are worth noting. Both wind clustering (Wind ILQ) and solar
clustering (Solar ILQ) increase with population. This is not surprising since total
numbers of firms generally increase with population. Although fairly small, 0.08 for
Wind ILQ and 0.07 for Solar ILQ, the number of incentives is significantly correlated
with clustering as would be expected.
Wind research and development (R&D) and solar R&D spending in universities is
significantly correlated with clustering. A greater correlation is between wind and solar
R&D and MSA population. Since larger cities tend to have more universities, this is not
surprising. Wind potential is positively correlated with the number or wind incentives.
Likewise, solar potential is positively correlated with the number of solar incentives. It
appears that legislatures are more likely to incentivize renewable energy that they have
the potential to generate in their states. The explanatory variable, League of
Conservation Voters' scores (LCV), is significantly correlated with the clustering
variables, Wind ILQ and Solar ILQ.
Table 4. Correlations for Wind Energy Manuf
acturing Clustering
(I) (2) (3 ) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8 ) (9) (l0) (11) ( 12) (13 ) ( 14) (15 ) ( 16) ( 17)
(I) Wind ILQ ('Yo)
(2) Population (thousands)" h 0.54
(3) Change State Gross Prod (%) • 0.01 -0.00
(4) Change US GDP (%) '" 0.01 -0.04 0,67
(5) Avg Pnce of Elec ($IMBtu)" 0.13 0.16 -0.33 -0.47
(6) Commercial Interest Rate" 001 -0.03 0.33 0.53 -0.39
(7) Federal Incentive Indicator 000 -0,0 I 0.33 0.43 -0.30 0.30
(8) Sup COUI1 Rullng Indicator -0.00 0.04 -0.52 -o.n 0.63 -0.58 -0.46
(Y) No. Wind Incentives 0.08 0.01 -0.03 0.D2 -0.01 0.10 0.04 001
( 10) Trend -0.0 1 0.05 -0.45 -0.72 0.58 -0.70 -0.34 0.74 -0.05
(II) Wind Generating Facilities ,", h 0.32 0.30 -0.11 -0.1 t 0.19 -0.14 -0.09 0.12 0.13 0.15
( 12) Wind Labor (thousands) "h., 0,0 \ -0.05 002 0.00 002 -0.00 -0.00 000 -0.06 0,00 0.16
( \ 3) Wind R&D ($ Millions) "h., 0.39 0.60 0.Q2 -0.00 0.13 -0.00 -000 000 0.08 0.00 0.21 -0.03
( 14) Wind Potential (km')· 0.12 0.01 00 I -000 -0.02 000 0.00 -000 0.38 O.OC 0.14 -0.09 0.07
( 15) Nation Lab Indicator 0.25 0.18 002 -0.00 0.04 000 0,00 000 002 -0.00 0.26 0,02 0.17 0.09
( 16) LCV (fIOO)"" 0.24 0.24 -0.Q2 0,00 0.12 -0.00 -0.00 ·000 0.16 0,00 0.04 -0.04 O.l? 0.09 0.04
( 17) LCV X Wind Labor ".•.• 0.Q2 -0.05 0.Q2 0.03 -0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.07 -0.04 002 U.14 -0.02 -0.00 O.OH 0.07
( 18) LCV X Wind R&D ".•. , 0.31 0.21 -00 I 0.00 0.12 -0.0 1 0.0 \ -() 01 0.06 0.0\ 0.D7 -om 0.13 0.00 0.08 0,07 ·001
Signiticance greater than 10% indicated
with bold typeface
o
o
Table 5. Correlations for Solar Energy Manufacturing Clustering
( ! ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) ( \2) (\3) ( 14) ( 15) ( :6) ( 17)
(I) 50101' ILQ (0/,,)
(2) Population (thousands) ".1' 0.46
(3) Change StOle Gross Prod (%) " 001 -0.00
(4) Change US GDr ('X,)" 000 -0.04 0.67
(5) AvE' hice of Ekc ($IMBtu) , 0.12 0.16 -0.33 -0.47
(6) lO'l1ll)en,;\n! Interest Rate:1 (I()() -0.03 0.33 0.53 -0.39
0) Federal Incentive IndIcator 0.(10 -0 0: 0.:13 0.43 -0.30 0.30
(8) Sup CI.\UI1 Rulll1g Indicator -(IOU 0.04 -0.52 -0.72 0.63 -0.58 -0.46
(9) No Sola!" II1Cel1tl Ve5 om 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.20 0.10 -0.08
(10) Tl'el1(! ·000 0.05 -0.45 -0.72 0.58 -0.70 -0.34 0.74 -0.16
~ I I ) Sulol Generotlng Facilities .'. b 0.31 0.23 -0.03 -0.06 0.14 -0.08 -0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10
( \ 2) So!al' Lahol' (thuusands) .•. b., 0.Q4 0.Q3 0.05 -0.00 0.06 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.13
(13 ) Solar R&D ($ Millions) ".h.• 0.32 0.60 002 -0.00 0.13 -0.00 -0.00 000 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.01
( 14) Solar Potential (kill)) h -0.Q3 -0.04 0.12 -0.00 -0.12 -0.00 0.00 -000 0.21 0.00 0.14 0.24 -0.03
( I 5) NatiOIl Lab Indicator 0.17 0.18 O.Q2 -0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 -0.00 0.11 0.05 0.17 0.11
( 16) LCV (i I00) "., 0.15 0.24 -0.02 0.00 0.12 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.16 -0.26 0.04
( I 7) LCV X Solar Lao(lr ". b.' 0.25 0.20 -0.0 I 0.00 0.12 -00\ 0.0\ -0.0\ 0.01 0.0\ 0.0\ -0.01 0.12 -0.05 0.07 0.07
( I R) LCV X Solar R&D ". h. < om -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.04
Significance greater than I()% indicated with bold typeface
o
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Sample Selection Correction and Fixed Effects Estimation
As explained in the previous chapter, 24 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
were omitted from the dataset because their annual population data was unavailable from
Global Insight and Statistical Abstracts of the United States. I use a Heckit method
(Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Heckman, 1979) to test and correct potential sample
selection bias. I use the logged value of Total Non-farm Labor in the explicit selection
equation (Wooldridge, 2003) to generate the inverse mills ratio (IMR). Then, the IMR is
included in the full model estimation. Total Non-farm Labor is an appropriate variable to
use in the selection model, firstly, because it is not used in the primary model. Secondly,
it is cOtTelated with the reason for exclusion from the dataset but not with the dependent
variable's etTors in the primary model (Wooldridge, 2003).
Ifthe coefficient on the IMR variable is significant, then sample selection bias is a
concern (Wooldridge, 2003). Since the IMR variable is not significant in the wind
models, sample selection is not a concern for wind manufacturing clusters. However, the
IMR in the solar models is positive and significant, indicating a selection bias in the
MSAs that were omitted from the sample. The positive sign on the IMR coefficient in the
solar models indicates that there are unobserved characteristics in the omitted MSAs that
increases the levels of clustering reported. It is impossible to know what these
unobserved characteristics might be. The IMR is included in the regressions to cotTect
for this bias. Since the IMR variable must be included in the solar model, it is also
included in the wind models for symmetry.
As explained in the previous chapter, fixed effects is the appropriate model for
this empirical setting, particularly because MSAs have many unobserved characteristics
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that influence the type of businesses that fonn and the propensity for clustering. The
fixed effects estimations, including the inverse mills ratio (IMR) variable, are in Table 6
for wind models and Table 7 for solar models. The base model for wind energy
manufacturing clusters is column WI, for solar energy manufacturing clusters is column
Sl.
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W4
0.102
(0.221 )
0.608
(0.380)
-0.366
(0.475)
1.525
(1.010)
-0.041**
(0.016)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.060**
(0.027)
0.145
(0.103)
0.058*
(0.034)
0.014**
(0.007)
-0.356**
(0.158)
0.075**
(0.037)
0.015
(0.010)
0.122*
(0.072)
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
-0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
-0.061 ** -0.060** -0.060**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
0.142 0.143 0.145
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
0.060* 0.058* 0.058*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
0.014** 0.014** 0.014**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
-0.359** -0.356** -0.356**
(0.158) (0.158) (0.158)
0.077** 0.075** 0.074**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
0.014 0.015 0.015
(0.010) (0.010) (0.0 I0)
0.114* 0.116*
(0.065) (0.065)
-0.028
(0.033 )
Inverse Mills Ratio
Avg Price ofElec ($/MBtu) a
Change US GDP (%) a
Commercial Interest Rate a
Federal Incentive Indicator
Wind Labor a. b. c
Sup Court Ruling Indicator
No. Wind Incentives
Wind Generating Facilities a. b
Winti R&D a. b. c
Trend
LCV (/1 00) a. c
LCV X Wind Labor a.b.c
Table 6. Fixed Effects Estimation for Wind Model
DV - Wind ILQ WI W2 W3
-------"'--------- ------------
Population (thousands) a,b 0.127 0.103 0.093
(0.221) (0.221) (0.220)
0.609 0.605 0.605
(0.380) (0.379) (0.379)
Change State Gross Prod (%) a -0.395 -0.374 -0.384
(0.470) (0.472) (0.471)
1.560 1.531 1.538
(1.007) (1.008) (1.009)
-0.041** -0.041** -0.042**
LCV X Wind R&D a. b. c
observations
MSAs
R-squared
4029
252
0.030
4029
252
0.031
4029
252
0.031
0.012
(0.022)
4029
252
0.031
4.14 **F statistic
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a lagged; b logged; c centered
2.083 2.083
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Table 7. Fixed Effects Estimation for Solar Model
DV - Solar ILQ SI S2 S3 S4
Population (thousands) o. b 0.763** 0.724** 0.759** 0.713**
(0.305) (0.309) (0.309) (0.309)
Inverse Mills Ratio 1.315*** 1.319*** 1.311** 1.363***
(0.510) (0.509) (0.510) (0.516)
Change State Gross Prod (%) ° 2.128*** 2.167*** 2.185*** 2.246***
(0.606) (0.607) (0.608) (0.613)
Change US GDP (%) ° -2.077 -2.142 -2.149 -2.226
(1.447) (1.451) (1.451) (I.456)
Avg Price ofElec ($/MBtu) ° 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.014
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Commercial Interest Rate a -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
(0.011) (0.011) (0.01l) (0.011)
Federal Incentive Indicator -0.074** -0.073** -0.073** -0.073**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Sup Court Ruling Indicator -0.122 -0.125 -0.129 -0.114
(0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.144)
No. Solar Incentives 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.094***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Trend -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Solar Generating Facilities a. b -1.452** -1.460** -1.467** -1.479**
(0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658)
Solar Labor a. b. c
-0.069 -0.075 -0.068 -0.093
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Solar R&D a, b, C 0.010 0.011 0.01l 0.012
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
LCV (/100) a.c 0.173* 0.168* 0.236**
(0.090) (0.090) (0.115)
LCV X Solar Labor a. b. c 0.083*
(0.042)
LCV X Solar R&D a. b. c 0.088**
(0.041 )
Observations 4029 4029 4029 4029
MSAs 252 252 252 252
R-sguared 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.039
F statistic 2.92 2.083 6.265***
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a lagged; b logged; C centered
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I discuss each variable from the top of Tables 6 and 7 proceeding downward. The
estimated coefficient on the Population variable is positive as expected, but it is only
significant for the solar model. I expect manufacturing clustering to increase as
population of the MSA increases, because number of firms increases with population.
The inverse mills ratio coefficient is positive and significant in the solar model, which
indicates a selection bias resulting in higher values of the dependent variable.
While most of the explanatory variables have the expected sign, a few variables
had opposite signs for the different technologies of wind and solar. Change in State
Gross Product is negative for wind models and positive and significant for the solar
models. I expect manufacturing to increase when the change in state gross product
increases. The surprisingly negative sign for the wind models can be ignored for
practical purposes. Not only is it non-significant, the coefficient and the t-va1ues are
small (Wooldridge, 2003), ranging from -0.56 to -0.67 across the models. Change in US
GDP is positive for wind models and negative for solar models. I expect manufacturing
to increase when the change in US GDP is positive as the result of a growing economy.
This time, the surprising negative values for the coefficient are in the solar models. It is
interesting to note that the signs reverse in each model, but these variables are
insignificant.
In the wind models, the negative and significant signs on the Average Price of
Electricity coefficients are expected, since manufacturing decreases as the cost of inputs
increases. The solar models have a positive sign, however the t-values are small, ranging
from 0.59 to 0.63, so once again these can be ignored for practical purposes. The
negative signs on Commercial Interest Rate coefficients are expected since investment in
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manufacturing is expected to decrease as the cost of capital increases. For both of the
models these variables are significant.
The negative and significant coefficients on the indicator variable for the years
Federal Incentives were enacted are surprising. Previous research (Russo, 2001,2003;
Sine et al., 2005; Sine & Lee, 2009), showed that federal incentives were positively
correlated with foundings of wind energy generating facilities. However, previous
researchers were measuring founding of qualifying facilities~the customers of the wind
manufacturing clusters~ not founding of wind energy system and component
manufacturers. The only explanation I can see is that the rise in component
manufacturers disguises the drop in system manufacturers during the years the federal
incentive was not in effect. In Figure 7, the component and system manufacturer counts
that go into the creation of ILQ are shown. Since the dependent variable is measuring
interrelated industry clustering, the variable does not behave as it did in models for
energy generator foundings.
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Figure 7. Wind and Solar System and Component Manufacturer Counts from 1978-1995
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Continuing with the discussion of control variables in the model, the Supreme
Court Ruling variable is one for 1983 and later to represent the time period after the
Supreme Court supported PURPA's required payment of avoided cost rates by utilities to
qualifying facility (QF) energy producers. The Supreme Court Ruling variable was
found to be positive and significant in providing legitimacy to wind energy producers
(Sine et aI., 2005). In Table 6, for the wind models, the Supreme Court Ruling indicator
is positive but not significant. In Table 7, for the solar models, the Supreme Court Ruling
coefficient is negative. It may be that the Supreme Court ruling supporting payment of
avoided cost rates provided stability to wind energy producers but did not influence solar
energy producers because solar technology was still not commercially viable. Or, it
could be that the Supreme Court ruling did not change the market opportunities for
manufacturers because it was expected to support avoided cost rates. The positive and
significant coefficients are expected for Number of Wind Incentives and Number of Solar
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Incentives. A trend variable is included to capture the generally increasing nature of the
dependent variable, ILQ. The trend variable is positive and significant for the wind
models. It is not significant for the solar models.
The variable representing informed customers for wind and solar manufacturing
clustering is Generating Facilities. The variable for wind and solar is negative and
significant. This is likely an artifact of the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis is
MSA- this was selected based on previous cluster research and because manufacturing
clustering is a predominantly urban activity. However, wind and solar generating
facilities are predominantly located outside urban areas. Although Porter (1990) predicts
clustering to accompany increased demand conditions, for the alternative energy
generating market, the nature of energy-generating siting requirements, counteracts that
prediction.
The variable representing the skilled labor pool for wind manufacturing, Wind
Energy Labor Pool, is positive and significant. The variable representing skilled labor
pool for solar manufacturing, Solar Energy Labor Pool, is negative and not significant.
However for Solar Energy Labor Pool, the coefficient is very small and the t-values are
not large, ranging from -0.80 to -1.09, indicating that for practical purposes these can be
ignored (Wooldridge, 2003).
The variables representing knowledge spillover, Wind R&D and Solar R&D, are
positive but not significant. Researchers studying bio-technology clusters have found
knowledge spillover to be an extremely strong influence on clustering (Owen-Smith &
Powell,2004). Perhaps since wind and solar energy manufacturing are technologies that
do not require expensive laboratories and specialized tacit knowledge, knowledge
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spillover is not as important in these industries. In the next section I discuss models 2, 3,
and 4 that test hypotheses I, 2a, and 2b.
Testing Direct Effects of a Congruous Institutional Logic on Clustering
Hypothesis I predicts a positive and direct relationship between a congruous
institutional logic and clustering. The League of Conservation Voters Environmental
Scorecard average scores (LCV) represent the congruous institutional logic for
congressional representatives for each MSA. Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive direct
effect from LCV on the dependent variable, ILQ. Table 6, shows the addition of LCV to
the wind manufacturing cluster model in column W2, and Table 7 shows the addition of
the LCV to the solar manufacturing cluster model in column S2. The direct effect of a
congruous institutional logic is significant for both models. Hypothesis 1 is supported.
To detennine if the inclusion of the LCV variable is an improvement to the
previous model, I test to see if it has a nonzero partial effect on the dependent variable.
Change in R2 is not the best method to detennine if inclusion of a regressor improves the
model, because R2 always improves with the inclusion of another variable (Wooldridge,
2003). An F statistic can be used to detennine if model W2 is an improvement over WI.
The F statistic is calculated using the R2 values for model WI and W2:
F= (Rzwz-Rzwl)/q
(1- RZwz)/(n - k -1)
Where:
q = number of restrictions introduced between models
n = number of observations
k = number of variables in W2 including the constant
(5.0)
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The 5% critical value for the F distribution for numerator degrees of freedom (q) and
denominator degrees of freedom (n-k-l) is 3.84. The F statistic for model W2 compared
to WI is:
F= (0.031-0.030)/1 =4.14
(1- 0.031) /(4029 -13 -1)
Since 4.14 is greater than the F critical statistic for 5% significance, W2 is an
(5.l)
improvement over the previous model, W 1. Comparing models S1 and S2, the inclusion
of the LCV direct effect is not an improvement. Using more significant figures than
reported in Table 7 for the R2 results in:
F = (0.0364 - 0.0357)/1 = 2.92
(1- 0.0364)/(4029 -13 -1) (5.2)
This is less than the F critical of3.84. Model S2 is not a significant improvement over
S 1. F statistics are reported in the last row in all tables using fixed effects estimation.
The magnitude of the coefficient is important to understanding the practical
significance of a variable. When interpreting this variable, it is important to remember
that it is centered for each year. Holding all other variables constant, an increase in LCV
scores by 10 over the average LCV score for any given year increases wind energy
manufacturing clustering by 0.114*(0.10) = 0.0114. The average number of wind
component and system manufacturers across the panel is 134. To convert 0.0114 to
number of firms, I multiply 134 times 0.0114, resulting in an increase of 1.5 in
manufacturing firms in an MSA. If the dependent variable, Wind ILQ, increases by
0.0114, a cluster increases by 1 to 2 more manufacturers. For smaller cities such as
Missoula, Montana, this would be considered successful economic development, but for
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larger cities such as New York City, this would be practically insignificant. The practical
significance of the institutional logic variable is small. A similar calculation for practical
effect on solar manufacturing clustering results in an increase of 1.8, so about the same
increase of 1 to 2 more solar system or component manufacturers for an increase in 10
over the average LCV scores for a year.
Testing Moderating Effects on Pecuniary Externalities
Hypothesis 2a predicts a positive moderating relationship from a congruous
institutional logic on the relationship between pecuniary externalities and clustering. For
the wind manufacturing cluster model, W3, the coefficient on LCV is positive and
significant while the interaction term LCV X Wind Energy Labor Pool is negative and
not significant. For the solar manufacturing cluster model, S3, the coefficient on LCV
and the interaction term LCV X Solar Energy Labor Pool are both positive and
significant. Just looking at significance of the coefficient estimates, it appears hypothesis
2a is not supported in the wind model and is supported in the solar model.
The practical significance of model W3 can be understood only through the direct
effect of the LCV variable. Since the interaction term is not significant (p value=0.39) it
is inappropriate to use it to predict its influence on the dependent variable. Holding all
other variables constant, an increase in LCV scores by 10 over the average LCV score
any given year increases wind energy manufacturing clustering by 0.116*(0.10) =
0.0116. This direct influence once again correlates with an increase of 1 to 2 more
manufacturers in a MSA. The practical significance of the institutional logic variable is
small.
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To detennine if the inclusion of the direct effect and moderating effect are an
improvement to the wind model, I test to see ifjointly they have a nonzero partial effect
on the dependent variable. The 5% F critical is 3.00, for a numerator degrees of freedom
and a denominator degrees of freedom of 4014. The F statistic comparing WI and W3 is:
F = (0.031- 0.030) 12 =2.083
(1- 0.031) I(4029 -14 -1) (5.3)
indicating that the inclusion of the direct and moderating effect on pecuniary externalities
is not jointly significant.
For solar model S3, the coefficients on LCV and the interaction tenn LCV X
Solar Energy Labor Pool are both positive and significant. The practical significance of
model S3 can be understood by taking the pmtial derivative of LCV on Solar ILQ:
OILQ
OLCV = f3LeT + f3LcvxLnbOlLaborPool (5.4)
From model S3, the values for PLCV= 0.168 and PLCV X Labor = 0.083, can be inserted into
the partial effects equation 5.4, resulting in:
oILQ
--= 0.168 + 0.083(LaborPool)
OLCV
(5.5)
By setting equation 5.5 equal to zero and solving for Labor Pool, we see that any
Labor Pool value greater than -2.024 will have a positive influence on solar energy
manufacturing clustering. The values of the centered Solar Labor Pool variable range
from -3.56 to 2.81, so it is possible for a small value for Solar Labor Pool to overcome
the positive influence of the LCV variable. By inserting an interesting value for labor
pool into the partial derivative, we see the practical significance. An increase by one for
the skilled labor pool in a MSA over the average value for Labor Pool, results in 0.168 +
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0.083(1) = 0.251. This variable is logged, the exponential ofl is equal to 2.718. So an
increase of2,718 people in the labor pool over the average results in an increase of 0.251
in Solar ILQ. An increase of 0.251 in Solar ILQ is equal to that value multiplied by the
average number of finns of 158, which is an increase of 40 new finns in a MSA. The
indirect effect for a congruous institutional logic is practically significant even for larger
cities.
The significance on the individual coefficients does not indicate significance
when considered separately. I need to test if they are jointly significant, not just look at
whether each variable is individually significant (Wooldridge, 2003). The F statistic
comparing S1 and S3 is:
F= (0.037-0.036)/2 =2.083
(1- 0.037)/(4029 -14 -1)
Since the 5% F critical is 3.00, the inclusion of the direct and moderating effect on
(5.6)
pecuniary externalities is not jointly significant for the solar model. The variables of
LCV and LCV X Solar Energy Labor Pool are not an improvement in the model. In the
next section I discuss the results ofthe moderating effect of a congruous institutional
logic on the second type of externality.
Testing Moderating Effects on Technological Externalities
Hypothesis 2b predicts a positive moderating relationship from a congruous
institutional logic on the relationship between technological externalities and clustering.
For the wind manufacturing clustering model, W4, the coefficient on LCV is positive and
significant, while the interaction term LCV X Wind R&D is positive but not significant.
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For the solar manufacturing cluster model, S4, the coefficient on LCV and the interaction
term LCV X Solar R&D are both positive and significant. Hypothesis 2a is not supported
in the wind model and is supported in the solar model.
The practical significance of model W4 can be understood through the direct
effect of the LCV variable on clustering. Since the interaction term is not significant (p
value = 0.586) it is inappropriate to use it to predict its influence on the dependent
variable. Holding all other variables constant, an increase in LCV scores by 10 over the
average LCV score for any given year increases wind energy manufacturing clustering by
0.122*(0.10) = 0.0122, resulting in an increase of 2 more manufacturers in a MSA. The
practical significance ofthe institutional logic variable is small.
To determine if the inclusion of the direct effect and moderating effect are an
improvement to the wind model, I test to see if jointly they have a nonzero partial effect
on the dependent variable. The 5% F critical is 3.00, for a numerator degrees of freedom
of two and a denominator degrees of freedom of 4014. The F statistic comparing WI and
W4is:
F = (0.031- 0.030) /2 =2.083
(1- 0.031)/(4029 -14 -1) (5.7)
indicating that the inclusion of the direct and moderating effect on pecuniary externalities
is not an improvement in the model.
For solar model S4, the coefficients on LCV and the interaction term LCV X
Solar Energy Labor Pool are both positive and significant. The practical significance of
model S4 can be understood by taking the partial derivative ofLCV on Solar ILQ:
aLQ = 0.236 + 0.088(R & D)
OLCV
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(5.8)
Setting equation 5.8 equal to zero and solving for Solar R&D, shows that any R&D value
greater than -2.68 will have a positive influence on solar energy manufacturing
clustering. The values of the centered Solar R&D variable range from -3.61 to 8.67, so it
is possible for a small value for Solar R&D to overcome the positive influence of the
Lev variable. We can examine practical significance by inserting an interesting value
for Solar R&D. An increase by one in the research and development spending in a MSA
over the average R&D spending results in 0.236 + 0.088(1) = 0.324. So an increase of
$2,718,000 in the R&D spending in relevant engineering disciplines in a MSA's
universities over the average R&D spending results in an increase of 0.324 in Solar ILQ.
An increase of 0.324 in Solar ILQ is equal to that value multiplied by the average number
of firnls of 158. This results in an increase of 51 new firms in a MSA. The indirect effect
for a congruous institutional logic is practically significant even for larger cities.
To test if they are jointly significant, not just look at whether each variable is
individually significant (Wooldridge, 2003), I use an F test. The F statistic comparing S1
and S4 is:
F = (0.039 - 0.036) 12 =6.265
(1- 0.039) I(4029 -14 -1)
Since the 5% F critical is 3.00, the inclusion of the direct and moderating effect on
(5.9)
pecuniary externalities is jointly significant and an improvement for the solar model.
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Testing Technological Uncertainty Moderating Effects on Congruous Logif
Hypothesis 3 predicts a moderating relationship from technological uncertainty on
{l congrvous institutional logic's positive direct effect on clustering. Greater uncertainty
enhances the direct effect of a congruous institutional logic on clustering in MSAs. To
test this hypothesis, I draw on the historical difference in the viability between wind
energy production and solar energy production. As explained in Chapter 4, wind energy
has been more commercially viable as an alternative energy generating technology than
solar or photovoltaic energy. For example, in 1980, the projected cost of energy
generated by wind was 198 mills/kWhr, which decreased to 57 mills/kWhr in 1995. The
projected cost of energy generated by solar was 1,814 mills/kWhr which decreased to 275
mills/kWhr in 1995 (Mcveigh et aI., 1999). Throughout the time span for the study, wind
was a more viable and stable technology.
I test hypothesis 3 by comparing the coefficient on the variable representing the
congruous institutional logic, the League of Conservation Voters scores (LCV),between
the wind and solar models. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the LCV coefficient is
significantly greater in the solar model, S2, than the wind model, W2. The null .
hypothesis for the t-test sets the coefficients for each model equal to each other:
Ho : fJLCVw,nd - fJLCVsolar = 0 (5.10)
Using the standard error for each coefficient and sample size of 4029, a t-test rejects the
null hypothesis (t = -33.98, P value = 0.000). The coefficients are significantly different
with the LCV coefficient for the solar model being greater than that for the wind model.
Hypothesis 3 is supported at 1% significance.
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The hypotheses were tested with fixed effects estimation and a t-test between
explanatory variable coefficients in the two models. Hypothesis 1 is supported for the
wind model, hypothesis 2a is not supported, hypothesis 2b is supported in the solar
model, and hypothesis 3 is supported. However, hypotheses testing cannot determine if
the causal relationship is bi-directional. In the next section, I test for reverse causality in
the wind and solar models.
Causal Relationship
To ensure that the support for the hypotheses is causal and not spurious, I
need to determine if the reverse relationship is occurring. Do LCV scores increase
because MSAs have more firms in renewable energy manufacturing? I examine the
causal relationship in two ways. First, I lag the dependent variable in the model and
regress it on the congruous institutional logic variable (Granger, 1969). Second, I regress
the model on only those observations where the previous year's clustering was zero.
Using the longitudinal nature of the data, I regress the Wind ILQ and Solar ILQ
variable, lagged one year, on the LCV variable. Tables 8 and 9 show the results of the
regressIOn.
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Table 8. Reverse Causality Regression for Wind Model, Fixed Effects Estimation,
Dependent Variable - LCV
W5 W6
Population (thousands) a. b 0.225*** 0.225***
(0.051 ) (0.051 )
Change State Gross Product(%) a 0.017 0.016
(0.104) (0.104)
Change US GDP (%) a -0.133 -0.132
(0.208) (0.208)
Avg Price ofElec ($/MBtu) a 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Commercial Interest Rate a -0.00 I -0.00 I
(0.002) (0.002)
Federal Incentive Indicator -0.005 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
Supreme Court Ruling Indicator -0.028 -0.028
(0.019) (0.019)
Trend -0.004** -0.004**
(0001) (0.001)
IMR for Wind Model 0.123* 0.123*
(0.064) (0.064)
No. Wind Incentives 0.014** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006)
Wind Generating Facilities a. b -0.032*** -0.032 ***
(0.011) (0.011)
Wind Labor a. b. c 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.008)
Wind R&D a. b. c
-0.002 -0.002
(0.003 ) (0.003)
Wind ILQ (%) a -0.00 <
(0.003)
Observations 4028 4028
MSAs 252 252
R-squared 0.012 0.012
F statistic (compared to model I) 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a lagged; b logged; C centered
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Table 9. Reverse Causality Regression for Solar Model, Fixed Effects Estimation,
Dependent Variable - LCV
S5 S6
Population (thousands) ., b 0,254*** 0,252***
(0,055) (0,055)
Change State Gross Product(%) • 0,091 0,080
(0.121) (0.121)
Change US GDP (%). -0.188 -0.174
(0.224) (0.224)
Avg Price ofElec ($/MBtu)· 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Commercial Interest Rate • -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Federal Incentive Indicator -0.008 -0.008
(0.006) (0.006)
Supreme Court Ruling Indicator -0.030 -0.029
(0.020) (0.020)
Trend -0.003** -0.003**
(0.002) (0.002)
IMR for Solar Model 0.179** 0.171 *
(0.091) (0.091 )
No. Solar Incentives 0.024*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006)
Solar Generating Facilities ., b 0.008 0.014
(0.019) (0.020)
Solar Labor •. b. c 0.034* 0.035*
(0.019) (0.019)
Solar R&D •. b. c
-0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Solar ILQ(%) • 0.004**
(0.002)
Observations 4028 4028
MSAs 252 252
R-squared 0.012 0.013
F statistic (compared to model 1) 4.07**
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
• lagged; b logged; c centered
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In the wind model, W6, the coefficient on the Wind ILQ variable is not
significant. In the solar model, S6, the significant coefficient for Solar ILQ suggests a
case of mutual causality. It suggests that if a MSA increases by 10 firms, meaning the
Solar ILQ increases by 0.20, the LCY score will increase by 0.004*0.20 = 0.008. LCY is
reported as a percent, so that scales to an increase in a MSA's LCV score over the
average by 0.80. The practical significance is very small. Although reverse causality is
present in the solar model, it is of little practical significance. Causality in the model is
as hypothesized.
I examine causality further by isolating instances when clustering first appears. I
identified 48 cases in wind clustering and 56 cases in solar manufacturing clustering
where clustering emerged after the previous time period had zero clustering. Selecting all
observations for which the previous time period had no clustering and then regressing on
the dependent variable eliminates any potential recursive influence of clustering on LCV
scores. The regression results are in Tables 10 and 11.
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Table 10. Regression on First Emergence of Wind Energy Manufacturing Clustering
DV - Wind ILQ W7 W8
Trend
LCV (11 00) a c
Wind R&D a, b, C
Inverse Mills Ratio
Population (thousands) a, b -0,191 -0.199
(0.332) (0.318)
-3.295 -3.323
(2.458) (2.549)
3.205 3.666
(4.175) (5.192)
-27.048** -26.057*
(11.279) (13.364)
-0.045 -0.046
(0.059) (0.062)
0.091 0.076
(0.139) (0.191)
-0.093 -0.090
(0.320) (0.320)
-0.025 -0.061
(0.778) (0.866)
-0.090 -0.082
(0.147) (0.152)
-0.056 -0.059
(0.078) (0.084)
0.238 0.248
(0.454) (0.479)
-0.115 -0.115
(0.119) (0.120)
0.032 0.032
(0.080) (0.085)
0.241
(1.279)
Change State Gross Product (%) a
Change US GDP (%) a
Avg Price ofElec ($/MBtu) a
Commercial Interest Rate a
Federal Incentive Indicator
Supreme Court Ruling Indicator
No. Wind Incentives
Wind Generating Facilities a, b
Wind Labor a, b,c
Observations
R-squared
48
0.292
48
0.294
0.0960F statistic
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a lagged; b logged; C centered
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Table 11. Regression on First Emergence of Solar Energy Manufacturing Clustering
DV - Solar ILQ S7 S8
Population (thousands) a, b 0.095 0.094
(0.233) (0.235)
Inverse Mills Ratio -6.573*** -6.889**
Change State Gross Product (%) a
Change US GDP (%) a
Avg Price ofEJec ($/MBtu) a
Commercial Interest Rate a
Federal Incentive Indicator
Supreme Court Ruling Indicator
No, Solar Incentives
Trend
Solar Generating Facilities a, b
Solar Labor a, b, C
Solar R&D a, b, C
LCV (1100) a C
(2.249)
-38.565***
(11.181)
44.447**
(16.866)
-0.048
(0,048)
-0, I05
(0,075)
-0,225
(0.4 I7)
1.818*
(1.040)
0.022
(0.218)
-0.067
(0.091 )
0,931
(0,653 )
0,087
(0.109)
-0.048
(0.073)
(2.592)
-37.715***
(10.911)
42.653**
(16.585)
-0.047
(0.047)
-0.093
(0.074)
-0.250
(0.438)
1.832*
(1.064)
0.001
(0,232)
-0.066
(0.092)
0.823
(0.704)
0,076
(0.112)
-0.063
(0.077)
0.574
(0.839)
Observations 56 56
R-squac.re---=d .:,0'--.4---=7---=7 --=-0'--.4.:,8-=-1 _
F statistic 0.324
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a lagged; b logged; C centered
Regressing on a cross-section of MSAs in the year they first exhibit clustering
results in positive but insignificant coefficient estimates. From these estimations, it is
difficult to say much about the relationship between LCV and clustering. The sample
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sizes are small and the observations come from different years in the dataset. In addition,
looking at the F statistic, models including Lev are not a significant improvement over
the base model. It is better to use the Granger method to understand reverse causality.
The Granger (1969) method indicates the causality is in the direction predicted by the
model, and the reverse causality that does occur in the solar data has a very small effect.
In the next section, I use a Hausman-Taylor estimation to understand the influence of
time-invariant control variables in the model.
Influence ofTime Invariant Regressors
Although including time-invariant regressors was not necessary to test the
hypotheses, by including them in the model I am ableto understand more about the
clustering phenomena. I employ a Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimation method to
understand how the time-invariant regressors of wind potential, solar potential, and
presence of a national laboratory influence clustering. Hausman-Taylor estimates the
coefficients of the time-invariant regressors with random effects while maintaining fixed
effects estimation for the rest of the regressors. Table 12 presents the results of the
Hausman-Taylor estimation for wind energy manufacturing clusters, and Table 13
presents the results for solar energy manufacturing clusters.
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Table 12. Hausman-Taylor Estimation for Wind Model
DV - Wind ILQ W9 WIO WI I WI2
Population (thousands) a. b 0.438*** 0.420*** 0.455*** 0.400**
(0.159) (0. 160) (0.155) (0.161)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.676** 0.671 ** 0.670** 0.676**
(0.301) (0.30 I) (0.300) (0.301)
Change State Gross Prod (%) a -0.210 -0.187 -0.177 -0.185
(0.528) (0.528) (0.527) (0.529)
Change US GDP (%) a 1.333 1.305 1.291 1.304
(1.037) (1.037) (1.035) (1.038)
Avg Price ofElec ($/MBtu) a -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Commercial Interest Rate a -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Federal Incentive Indicator -0.065** -0.065** -0.065** -0.065**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Sup Court Ruling Indicator 0.126 0.127 0.128 0.129
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
No. Wind Incentives 0.069** 0.068** 0.068** 0.067**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Trend 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Wind Generating Facilities a. b -0.365*** -0.362*** -0.362*** -0.363***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Wind Labor a. b, C 0.072** 0.070** 0.069** 0.070**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Wind R&D a, b, C 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0,016)
Wind Potential (km2) b 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.002
(0.047) (0.048) (0.045) (0.048)
National Lab Indicator 22.804*** 22.885*** 20.517*** 24.136***
(5.659) (5.697) (5.129) (5.648)
LCV (/100) a, C O. 114 0.116 0.124
(0.077) (0.077) (0.079)
LCV X Wind Labor a. b. C
-0.028
(0.040)
LCV X Wind R&D a, b. c 0.014
(0.021 )
Observations 4029 4029 4029 4029
MSAs 252 252 252 252
l(d.£) 151.97(15) 153.69 (16) 156.59 (17) 155.29 (I7)
l Difference 1.72 4.62* 3.32
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a lagged; b logged; C centered
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Table 13. Hausman-Taylor Estimation for Solar Model
DV - Solar ILQ S9 SIO SII SI2
Population (thousands) a, b 0.749*** 0.720*** 0.902*** 0.674***
(0.254) (0.255) (0.226) (0.253)
Inverse Mills Ratio 1.455*** 1.458*** 1.393 *** 1.508 ***
(0.544) (0.545) (0.534) (0.545)
Change State Gross Prod (%) a 2.251 *** 2.291 *** 2.315*** 2.360***
(0.809) (0.809) (0.799) (0.811)
Change US GDP (%) a -2.294 -2.356 -2.336 -2.437
(1.526) (1.526) (1.509) (1.529)
Avg Price ofElec ($/MBtu) a 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Commercial Interest Rate a -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
(0.0 10) (0.010) (0.0 I0) (0.010)
Federal Incentive Indicator -0.074* -0.073 * -0.076* -0.073*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Sup Court Ruling Indicator -0.146 -0.148 -0.147 -0.138
(0.128) (0.128) (0.126) (0.128)
No. Solar Incentives 0.103*** 0.100*** 0.104*** 0.097***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034 ) (0.034)
Trend -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Solar Generating Facilities a. b -1.423 *** -1.432*** -1.431 *** -1.451 ***
(0.132) (0.132) (0.130) (0.132)
Solar Labor a. b. c
-0.041 -0.046 -0.032 -0.060
(0.099) (0.100) (0.095) (0.100)
Solar R&D a. b, c 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.006
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Solar Potential (Ian2) b -0.083 -0.082 -0.053 -0.086
(0.056) (0.057) (0.048) (0.058)
National Lab Indicator 38.817*** 39.388*** 25.581 *** 42.135***
(12.233) (12.310) (8.855) (11.660)
LCV (/100) a.c 0.170 0.163 0.232**
(0.108) (0.108) (0.110)
LCV X Solar Labor a, b. c 0.081
(0.067)
LCV X Solar R&D a, b, c 0.088***
(0.029)
Observations 4029 4029 4029 4029
MSAs 252 252 252 252
X2 168.76 (15) 170.77 (16) 179.70 (17) 182.11(17)
l Difference 2.01 10.94*** 13.35***
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a lagged; b logged; C centered
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The most striking result using a Hausman-Taylor estimation method is the very
large, positive, and significant coefficient for the presence of a national laboratory in a
MSA. The three MSAs with national laboratories are Boulder, Colorado; Albuquerque,
New Mexico; and Berkeley, California. Although the variable representing research and
development was not significant in the models, the national laboratory indicator is. It
appears that the knowledge spillover variable may be too broad and not specific enough
to wind or solar energy research.
Although the explanatory variables are no longer significant at the 10% level in
the Hausman-Taylor model, those that were supporting hypotheses in the fixed effects
model are behaving in similar fashion, but with reduced significance. The testing of
hypothesis 1 relies on the estimate for the LCV coefficients. The coefficients are about
the same value, with the wind model having a p value of 0.86 and the solar model having
a p value of 0.88. In the fixed effects estimation, hypothesis 2a was partially supported
by the solar model, but not by the wind model. For hypothesis 2a the coefficients are
similar to those in the fixed effects model, but they lose some significance. In the solar
models, the direct effect has a p value of 0.87 and the moderating effect has a p value of
0.77. Similarly, for hypothesis 2b, which was suppOlied by the solar model, is still
supported in the Hausman-Taylor estimation. Hypothesis 3 was supported in the fixed
effects estimation and is supported in the Hausman-Taylor estimation (t value= 26.8, p
value = 0.00).
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Discussion of Results
This study finds support for some but not all of the hypotheses. Looking at the
estimates for the explanatory variables in the wind models, only the variable for the
congruous institutional logic's direct effect is significant. While in the solar models, the
estimates for the direct and moderating effect of a congruous institutional logic are
significant in the solar model. Although the explanatory variables for hypothesis 1 and
hypothesis 2a in the solar model are significant, unfortunately the F statistic is not
significant. The hypotheses are not supported when the F statistic does not indicate that
the restricted model is an improvement over the unrestricted model. I find causality in the
direction predicted with results similar to the fixed effects estimation when I use a
Hausman-Taylor estimation. The results for the hypotheses are summarized in Table 14.
Table 14. Summary of Results
Hypothesis Wind SolarModel Model
1 - Congruous institutional10gic has a positive direct effect Yes No
2a ~ Congruous institutional logic has a positive moderating No No
effect on pecuniary externalities
2b - Congruous institutional logic has a positive moderating No Yes
effect on technological externalities
3 - Technological uncertainty has a positive moderating Yes
effect on congruous institutionallogic
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The results support the direct effect of a congruous institutional logic on
clustering. The partial support for the moderating effect by a congruous institutional
logic on the positive direct effect of extemalities on clustering highlights the difference
between the two technologies. The pattem of partial support for the solar models, but not
the wind models, indicates more influence from a congruous institutional logic when a
technology is not commercially viable. Since the dominant design was not determined
for solar energy during the time span of the study as it was for wind energy, it appears
that the moderating effect is significant during greater technological flux.
The large practical effect of the interaction variable on clustering in the solar
models is surprising. While the direct effect in wind and solar models is modest-an
increase in 10 over the LCV average results in 2 new firms-the moderating effect in the
solar models was quite pronounced. An increase in 2,718 skilled laborers over the
average results in an increase of 40 finns. An increase in $2,718,000 in R&D at
universities over the average results in an increase of 51 firms. Although we might
expect the causal relationship to be reciprocal, the wind model did not show reverse
causality and the solar model's reverse causality was practically very small. If a MSA
increases its solar energy cluster by 10 firms, the MSA's LCV score would increase by
0.08 over the average.
The national laboratory indicator's large and strongly significant coefficients are
surprising. Although I expected there to be an influence, I did not expect it to be greater
than the research and development spending by the universities located in a MSA. This
indicates the incredible value a national laboratory has for local economic development.
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In the next section, I discuss several limitations to this study that influence the ability to
generalize the findings.
Limitations
Testing hypotheses about regional clusters present several challenges. The first
was in selection of an empirical context. The second was in operationalizing the
variables, particularly clusters, and the third is in generalizability.
The first limitation to consider is the choice of empirical context. Choosing the
post-PURPA energy industry provides an ideal environment in which to explore the
institutional influences of regional cluster emergence, due to the clear link between a pro-
environment institutional logic and the pro-environmental perceptions of manufacturing
of renewable energy generation equipment (Mitchell et aI., 1992). While potentially an
extreme case (Yin, 2003), it is precisely that clear link which allows for the identification
and analysis of human populations with pro-environmental sentiments, and to test the
influence of this pro-environmental sentiments on the emergence of regional clusters.
While such 'clarity' may not be as obvious in less demarcated and represented
institutional logics, the implications of this study do provide additional insight to both
academics and practitioners in understanding how institutions influence regional cluster
emergence. In other contexts, public policy makers may have difficulty in identifying
congruous institutional logics for other regional clusters with hazier ideological
indicators.
The second limitation of this study is the operationalization ofthe variables.
One contribution of this study to this area of research is that I represent clusters as
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interrelated firms, not just the density of one organizational fonn. However, I was only
able to represent clusters of finns in the supply chain for wind and solar energy
equipment manufacturers. I assumed that if a manufacturer produced equipment that is a
component in an energy system that it is in a cluster. Given the nature of my study, to
test across many MSAs for many years, I was not able to collect data at the fine
granularity of actual business relationships in clusters. Another limitation is in the
operationalization of knowledge spillover. The research spending of universities in
relevant engineeling disciplines appears to be too broad of a measure to target spillover to
renewable energy manufacturing. However, the large coefficient on the presence of a
national laboratory, as shown in Tables 12 and 13, indicates that spillover is an important
positive externality for cluster emergence.
The third limitation is a concern over generalizability of these findings. The
sample for this study is close to the entire population of U.S. MSAs, so its predictive
ability to other U.S. MSAs is limited to around 30 cities not included in the sample.
However, the findings on institutional fit for business activities with congruous
institutional logics are generalizable. For example, if we could measure
'wholesomeness' across MSAs, we might be able to explore how that influences cluster
emergence in many cities, as it did in the musical theater cluster of Branson, Missomi
(Chiles et al., 2004). There are many institutional logics that can influence geographical
regions (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Measuring them is a more difficult challenge than
recognizing them. Due to the difficulty in measuring institutional logics that fit specific
business cluster activities, it may be difficult to generalize the findings of this study in
other contexts. Despite these limitations, this study presents several theoretical,
managerial, and policy implications. I review these implications in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
For more than a century, researchers have studied regional clusters (Marshall,
189011920), and yet, we are still unsuccessful in predicting where clusters will emerge
(Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005). Predicting the appearance of clusters is not as
easy as saying that once one firm has seeded in a region then others will follow.
Although there are software development clusters in Seattle, Washington, and the Bay
Area in California, the lack of software development clusters in Phoenix, Arizona, and
Fargo, North Dakota, are evidence of the fallacy in that statement.
To explain cluster emergence, researchers have explored and theorized the
benefits to pecuniary (Rosenthal & Strange, 2007) and technological externalities
(Lawson, 1999; Tallman et al., 2004). Although hinted at and used as an explanation,
institutional influences have rarely been measured (noted exception: Chiles et al., 2004;
Saxenian, 1994) particular!y in varying levels across multiple regions to determine
influence on business activity. This dissertation builds on these prior studies, by
investigating the following research question: How do institutions, spec~fically varying
levels ofa congruous institutional logic, affect regional cluster emergence? To answer
this question, I use an institutional logics framework to model how cluster emergence is
influenced by various factors, such as supportive institutional logics, knowledge
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spillover, labor pooling, and technological uncertainty. In this chapter I provide an
overview of the study and address its theoretical, managerial, and public policy
implications.
Overview and Summary
In this section I provide a brief overview of this research project. To begin this
study, I reviewed prior research and identified gaps in the cunent understanding of how
institutions influence cluster emergence. My theoretical model, based on an institutional
logics framework, fills the identified gaps in prior research. Tests of the hypotheses
developed from the theoretical model demonstrated support for institutional influences on
clustering that is enhanced by technology uncertainty.
Prior Research
Since the benefits from regional clusters derive from positive externalities, I
organized the literature review using Scitovsky's two external economies: pecuniary and
technological (1957). Beneficial pecuniary externalities improve the profitability of
finns by decreasing cost of inputs or increasing the price for outputs. Improved labor
pooling is an example of a pecuniary externality for clustered finllS. Beneficial
technological externalities improve the profitability of finns by increasing their
production function. Receiving knowledge spillover is an example of a technological
externality for clustered firms. To find gaps, I reviewed research at the intersection of
these externalities and three types of institutions (Scott, 200 1)-regulatory, normative,
and cultural-cognitive.
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Prior regional cluster research on pecuniary externalities finds many benefits to
clustering, including enhanced access to existing resources and reduced costs of inputs,
increased legitimacy, and access to specialized inputs. Research at the intersection of
pecuniary externalities and institutions finds that regulatory institutions can increase
clustering by increasing prices for outputs (i.e. Russo, 2003), or through improved access
to inputs such as labor (i.e. Rosenthal & Strange, 2007). Although there is no prior
research on clusters and normative institutions, cultural-cognitive institutions can
increase clustering through institutional grooming that improves access to necessary
inputs (Chiles et aI., 2004). It is clear there is a lack of research addressing the impact on
clusters by institutional influences that vary across many regions.
Prior regional cluster research on technological externalities finds many benefits
to clustering, including knowledge spillover, innovation, knowledge creation within
networks, and knowledge creation from social resources such as experience. Research at
the intersection of technological externalities and institutions finds that regulatory
institutions can facilitate knowledge spillover (Stuart & Sorenson, 2003b). Normative
institutions can increase clustering by encouraging support for businesses connected
through family networks (Piore & Sabel, 1984). Cultural-cognitive institutions can
increase clustering by supporting knowledge sharing or entrepreneurial behaviors
(Saxenian, 1994). Unfortunately, prior research usually represents clusters comprised of
only one type of organizational form. In two studies which examine clusters of
interrelated films (Chiles et aI., 2004; Saxenian, 1994), the authors undertake an in-depth
examination of already-established clusters. I find a lack ofprior research that examines
how varying levels of institutions influence clustering across multiple regions.
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Gaps
The literature review identifies several areas where this study can fill gaps in our
understanding about institutional influences on cluster emergence. Areas in which there
is need for improvement in research include comparing across multiple regions,
measuring clusters as interrelated firms, and representing more than one type of
institution. This study increases understanding about cluster emergence by comparing
influences on clustering across many regions. Regions with clustering must be compared
to regions without clustering. In contrast with prior research, this study samples across
multiple regions rather than just regions with retrospectively identified clusters. This
study improves understanding about cluster emergence by measuring clusters as
interrelated firms. Prior research has suffered from sampling only one organizational
form (Audia et al., 2006; Freeman et al., 2006). This study improves measurement of
clusters by using clusters of interrelated firms rather than clusters of one organizational
form. A methodological contribution of this study is the measure developed to represent
agglomeration of interrelated firms, the interrelated location quotient (ILQ), which is a
modification of the commonly used location quotient (O'Donoghue & Gleave, 2004).
Additionally, this study improves understanding about institutional influences on
cluster emergence by modeling more than one type of institutional influence. Only a few
studies have examined more than one type of institutional influence on clusters. Those
notable exceptions are Saxenian (1994), Russo (2003), and Chiles and colleagues (2004).
However, in contrast with this study, Saxenian and Chiles and colleagues examined only
established clusters, while Russo measured clusters as a density of only one type of
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organizational fonn. In order to better understand the influence of institutions, this study
investigates both regulatory and cultural-cognitive institutions.
Theoretical Model
In order to include institutional influences on regional cluster emergence, the new
theoretical model incorporates an institutional logics framework into an existing cluster
model. Institutional logics are belief systems that guide the actions of organizations and
individuals (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Prior research on institutional logics has shown
them to exert influence at the level of geographic communities (Thornton & Ocasio,
2008), and as such are suitable to use in understanding the institutional influences on
cluster emergence. Figure 8 shows the conceptual model resulting from the integration of
institutional logics into an existing model of cluster emergence.
Figure 8. Conceptual Model
Pecuniary
Extemality
CongnlOus
Institutional
Logic
Technological
Uncertainty
Clustering
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Prior research has shown that institutional logics exert a direct influence on the
behaviors of organizations and individuals (Haveman & Rao, 1997; Lounsbury, 2007;
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). For example, the prevalence ofa community-banking
institutional logics results in more foundings of community banks (Marquis &
LounsburY,2007). When an institutional logic fits with a business's activities, as in the
example with community-banking, it is understood to be congruous. In another example,
an institutional logic of Progressivism advocates personal savings, and as Progressivism
spread across the U.S., this institutional logic resulted in a noticeable increase in the
founding of more thrift organizations (Haveman & Rao, 1997). My theoretical model
incorporates a positive direct effect of congruous institutional logic on clustering.
In addition to direct influence, prior research has shown that institutional logic
exerts a moderating influence on the behaviors of organizations and actors (Thornton,
2004). For example, while studying publishing in higher education, Thornton found that
an editorial institutional logic had a greater moderating influence on executive succession
than a market institutional logic. Thornton identifies an editorial logic as valuing prestige
for a publishing house contrasted with a market logic valuing profitability. The editorial
logic is a specific logic because it is linked to an industry or profession, while the market
logic is a universal logic that is widely held throughout the general population. Thornton
generalizes this finding to conclude that specific logics moderate business activities more
so than universal logics. My theoretical model incorporates the moderating influence of
institutional logics on the clearly established direct affect of positive pecuniary and
technological externalities on clustering. My second hypothesis predicts that a congruous
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institutional logic enhances the positive direct affect of each type of externality on
clustering.
Finally, since uncertainty amplifies the influence of institutions (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983) on firm activities, my model must incorporate uncertainty. This is relevant
to regional clusters because researchers have found that decision makers seek infOlmation
from geographically proximate institutional sources when faced with uncertainty (Davis
& Greve, 1997; Marquis et aI., 2007). There are many types of uncertainty, but since
clusters form around an industry or technology, technological uncertainty is captured in
the model. Specific to teclmology, whether and how it is used is also greatly influenced
by institutional pressures (Martinez & Dacin, 1999). Prior research has shown that
congruous institutions increase adoption of technology (Sine & Lee, 2009; Sommers &
Napier, 1993). Since uncertainty has a moderating influence on institutional influences
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the third hypothesis predicts that technological uncertainty
enhances the positive direct affect of a congruous institutional logic on clustering. Next,
I summarize how I measured and tested these hypotheses.
Analysis and Findings
In order to measure and test the hypotheses, I needed an empirical setting in
which I could clearly identify and measure a congruous logic with known business
activities. This study uses the passage of the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA) as a catalyst in the renewable energy sector to examine the emergence of wind
and solar energy manufacturing supply chain clusters. Human populations with pro-
environmental institutional logics support, or in other words, are congruous with, the
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business activities of renewable energy manufacturing (Mitchell et al., 1992). This study
measures the prevalence of this congruous institutional logic across u.s. metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs) with clustering of wind and solar energy manufacturers.
Factors used to measure this relationship include availability of skilled labor
representing pecuniary externalities, and university research and development spending
in relevant engineering disciplines representing technological externalities.
Technological uncertainty is represented by the demonstrably different technological
trajectories and commercial viability between the two types of technology-wind energy
and solar energy. For example, solar energy had competing designs and drastically
higher costs for energy produced from 1978 to 1995 (Gipe, 1995; Mcveigh et al., 1999).
Since solar has greater technological uncertainty, the third hypothesis predicts that
clustering for solar energy manufacturing will be influenced more by a congruous
institutional logic than a congruous institutional logic will influence wind energy
manufacturing.
I use a fixed effects estimation to test hypotheses 1 and 2. I use a mean
difference, assuming unequal variances, t-test to compare the difference in the congruous
institutional logic coefficients of the wind and solar models. Analysis supports
hypotheses 1 in the wind models, indicating that congruous institutional logics do have a
positive direct effect on clustering. However, the practical effect of hypothesis I is small.
I do not find support for hypothesis 2a, that a congruous institutional logic
enhances the positive relationship of positive pecuniary externalities on clustering. I find
support for hypothesis 2b in the solar model but not the wind model. In the solar model, I
find that congruous institutional logics enhance the positive direct affect of positive
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technological externalities on clustering. The strong significance for this relationship in
the solar model makes sense if we consider the differences in the technology trajectory
between wind and solar energy. Throughout the time period for the study, 1978 - 1995,
solar energy was not commercially viable and did not have a dominant design. On the
other hand, wind energy settled on a dominant design in the early 1980s and, with the
help of incentives and generous avoided cost rates, was commercially viable (Gipe,
1995). With such high levels of technological uncertainty, I expect institutional
influences to be much more important (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Compared to the
small practical effect from the direct relationship of congruous institutional logics on
clustering, the practical effect of the moderating influence is quite large.
The importance of technological uncertainty in this context is reinforced by
hypothesis 3. The t-test supports this hypothesis at a 1% significance level. As
technological uncertainty increases, this positive direct affect of a congruous institutional
logic is enhanced. The results from the hypotheses testing indicate that congruous
institutional logics influence clustering, and that how they influence clustering depends
on the technological uncettainty associated with the products or applications of a cluster.
In wind energy manufacturing clusters, the direct affect of a congruous institutional logic
is significantly supported, while in solar energy manufacturing clusters, the moderating
affect of a congruous institutional logic is significantly suppOlted. When comparing
across the two models, the direct influence of the congruous institutional logic is
significantly greater for solar energy manufacturing clusters than for wind energy
manufacturing clusters. Another interesting result of the hypotheses testing is the large
practical effect of the moderating influence of a congruous institutional logic compared to
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the smaller practical effect of its direct influence. When the measure for congruous
institutional logic is increased to show an increase of2 firms from the direct effect, an
increase of 51 firms from the moderating effect on positive technological externalities is
also shown. This suggests that as technological uncertainty increases, the influence of
congruous institutional logics becomes increasingly more important.
Given the positive feedback loops in clusters, reverse causality is a genuine
concern between institutional logics and levels of clustering. I test for reverse causality
using a Granger method (1969). There is no indication of reverse causality in the wind
models. Although there is reverse causality in the solar models, the practical effect is
very small. Since I used fixed effects estimation, any time-invariant regressors are not
estimated. Yet there are three dropped variables that might have relevance on cluster
emergence in this empirical setting: wind potential, solar potential, and presence of a
national laboratory. To examine the influence of time-invariant regressors I employ a
Hausman-Taylor estimation. I find that the natural resource endowment of wind and
solar energy potential is not significant on clustering. However, the most surprising
significant coefficient in the analysis is the strong influence of knowledge spillover from
national laboratories on clustering. In the next section, I consider the theoretical,
managerial, and public policy implications of these findings.
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Implications
Positive feedback loops (Arthur, 1994) in regional clusters (Marshall, 1890/1920;
Porter, 1998a) interest researchers, managers, and economic developers alike. Positive
feedback loops provide increasing economic returns, improved innovation, and
competitive advantages that are resistant to globalization trends. Because of this interest,
they have been studied in many different disciplines, including economic geography,
management, and sociology. To explain cluster emergence, researchers have explored
and theorized the benefits from pecuniary (Rosenthal & Strange, 2007) and technological
externalities (Lawson, 1999; Tallman et aI., 2004). This study extends cluster theory by
modeling how varying levels of congruous institutional logics influence regional cluster
emergence.
While having studied the role of regulatory institutions, previous research has
given little attention to the role of cognitive institutions on emergence of regional clusters
(Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005). By analyzing both the regulatory and cognitive
influences of institutions on regional cluster emergence, this study contributes to our
current understanding of their implications for regional cluster emergence. In doing so,
this study also contributes to a more robust understanding of how academics and
practitioners conceive of and engage in regional cluster development. In this section, I
discuss the theoretical, managerial, and public policy implications of this study.
Theoretical Implications
The theoretical implications come primarily from the extension of cluster theory.
This study extends cluster theory by incorporating an institutional logics framework to
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model institutional influences on cluster emergence and growth. However, there is an
additional benefit resulting from new applications of institutional logics. Institutional
logics are extended by moderating them with technological uncertainty and by applying
them to regional clusters. Next, I address implications for regional clusters and
institutional logics. This is followed by a discussion of possible areas for future research.
Implications for regional clusters. Many researchers allude to the importance of
institutional influences on clusters (Maskell, 2001) and yet they remain understudied
(Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005; Martin & Sunley, 2006). This study narrows that
gap by theoretically modeling the influence of institutional context on clusters by using
an institutional logics framework. Institutional logics are well suited to filling this gap in
previous research on regional clusters because they have been shown to act in geographic
regions (Thomton & Ocasio, 2008).
The term, congruous institutional logics, that I develop and use, can be extended
to examine the concept of regional institutional niches. Niches, where particular
institutional logics are prevalent, create fecund environments to support businesses with
acti vities that align with that the values of that institutional logic. These niches benefit
from the direct and moderating effects of an institutional logic.
Using institutional logics to model institutional influences on clustering identifies
three relationships. First, a congruous institutional logic directly influences clustering.
Second, a congruous institutional logic, through a moderating influence, enhances the
direct affects on clustering of positive extemalities. Third, a congruous institutional
logic's direct affect on clustering is enhanced, through a moderating affect, by
technological uncertainty. This theoretically combines predictions of regional clusters
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(Porter, 1990; Tallman et al., 2004) with predictions of institutional theory on the
influence oftechnological uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Martinez & Dacin,
1999).
This study finds support for a direct influence from a congruous institutional logic
and the moderating influence of technological uncertainty on that direct affect.
Additionally, this study finds that congruous institutional logics moderate the beneficial
influence of positive technological externalities when technological uncertainty is high.
Taken together, the findings emphasize the importance of technological uncertainty on
institutional influences on cluster emergence.
Focusing on the context of renewable energy manufacturing and a congruous
logic of pro-environmentalism, I found support for the hypotheses. However, many of
the theoretical predictions and findings are applicable to other industries and their
associated congruous institutional logics. The key is determining the congruous
institutional logics and levels of uncertainty for the industries.
Congruous institutional logics are supportive of a cluster's business activities.
The theoretical model only predicts relationships between congruous institutional logics
and clustering. As such it does not predict the relationship for incongruous institutional
logics and clustering. However, as long as congruous institutional logics can be
identified then relationships with clustering can be predicted in other industries. For
example, a regional cluster such as the diamond district in New York City could
conceivably have a congruous institutional logic of family loyalty (Friedland & Alford,
1991). The model predicts a direct relationship between the presence of the congruous
institutional logic and clustering. However, since this industry is very stable with low
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uncertainty, the congruous institutional logic will have a reduced direct influence and will
not have a moderating influence.
Uncertainty is important to the theoretical model in two ways. First, uncertainty
enhances the influence of institutions (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). In the diamond
district example, the direct influence of a congruous institutional logic is less important
because the diamond industry is very stable. Second, the moderating influence of a
congruous institutional logic increases as uncertainty increases. For example, a regional
cluster in organized crime also has a congruous institutional logic of family loyalty.
However, as an industry, organized crime has greater uncertainty than diamond importing
and sales. As such, the model predicts a stronger direct influence and a moderating
influence as well.
These direct and moderating influences can be seen through the lens of
transaction cost economics. Alignment of ideology has been argued to reduce transaction
costs between organizations (Ingram & Simons, 2000). A similar transaction cost
reduction between organizations, or individuals and organizations is likely when their
beliefs, represented by a congruous institutional logic, align with an organization's
activities.
Trust between transaction partners can be a competitive advantage when it
reduces transaction costs (Barney & Hansen, 1994). In a study of the electrical
equipment manufacturing industry, inter-organizational trust reduced transaction costs
(Zaheer, Mcevily & Perrone, 1998). In a similar study of automakers and their suppliers,
trustworthiness was shown to minimize transaction costs and increase information
sharing between the parties in the transaction (Dyer & Chu, 2003). Hofstede (1980)
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argues this is because similar belief systems enhance the processing of communicated
information. Although this finding comes from international management literature, the
same concept applies to the finer grained nuances of geographic regions (North, 1990).
This study fills a gap in understanding about how regional differences in non-
economic sectors inf1uence economic outcomes (Lee & Sine, 2005) by incorporating
institutional logics into a cluster model. Considering a Porterian cluster model (Porter;
1990), factor conditions and demand conditions are recursive with clustered firms.
Pecuniary and technological externalities have a positive feedback loop occun-ing with
clustering. However, in examining the relationship between institutional logics and
clustering, this study finds a feedback loop only in the solar models and not in the wind
models. The reverse causality that is present in the solar models is very small. This is
likely due to the slow rate of change for cultural-cognitive institutions (North, 1990),
while factor and demand conditions can change rapidly. That slow rate of change of a
regional cluster's cultural-cognitive institutional resources are an advantage because they
are inimitable and non-transfen-able (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). This enduring
quality makes them subtle and important, particularly in the face of globalization
pressures (Guillen, 2001). Thus making a cluster's institutional resources strategically
very important. Russo (2003) supports the creation of competitive advantage when
organizations achieve strategic fit with their natural environment. Similarly, this study
has the potential to show how organizations can achieve strategic fit with their
institutional environment.
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Implications for institutional logics. This study used institutional logics as a
theory to bridge a gap in the explanation of institutional influences by regional cluster
theory. In addition to extending theory on clusters, this study extends institutional logic
theory by applying it to regional clusters and by modeling the influence of technological
uncertainty on logics. Although researchers have shown that institutional logics
influence activities within geographical areas (Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury,
2007; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), prior to this study, institutional logics had yet to be
applied to regional clusters. Integrating institutional logics into regional cluster models
allows prediction of the interactions between institutional logics and externalities.
This interaction, how institutional logics enhance benefits from positive
externalities, has not been previously modeled. Only one study reviewed found a
moderating relationship between institutional logics and organizational activities
(Thornton, 2004). In higher education publishing, Thornton (2004) found the specific
logic of an editorial logic moderated organizational actions, while the universalistic logic
of a market logic directly influenced organizational actions. In this study I find that a
pro-environmental logic is more likely to have a moderating influence when there is
greater technological uncertainty. This study extends institutional logics by identifying
high uncertainty as another condition in which institutional logics has a moderating
relationship on organizational activities.
Institutional logics are a newer research area, first mentioned by Friedland and
Alford in 1991. To my knowledge, no research has theoretically applied the impact of
technological uncertainty on the potency of institutional logics. As an instantiation of
institutions (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), it follows that uncertainty will enhance the
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influence of institutional logics as uncertainty also enhances the influences of institutions
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, this has not been hypothesized or tested. This
study modeled and hypothesized the enhancing influence of increasing technological
uncertainty. The analysis strongly supports a difference in the direct influence between
the congruous institutional logic variable for solar energy manufacturing clustering
versus wind energy manufacturing clustering. The importance of technological
uncertainty enhancing the impact of a congruous institutional logic is reinforced by the
support for the moderating influence of a congruous institutional logic in the high
uncertainty context of solar energy.
Future research. This study found strong support for the idea that technological
uncertainty enhances the influence of institutions on clustering. An area for future
research is an examination of how other types of uncertainty influence clustering. This
study focused on the influence of a congruous institutional logic on clustering. Other
areas for future research include how variations in institutional logics influence
clustering. Extensions of the data provide another area for future research.
This study finds that when technology is uncertain, institutional logics have a
strong moderating influence on clustering. Most of the recent research on clusters has
focused on the technological externality of knowledge spillover (Owen-Smith & Powell,
2004; Saxenian, 1994; Tallman et al., 2004). Future research should consider how
different types of uncertainty influence other institutional influences on clustering. For
example, in times of high unemployment during a market contraction, do congruous
institutional logics then significantly enhance the benefits from positive pecuniary
externalities, such as labor pooling, on clustering? When the type of uncertainty matches
-----------------------
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an input, the uncertainty enhances institutional influences on that business activity. This
is because the additional legitimacy provided by institutions is an important source of
information for decision makers navigating uncertain decisions. It would be useful to
confilm if other types of uncertainty enhance the influence of institutional logics on
organizational actions.
This study focused on a single institutional logic, pro-environmentalism, but
organizations operate in multiple institutional spheres (Kraatz & Block, 2008). How do
overlaying institutional logics influence clustering? Future research could examine how
multiple institutional logics (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) interact
with uncertainty and externalities. Since we know that congruous institutional logics
influence clustering, how does more than one congruous institutional logic influence
clustering? Is this influence summative or multiplicative? What if the plural institutions
are contradictory? How does that influence clustering? Mars and Lounsbury (2009)
argue that a hybrid logic can be created from competing logics that can open new
entrepreneurial opportunities. Future research could test this proposition.
It would be interesting to study if a saturation point exists for an institutional logic
at which it creates an institutional identity for clusters, just as Romanelli and Khessina
(2005) have discussed the existence of a regional industrial identity. They find that it is
only with a certain concentration and intensity that an industry creates an industrial
identity. Just as a regional industrial identity attracts outside organizations and resources,
perhaps a regional institutional identity could do the same. Haveman and Rao (1997)
found co-evolution oforganizations and institutions with the spread of Progressivism,
however I find a one-directional relationship. Future research may find that the
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relationship between organizations and institutional logics co-evolves when institutional
logics reach a saturation point.
Another area indicated for future research examines the potential results of
incongruous institutions. Tan (2006) found premature ossification in a Beijing science
park fostered by the Chinese government. He conjectured that it was due to a
misalignment with the institutional environment. A potential study could identify
fostered regional clusters and then measure the influence of an incongruous institutional
logic.. Or rather than examining when there is a misalignment with the institutional
environment from the start, what happens when an organization's activities suddenly no
longer fit with an institutional logic?
A before-and-after study of a drastic change in the perception of an industry
would present an interesting way to measure the negative influence of institutional
misalignment. For example, asbestos production and related products were once
considered exceedingly safe, particularly for their fire- and heat-resistant properties. At
one time, asbestos production would have been congruous with a protective institutional
logic. Once it was determined that asbestos was damaging to humans, how were those
businesses affected, given different levels of the once-congruous institutional logic? It is
likely negative consequence of misalignment have a greater magnitude than beneficial
consequences of alignment with the institutional environment. The additional transaction
costs to organizations whose activities are censured by individuals would decrease
organizational survival rates. It would be interesting to confirm the stultifying influence
of misalignment is greater than the supportive influence of alignment with a congruous
logic on clustering.
152
Data related extensions provide another avenue for future research. The
timeframe for the study was sixteen years, but adding data post-1995 could provide a
better understanding about the influence of national laboratories. More national
laboratories than those included in this study were established after 1995. For example,
the Idaho National Laboratory in Idaho Falls focuses on biofuels, the Oakridge National
Laboratory in Oakridge, Tennessee focuses on bioenergy, and the Battelle Laboratory in
Columbus, Ohio focuses on fuel cells. Including newer laboratories such as these could
clarify the influence of national laboratories on cluster emergence. Klepper's (2007)
study of Detroit' s automotive cluster found it was the result of spin-offs. However, to
know if renewable energy manufacturing clustering is due to technology demonstration
leading to opportunity recognition by entrepreneurs or from labor spillover from the
national laboratories will require data that are more granular. Adding more recent years
to the dataset allows current interviews to capture the mechanisms in these emerging
clusters.
These areas for future research result from the extension of cluster and
institutional logics theories. Theoretical implications for this study extend theories on
regional clusters by implementing institutional influences directly, and by moderating the
direct effects of externalities. Institutional logics theory is extended by applying it to
regional clusters and by modeling the influence of technological uncertainty on
institutional logics. Next, I discuss how these theoretical implications influence
managerial applications.
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Managerial Implications
By including institutional influences on cluster emergence, this study builds a new
perspective for managers. Findings from previous cluster research indicate that managers
need to consider an industry's essential and unique inputs before deciding which are most
influential to the selection of a location. This study's findings, that congruous
institutional logics have direct and moderating influences on the clustering of finns,
encourages mangers to objectively consider the institutional environment when selecting
locations for competitive advantage. Based on this study, the more uncertainty involved
in the business proposition, industry, or application, the more the importance of the
institutional context is increased.
This study finds a small direct impact of a congruous institutional logic on
clustering. As suggested in previous research, managers must look for access to
pecuniary and technological externalities. This study argues that managers also must
consider institutional resources. Institutional resources that should be considered include
a positive regulatory climate and a positive cultural-cognitive climate. Regulatory
institutions can decrease cost of inputs or increase demand (Rosenthal & Strange, 2007).
Cultural-cognitive institutions can reduce transactions costs (Ingram & Simons, 2000)
and help secure resources through institutional grooming (Chiles et al., 2004). For
example, consider firms that emphasize Christian values and that generate consumer
goods. Locating in MSAs with a prevalence of a Christian institutional logic can create a
competitive advantage for those finns.
This study finds that the direct influence of a congruous institutional logic is
greater as technological uncertainty increases. The direct influence was greater for solar
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energy manufacturing than for wind energy manufacturing clusters because there was
greater technological uncertainty with solar energy technology. For example, the direct
influence of a congruous institutional logic on hydropower is less than on tidal power
because the technology and markets for hydropower are well established, while the
technology for tidal power is still developing. Therefore, a manager making a location
decision for a tidal power manufacturing finn must be more cognizant of institutional
context.
In addition to a direct influence, the findings show that congruous logics have a
moderating influence in the solar models. Given the large practical impact of the
moderating influence of congruous institutional logics, managers and entrepreneurs
operating in technologically emergent areas should consider the competitive advantage of
congruous institutional environments. The large moderating influence when
technological uncertainty is high strongly suggests considering institutional resources
when technology is new, such as with tidal power as compared to hydropower.
Applying this study's findings to the example of tidal power, first managers need
to consider factor conditions. Factor conditions to consider include pecuniary
externalities such as labor pooling and technological externalities such as knowledge
spillover. Access to necessary inputs will greatly influence location selection. Sources
for knowledge spillover include universities as well as federally funded laboratories.
Since generating power from tides is at this time commercially and technologically
uncertain, a manager of a firm in this industry should seek a location with support as well
as necessary factor conditions. Institutional support includes regulatory and cultural-
cognitive institutions. Locally supportive regulatory environments are important, in both
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wind and solar models, and number of state wind and solar incentives were significant for
the amount of clustering. Locally supportive cultural-cognitive institutions are important
as well, and could be measured by a greater prevalence of pro-environmental institutional
logic. The large practical impact of the moderating influence of a congruous institutional
logic on clustering when technological uncertainty is high could greatly benefit firms in
emerging technological areas such as tidal power.
Another managerial implication involves firms relocating to the United States.
These managers need to determine their competitive strengths, firm requirements, and
level of uncertainty in their competitive space. Their first consideration is the benefits
and detriments to locating in clusters. If congestion, competitive pressures, or unintended
knowledge spillover is a great concern, then the firms should not try to locate in a cluster.
Alcacer (2006) found more advanced cell phone manufacturers did not locate near other
manufacturers. Their second consideration is the necessary inputs. Location selection
must grant access to necessary inputs. Using variables from this study, managers should
consider access to component manufacturers, labor pooling, underlying scientific
discoveries, and a supportive regulatory and informal institutional environment. Their
third consideration is the level of uncertainty in the industry. Mangers can then
determine how important it is to find a congruous informal institutional environment.
The greater the uncertainty, the more important it is that mangers select a location with a
congruous institutional environment.
Since public policy makers are interested in attracting firms and supporting their
growth, this study's findings are applicable to public policy as well. Next, I discuss how
this study's findings influence public policy applications.
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Public Policy Implications
Economic developers and others who determine and implement policy initiatives
encourage regional clustering because of the clusters' benefits to local and national
economies. However, top-down clusters are rarely successful (Fromhold-Eisebith &
Eisebith, 2005). This study aims to provide better information for public policy makers
through a more accurate representation of clusters and by modeling both regulatory and
cultural-cognitive influences on clustering.
This study informs attempts to promote regional clusters by operationalizing
clusters as interrelated firms. Since regional clusters are truly comprised of interrelated
firms (Porter, 1998a) and not just one organizational form, this study holds hope of
providing improved information. For example, this study found that being located near
wind energy and solar energy generators was negatively associated with clustering of the
equipment manufacturers. This is counter to predictions that clusters will locate near
their informed customers, an indication of demand conditions in the Porter model (Porter,
1990). This finding suggests that public policy makers should consider the unique
characteristics of industries prior to following prescriptive advice for encouraging
clusters.
Additionally, there has been surprisingly little research on the interaction of
organizations and institutions specific to regional clusters (Martin & Sunley, 2006). This
study addresses that gap by using the theoretical framework of institutional logics to
improve our understanding of regional cluster emergence. As Russo stated:
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Only by specifying the complex system of institutions, organizations, and
actors can organization theorists make confident predictions about the
outcomes of policy initiatives. Only then can organization theory
maximize its relevance to the practice and study of public policy (2001:
83).
In other words, to adequately study the institutional effects on regional clusters,
attention must be given to subtleties in the economic system itself. This study
models and measures factor conditions, demand conditions, and two types of
extemalities, and how they interact with institutional influences. This study seeks
to maximize its relevance to public policy by more accurately modeling clusters
and by improving understanding about institutional influences on clustering.
In addition to institutional environment, when fostering clusters public policy
makers need to consider the previously advised essential components. Access to skilled
workforce and workforce development are necessary, as is knowledge spillover from
sources for innovation. This study found that knowledge spillover from national
laboratories was more important than spillover from university engineering research.
Since fostering cluster growth requires new firm foundings, it is important to
understand that entrepreneurs see opportunities for new businesses based on their
personal experiences and knowledge (Shane, 2000), therefore it is critical for regions to
create avenues for potential entrepreneurs to leam about an industry or relevant
technology. Perhaps national laboratories do a better job at spreading knowledge widely
throughout the populace than university research does. Other mechanisms for cluster
growth are labor market spillover and spin-offs.
This study's dataset ended at 1995. If it extended post-1995, we might find more
national laboratories strongly influence clustering also. Altematively, we may find the
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reverse relationship, national laboratories were established in locations with existing
clustering. Also, post-1995 we may see more firm emergence and clustering resulting
from university based knowledge spillover, particularly for solar energy, which is still
exploring new technologies. Public policy makers need to consider all resources at their
disposal, and if they are trying to create a more fertile environment, they should actively
seek a government research facility.
From an institutional resource viewpoint, public policy makers should consider
the regulatory and the cultural-cognitive environment when fostering clusters. This study
reinforces the importance of the institutional conditions. Considering regulatory
institutions, Tan (2006) felt that the premature ossification in a Beijing science park was
due to a misalignment between the scientific, entrepreneurial technology transfer and the
communist government that ran it. Previous research (Stuart & Sorenson, 2003b) has
shown that California's failure to enforce non-compete clauses resulted in more new firm
foundings. Flexibility for local governments in developing regulations can enhance
cluster development (Zeitlin, 1995). The importance of creating an environment where
employees can leave and start new businesses was reinforced by Klepper's study (2007)
of Detroit, in which he found that the importance to the emergence of the auto cluster was
due primarily to spin-offs from automakers by employees with innovations. Just as Sine
and colleagues (Sine et aI., 2005) found that regulations such as state wind incentives
were important in fostering the creation of new wind energy generating facilities, this
study finds that the number of wind and solar incentives foster wind energy and solar
energy equipment manufacturers. Regarding regulatory institutions, public policy
makers can create work force development, encourage knowledge spillover from research
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organizations, create an environment supportive of new finn foundings, and create
regulatory incentives for specific industries.
Unfortunately, cultural-cognitive institutions are more difficult to shape because
they change through human interpretation (Richerson & Boyd, 2005) and must overcome
inertia (North, 1990). This study found that there was not a recursive influence from
wind energy manufacturing clusters on the prevalence of a pro-environmental
institutional logic. Even though a recursive relationship was found with solar energy
manufacturing clusters on pro-environmental institutional logic, it was incredibly small.
Rather than try to legislate, regulate, or through other means shape the cultural-cognitive
environment, these findings suggest that public policy makers inventory their cultural-
cognitive environment. Once they know prevalent institutional logics and how they
might be waxing or waning, they should then detennine if the cluster they are trying to
foster is congruous.
Cultural-cognitive institutions are important to sustained regional economic
advantage. While globalization, the rapid growth of international trade and investment,
makes factor markets and codified knowledge highly transferable, research has shown
that regional clusters maintain their inimitability (Guillen, 2001). The enduring
locational advantages to finns in regional clusters are rooted in resources and capabilities
that are difficult or expensive to transfer (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). Although
many resources and capabilities are transferable, geographical, institutional, and inter-
organizational contexts are not.
Successful cluster development occurs when business activities fit the
institutional context. For example, Eugene, Oregon, has prevalent institutional
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logics such as pro-environmentalism, civic engagement, and counter-culturalism.
Some of Eugene's factor and demand conditions are access to agricultural bounty,
high unemployment, good transportation lanes, and access to large markets along
the 1-5 corridor. Even with this cursory institutional logic inventory, economic
development officials should avoid trying to create a cluster of food production
and processing such as present with corporate agriculture and meat processing in
the Midwest (Artz, Orazem & Otto, 2007). The inherent industry
conglomeration, environmental pollution, and concerns about the ethical
treatment of animals would not align with Eugene's prevalent institutional logics.
On the other hand, what can and has flourished in Eugene, Oregon, is a cluster of
food suppliers, processors, and distributors that target the natural and organic
consumer market (Tilleman, 2008). Public policy makers and economic
developers are more likely to succeed in fitting their efforts to the cultural-
cognitive institutional environment rather than trying to shape it. The findings of
this study suggest that fitting the institutional environment is particularly
important when there is great uncertainty involved in the technology or
applications of the emerging cluster.
Not only are regional clusters interesting to public policy in the abstract, but also
they are currently relevant within this study's concrete context of renewable energy.
Renewable energy industries are a major benefactor of the current U.S. Administration's
economic development efforts. Renewable energy and energy efficiency efforts received
more than $80 billion in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that passed on
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February 13, 2009 (Recovery Board, 2009). President Obama focused that investment by
saymg:
So we have a choice to make. We can remain one of the world's leading
importers of foreign oil, or we can make the investments that would allow
us to become the world's leading exporter ofrenewab1e energy. We can
let climate change continue to go unchecked, or we can help stop it. We
can let the jobs of tomorrow be created abroad, or we can create those jobs
right here in America and lay the foundation for lasting prosperity
(Obama, March 19,2009).
Public policy makers must consider the institutional conditions when
fostering regional clusters focused on renewable energy technology. One of the
reasons Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith (2005) conjecture that top-down fostered
clusters fail more often is because they do not fit the institutional environment.
Public policy makers need to consider the prevalence of pro-environmental
institutional logics when fostering regional clusters around renewable energy
technologies, particularly when the renewable energy technology is highly
uncertain.
By developing a model to understand institutional influences on cluster
emergence, I seek to make relevant information available for policy initiatives. I
find congruous institutional logics to be a small but significant influence on
regional cluster emergence. When technology is emergent, congruous
institutional logics have a large and significant influence on regional cluster
emergence.
In building a cluster model incorporating institutional influences, which includes
regulatory and cultural-cognitive institutions and interrelated organizations, this study
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builds a more robust perspective for researchers and public policy makers to
conceptualize this difficult task of fostering regional cluster emergence (Fromhold-
Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005) in three ways. First, this study operationalizes regional
clusters as interrelated firms, more accurately representing the types of regional clusters
public policy makers ostensibly seek to foster. Second, it provides insight into the
congruous institutional logics that must be considered to successfully foster regional
clusters. Lastly, for public policy makers seeking to encourage renewable energy sources
and industrial development within this industry, this study provides a strong empirical
view into the regional institutional niches most likely to support such development.
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APPENDIX A
SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
Research in clusters comes from a diverse body of literature including economic
geography, industrial economics, economic sociology, and organization theory.
Empirical research rarely identifies which school of thought the theoretical underpinnings
of the study rest on. As Newlands (2003, p.: 530) states in his discussion of competition
and cooperation in cluster research "it has proved extraordinarily difficult in practice to
distinguish the different theoretical approaches to clusters at an empirical level. " The
empirical unwieldiness of the different schools of thought necessitates a separate section
in which to organize the theoretical research in clusters. To meld externalities and
treatment of institutional environment with existing schools of thought, each school's
assumptions about extel11alities and institutions is reviewed. Reviewing the different
schools of thought by their approach to pecuniary and technological extel11alities assists
in evaluating their contributions to the literature.
Agglomeration theory originated from Alfred Marshall (1920), focuses on the
advantages to clustered firms in 'industrial districts' based on the higher levels of
competition. In this sense, agglomeration theory confonns to neo-classical economics
(Newlands, 2003). To this point, Marshall wal11ed against cooperation because it would
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moderate competitive forces in the cluster. Marshall's externalities can be classified as
pecuniary and technological (Fujita & Thisse, 1996) with a greater emphasis on
pecuniary externalities. Marshall identified several mechanisms enhancing firm
performance including access to firms in the value chain, and ease of formal and informal
communication. The enhanced access to firms in the value chain and reduced transaction
costs with ease of communication result in pecuniary externalities. With respect to
technological externalities, Marshall stated, "the mysteries of the trade become no
mystery, but are, as it were, in the air." In this sense, the hinted-at benefit is likely
technological in nature, but overall Marshall emphasized pecuniary externalities.
Michael Porter (1990; 1998a) extended Marshall's agglomeration theory to
specifically include more technological externalities. Porter emphasizes the increased
innovation firms must develop in response to the heightened competition in regional
clusters. This type of innovation improves organizational-level knowledge and
capabilities; in other words, innovation improves the production function of the firm.
Additionally, the common background of clustered firms provides knowledge that is a
competitive advantage to the finns. Originally, POtier focused on the genesis of
advantages arising from the increased competition, not cooperation. These competitively
derived advantages include increasing productivity, increasing capacity for innovation,
and stimulating new business ventures. In his 1998 article, Porter extended his definition
to include institutions that compete as well as cooperate (: 197). In summary, innovation
is addressed by agglomeration theory by the need to innovate given the increased
competition and aided by tacit knowledge resident in a common labor pool (Piore &
Sabel, 1984).
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Porter increases the applicability of agglomeration theory by adding supporting
institutions to the model. However, it still does not address institutions as informal
constraints, such as from interactions with regional residents or other firms in the cluster.
Agglomeration theory proposes that firm advantages result from increased competition
and common labor markets. While agglomeration theory focuses on explaining the
performance advantages to firms in existing clusters, it does not address how clusters
emerge or die.
The California school earned its name because the initiating researchers, Storper
and Scott, were both doing research in California during the development of this
literature. It tries to explain the reason for regional clusters by helping to understand the
structures and understandings that enable increased communication and trust, which
result in reduced transaction costs (Scott & Storper, 1986; Storper, 1995). Increasing
communication and trust, and decreasing geographical distance reduces the cost of
certain transactions particularly those requiring tacit knowledge. The California school
relies on the advantages inherent in shared background knowledge while adding in the
concept of reduced transaction costs between organizations. In this sense, the California
school emphasizes pecuniary externalities because it leads to reductions in costs of inputs
or increases in demand for outputs.
Untraded interdependencies developed from the California school's original
focus on reduced transaction costs resulting from propinquity. Untraded
interdependencies require close contact within the network of firms and individuals
because they are the languages, understandings, rules, and technological spillovers that
ease the sharing of knowledge (Storper, 1995). Untraded interdependencies, as a school
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of thought, explains technological externalities. This deviates from Williamsonian
transaction cost economics because it incorporates the need for institutional arrangements
to facilitate the development of trust and common understandings. Whereas Williamson
(1991, p.: 269) purposefully excludes institutional arrangements such as customs and
politics.
Storper (1995) explains the persistence of clusters because of the enduring nature
of untraded interdependencies. Although a regional cluster originally formed to
minimize transaction costs between firms for production factors, after transaction cost
advantages for production factors shift, a cluster endures because of its untraded
interdependencies. Untraded interdependencies aid cluster persistence despite loss of
economic advantages. It appears this concept of untraded interdependencies is closely
related to a region's informal institutions such as culture or ideology. True to
technological externalities, innovation results from sharing of information through
informal channels. However, the treatment of institutions is incomplete because the
school of thought focuses on inter-organizational dependencies, not accounting for how
other informal institutions affect organizational development.
Innovative milieu researchers argue that informal social interaction and a
regionally mobile labor force create a process of collective learning for clustered firms
(Camagni, 1991). Clearly, innovative milieu researchers are referring to technological
externalities created in regional clusters. However, innovative milieu has been criticized
for being underdeveloped and circular in its logic (Storper, 1995). Bringing in the
concept of collective identity is a possible solution to the circular logic of innovative
milieu. Brown and Duguid (2001) show how people in a community of practice, which
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is enhanced with collocation, develop shared identities through which communication of
tacit and explicit knowledge is freely shared. Although still developing, these ideas
contribute toward a broader theory of knowledge as applied to regional clusters.
Knowledge theory argues regional clusters exist because development of
knowledge is the key competitive concern of many firms. Knowledge theory proposes
that a geographically bound region in combinations with social embeddedness creates
shared understandings that facilitate transfer of knowledge and enhances innovation.
Clearly, knowledge theory researchers are focusing on technological externalities created
in regional clusters.
In a thought provoking article, Maskell (2001) argues for two levels of
information sharing and knowledge creation based on an organization's position in its
value chain. Maskell suggests innovation occurs when collocated competing firms
generate knowledge that is subsequently synthesized by firms vertically located on the
value chain.
Tallman, Jenkins, Henry, and Pinch (2004) bring the ideas of many researchers,
including Maskell, together in a cohesive knowledge theory for clusters. Tallman and
colleagues propose two types of knowledge in clusters, architectural and stock.
Architectural knowledge resides in the understandings of the social and industrial context
as has been shown by other researchers (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Kogut, 2000), while
stock knowledge is mobile Architectural knowledge facilitates the transfer of stock
knowledge. How easily the stock knowledge transfers depend on its nature, tacit or
explicit, and the absorptive capacity of the finns receiving the knowledge.
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Tallman and colleagues argue that firms benefit from knowledge present in a
regional cluster when they are members in the geographical identity and share common
interests. In other words, to develop architectural knowledge, organizations must fit the
identity of the cluster. Clearly institutions are important, although they are hinted at
rather than specifically addressed. While knowledge theory does not specifically address
cluster emergence, Maskell (2001) addresses the growth of clusters through the
mechanisms of 1) expanding existing finns, 2) relocating firms, and 3) spin-offs from
local firms. The enduring and complex nature of architectural knowledge may be the
result of the complex and path dependent nature of cluster development.
Evolutionary economics (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Nelson & Winter, 1982)
applies evolutionary concepts to economic change. Although it primarily focuses on the
internal workings of organizations, with a fundamental unit of the routine analogous to
the biological gene, the theory includes the concept of organizational adaptation to the
external environment. With its emphasis on learning and passing along of routines,
evolutionary economics focuses on technological externalities created in regional
clusters. Dosi, Nelson, and Winter emphasized that individuals are essential to
organizational actions because they constitute organizational behaviors (Dosi, Nelson &
Winter, 2000). As such, individuals' interpretations of institutions affect organizational
actions, thus allowing for the interaction of organizations and institutions in the theory.
It is important to clarify evolutionary economics does not equate external
environment with institutions in its terminology. Rather, evolutionary economics refers
to institutions within organizations, such that their term 'institutions' is very similar to
rules or routines. Organizations with less successful processes wither while those with
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more successful processes flourish. The concept of institutions more commonly used by
researchers (North, 1990; Scott, 2001) are part of evolutionary economics conception of
the external environment. A great contribution from Nelson and Winter's theory is the
emphasis on change across time. This allows organizations to adapt to their external
environment, an external environment that includes institutions. Evolutionary economics
accounts for the emergence of regional clusters by new firm:> spinning-off older firms
(Martin & Sunley, 2006). Successful firms have better routines to pass along to their
offspring, and often the offspring firms emerge to use improved routines that could not be
utilized in a parent firm (Klepper, 2007).
Clearly, no theoretical school completely deals with both technological and
pecuniary externalities while at the same time dealing with formal and infornlal
institutions. To accurately represent the interaction of institutions with technological and
pecuniary externalities a theoretical framework must represent institutions as both fonnal
rules and informal constraints.
APPENDIX B
SYSTEM COMPONENTS
Wind Generator System Components, listed in table 15.
Source: Sterzinger, G., & Svrcek, M. (2004). Wind Turbine Development: Location of
Manufacturing Activity: Renewable Energy Policy Project. Pg. 10
Solar Generator System Components, listed in table 16.
Source: Sterzinger, G., & Svrcek, M. (2005). Solar PV Development: Location of
Economic Activity: Renewable Energy Policy Project. Pg. 14
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Table 15. Wind System Components
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Component Sub component NAICS Code NACIS Code description
6-digit description to-digit
Rotor Blade 326199 All other AI41 Other fabricated fiberglass and
Plastics reinforced products
Products
Blade Extender 331511 Iron Foundries 1116 Ductile iron fittings 14 in. or more
Hub 331511 Iron Foundries 3221 Other ductile iron casting for all other
uses
Pitch Drive 335312 Motors and 30 Integral horsepower motors and
Generators generators other than for land
transDol1ation equip. (746 watts or more)
Nacelle and Anemometer 334519 Measuring and 7025 Other meteorological instruments and
Controls Controlling parts
Devices
Fliction-type Clutches and Brakes
--
Brakes 333613 Power 3111
Transmission
Equip.
Controller 334418 Printed circuits AOl5 Industtial process control board
and electronics assemblies
assemblies
Cooling Fan 333412 Industrial and 04 Axial fans
Commercial
fans and
blowers
-.
AI41 Other fabIicated fiberglass andNacelle Case 326199 All other
Plastics reinforced products
Products
Nacelle Frame 331511 Iron Foundlies 3221 Other ductile iron casting for all other
uses
Sensors 334519 Measuring and 7 Commercial, Meteorological,
Controlling Geophysical, and General Purpose
Devices InstlUments
Yaw Olive 335312 Motors and 30 Integral horsepower motors and
Generators generators other than for land
transP0l1ation equip. (746 watts or more)
Gearbox and Be31ings 332991 Ball and Roller 3032 Tapered roller bearings (including cups
Olive Train Bearings and cones), unmounted
1023 Complete ball be31ings, unmounted,
annular, including self-aligning, ground
or precision, angular contact, precision
Coupling 333613 Power 3329 Non·gear-type flexible couplings
Transmission
Equip.
Gearbox 333612 Speed Change, 7438 Enclosed concentric and parallel
Industlial (Planet3lY) center distance 6 in. or more
High and low speed 333613 Power 3792 Mechanical power transmission
shatis Transmission equipment, NEC, except pal1s
Equip.
Generator Generator 333611 Turbines, and 0871 Turbine generators
and Power Turbine
Electronics Generators, and
Turbine
Generator Sets
Power Electronics 335999 Electronic 3219 Other rectit»ing(power conversion)
Equipment and apparatus, except for electronic circuilly
Components,
NEC
Tower Tower 332312 Fabricated 5106 Fablicated stlUctural iron and steel for
StlUctural Metal transmission towers, radio antcnna, and
supp011ing stlUctures
Tower Flange 331511 Iron Foundlies 116 Ductile iron fittings 14 in. or more
Table 16. Solar System Components
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Component Sub compo~r~A.I(=S6- Code description NACIS 10- Code description
digit digit
Module Complete Module 334413 Semiconductors and -AOIO Photovoltaic modules
Related Devices
Solar Cell 334413 Semiconductors and -A005 Solar Cells
Related Devices
Top Surface 32721 J Flat Glass -1041 Flat glass,
nonautomotive, other
than pyrolytically
coated, clear, less than
5.0 mOl thick
Encapsulant 325211 Plastic Material and Resin -1160 Other thennoplastic
Manufacturing resins and plastics
materials
Rear Layer 326113 Unlaminated Plastics Film -0453 Other unlaminated
and Sheet ManufactUling plastics film and sheet
Electlical 335931 CUlTent-Canying Wiling -7100 CUlTent-canying metal
Connections Device ManufactUling contacts, including
precious metal
Frame 332322 Sheet Metal Work -G331 Other aluminum sheet
Manufacturing metal work
Balance of Batteties 335911 Storage Batteries -4207 All other lead acid
System stordge batteries, larger
than BCI dimensional
size group 8D (1.5 cu ft
or .042 cu m and
smaller), including
statting. lighting, and
ignition
Blocking Diode 334413 Semiconductors and -7015 Semiconductor rectifiers
Related Devices - power diodes and
assemblies
Charge Controller 335999 Electronic Equipment and -3104 Semiconductor battery
Components, NEC chargers, industlial and
railroad
Circuit BTeaker 335313 Switchgear and -1100 Power circuit breakers,
Switchboard Apparatus all voltages
Manubcluring
Inverter 335999 Electronic Equipment and -3219 Other rectifying (power
Components. NEC conversion) apparatus
(except for electronic
circuitIy)
Meter 334515 Instrument ManufactUling -1105 Integrating instruments.
for Measuring and Testing electrical, demand
Electlicity and Electtical meters, kW and kYA,
Signals combined watt-hour and
demand meters (single
phase and polyphase),
and combined watt-hour
and time switch meters
Switch Gear 335313 Switchgear and -AIOO Switchgear. except ducts
Switchboard AppaTatus and relays
ManufactUling
Wiling 331422 Copper Wire (Except -4213 Insulated copper wire
Mechanical) Drawing and cable for elechica I
transmission. made in
plants that dTaw wire
APPENDIX C
THOMAS REGISTER PRODUCT CATEGORIES
Wind Cluster Product Categories
• Windmills
• Wind Powered Generators
• Airfoils
• Nacelles
• Anenometers
• Indictors: Wind
• Windmill Towers
Solar and Photovoltaic Cluster Product Categories
• Cells: Solar Energy
• Cells: Photovoltaic
• Photovoltaic Systems & Equipment
• Solar Electricity
• Solar Energy Controls
• Solar Energy Generators
• Solar Energy Measurements
• Solar Tracking Equipment
• Solar Energy Electric Generation Equipment
• Solar Energy Power Supplies
• Solar Power Distribution Systems
• Solar Power System Cathodic Protection
• PV Generator
• PV Booster
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